From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 09/34] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2024 14:08:32 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240912190857.235849-10-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240912190857.235849-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Restructure gds mitigation to use select/apply functions to create
consistent vulnerability handling.
Define new AUTO mitigation for gds.
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0fb97b94f5b9..7fee5c3de135 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static void __init srbds_apply_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void);
/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -220,6 +221,7 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
mmio_apply_mitigation();
rfds_apply_mitigation();
srbds_apply_mitigation();
+ gds_apply_mitigation();
}
/*
@@ -801,6 +803,7 @@ early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);
enum gds_mitigations {
GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO,
GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
@@ -809,7 +812,7 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
};
static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS) ? GDS_MITIGATION_FULL : GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS) ? GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
@@ -850,6 +853,7 @@ void update_gds_msr(void)
case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO:
return;
}
@@ -873,13 +877,16 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
- goto out;
+ return;
}
if (cpu_mitigations_off())
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_AUTO)
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
/* No microcode */
if (!(x86_arch_cap_msr & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
@@ -892,7 +899,7 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
} else {
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
}
- goto out;
+ return;
}
/* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
@@ -914,8 +921,14 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
}
+}
+
+static void __init gds_apply_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ return;
+
update_gds_msr();
-out:
pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
}
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-12 19:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-12 19:08 [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/34] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-10-24 13:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/34] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/34] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/34] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/34] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/34] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:40 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/34] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 8:32 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/34] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 12:41 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-08 14:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 14/34] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 15/34] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-10-08 15:21 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 16/34] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 17/34] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 18/34] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:43 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:53 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:21 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 19/34] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 20/34] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 21/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-10-01 0:50 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:58 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:37 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 14:28 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 20:11 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-02 20:26 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-02 15:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-10-02 19:40 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 22/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 23/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 24/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 25/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 26/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 27/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:37 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 19:57 ` Kaplan, David
2024-09-12 20:16 ` Dave Hansen
2024-09-12 21:15 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 0:39 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-10-01 1:46 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-01 22:18 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-09-13 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 28/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 29/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 30/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 31/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 32/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 33/34] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-09-12 19:08 ` [RFC PATCH 34/34] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
2024-09-17 17:04 ` [RFC PATCH 00/34] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls Pawan Gupta
2024-09-18 6:29 ` Kaplan, David
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