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From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 14:08:32 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240912190857.235849-10-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240912190857.235849-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>

Restructure gds mitigation to use select/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.

Define new AUTO mitigation for gds.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0fb97b94f5b9..7fee5c3de135 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	mmio_apply_mitigation();
 	rfds_apply_mitigation();
 	srbds_apply_mitigation();
+	gds_apply_mitigation();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -801,6 +803,7 @@ early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);
 
 enum gds_mitigations {
 	GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
 	GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
 	GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
@@ -809,7 +812,7 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
 };
 
 static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS) ? GDS_MITIGATION_FULL : GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS) ? GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 
 static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
 	[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
@@ -850,6 +853,7 @@ void update_gds_msr(void)
 	case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
 	case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
 	case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO:
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -873,13 +877,16 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
 		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
-		goto out;
+		return;
 	}
 
 	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
 		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
 	/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
 
+	if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
 	/* No microcode */
 	if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
 		if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
@@ -892,7 +899,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
 		} else {
 			gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
 		}
-		goto out;
+		return;
 	}
 
 	/* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
@@ -914,8 +921,14 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
 		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
 	}
 
+}
+
+static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+		return;
+
 	update_gds_msr();
-out:
 	pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
 }
 
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-09-12 19:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08  8:40   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08  8:32   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:28     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21   ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01  0:43   ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:53     ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21       ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01  0:50   ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:58     ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37       ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28         ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26             ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50         ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37   ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57     ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16       ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15         ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01  0:39           ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01  1:46             ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18               ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18  6:29   ` Kaplan, David

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