From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org
Cc: hpa@zytor.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] x86/bugs: Remove MDS command line
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2024 15:31:36 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240924223140.1054918-3-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240924223140.1054918-1-daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Remove MDS command line option since it can be set using the common
clar_cpu_buffers parameter.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 32 -------------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 21 ------------
2 files changed, 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 66b567c4dce5..2753a1e51da5 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3231,38 +3231,6 @@
Format: <first>,<last>
Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
- mds= [X86,INTEL,EARLY]
- Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
- Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
-
- Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
- internal buffers which can forward information to a
- disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
-
- In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
- forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
- attack, to access data to which the attacker does
- not have direct access.
-
- This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
- options are:
-
- full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
- full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
- SMT on vulnerable CPUs
- off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
-
- On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
- an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
- mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
- this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
- too.
-
- Not specifying this option is equivalent to
- mds=full.
-
- For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
-
mem=nn[KMG] [HEXAGON,EARLY] Set the memory size.
Must be specified, otherwise memory size will be 0.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b3c9e1eede12..ed5524bc3ee4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -261,27 +261,6 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
}
}
-static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
-{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
- return 0;
-
- if (!str)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
- else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
- else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
- mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
- mds_nosmt = true;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
-
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-24 22:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-09-24 22:31 [PATCH 0/6] VERW based clean-up Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/bugs: Create single parameter for VERW based mitigations Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-08 19:24 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-09 16:17 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-09 16:36 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-09 16:39 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-09 19:44 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-09 20:02 ` Kaplan, David
2024-10-09 20:34 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-10 4:52 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-10 14:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-14 15:42 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-15 13:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-10-15 14:05 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` Daniel Sneddon [this message]
2024-09-24 22:34 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86/bugs: Remove MDS command line Dave Hansen
2024-09-24 22:41 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/bugs: Remove TAA kernel parameter Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/bugs: Remove MMIO " Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 5/6] x86/bugs: Remove RFDS " Daniel Sneddon
2024-09-24 22:31 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/bugs: Clean-up verw mitigations Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-02 14:20 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-02 14:46 ` Daniel Sneddon
2024-10-02 14:54 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-10-07 19:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-08 16:17 ` Daniel Sneddon
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