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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	alyssa.milburn@intel.com, scott.d.constable@intel.com,
	joao@overdrivepizza.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	jose.marchesi@oracle.com, hjl.tools@gmail.com,
	ndesaulniers@google.com, samitolvanen@google.com,
	nathan@kernel.org, ojeda@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org,
	alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/14] x86/cfi: Wreck things...
Date: Sat, 28 Sep 2024 15:31:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240928133114.GE19439@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240927231527.em2a4cjbnpos6c4u@treble>

On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 04:15:27PM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 27, 2024 at 09:48:57PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .export_symbol+0x3c9f0: data relocation to !ENDBR: entry_untrain_ret+0x0
> > 
> > Which states that while these functions are exported and (directly)
> > callable, they cannot be called indirectly. There are two solutions:
> 
> IIRC, exported symbols are by far the most common "need" for ENDBR.  But
> presumably the vast majority of them aren't being indirect called.
> 
> >  - exclude the .export_symbol section from validation; effectively
> >    saying that having linkable but not indirectly callable exports are
> >    fine by default, or
> 
> This is confusingly inconsistent IMO.

Yes. OTOH less indirectly callable functions is more better, no?

> >  - make all of those use SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START to restore the
> >    traditional (and expected, but less secure?) behaviour.
> 
> Why not just make SYM_FUNC_START imply "typed"?  That's consistent with
> what the compiler does anyway right?

It is indeed what the compiler does (unless __nocfi attribute is
employed), but it requires that there is a C declaration of the function
-- which is true for all exported functions but not necessary for all
SYM_FUNC_START() symbols per-se.

Also, it would make all ASM functions indirectly callable by default --
which I'm not sure is a good idea, I would much rather we keep this
explicit.

> Even better, require exported+indirect-called symbols to use
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_TYPED, otherwise they get sealed.  I suppose we'd need to
> add some module-to-vmlinux ENDBR validation to make sure modules don't
> get broken by this.

So I like this idea. but yeah, this is going to be a bit tricky to
validate.

Anyway, I think I'll do an initial patch moving all the EXPORT'ed
symbols over to SYM_TYPED_FUNC_START() for now, and we can look at
adding extra EXPORT magic on top of all that later on.

  reply	other threads:[~2024-09-28 13:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-27 19:48 [PATCH 00/14] x86/ibt: FineIBT-BHI Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:48 ` [PATCH 01/14] x86/cfi: Wreck things Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 23:15   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:31     ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2024-09-30 21:42       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-27 19:48 ` [PATCH 02/14] x86/boot: Mark start_secondary() with __noendbr Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:48 ` [PATCH 03/14] x86/alternative: Simplify callthunk patching Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 23:27   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 04/14] objtool/x86: Add .tail_call_sites Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 23:42   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-10-09 15:25     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-10  4:55       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 05/14] objtool: Rename the skylake hack to --direct-call Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 06/14] x86/traps: Prepare for ENDBR poison UD1 usage Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 07/14] x86/ibt: Clean up is_endbr() Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28  0:04   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:08     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-29 17:32   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30  8:30     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30  9:33       ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 16:43         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30 20:58         ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 08/14] x86/ibt: Clean up poison_endbr() Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 09/14] x86/ibt: Implement IBT+ Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28  1:07   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-29 17:38   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30  8:23     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 17:00       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-05 10:40   ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 10/14] x86/early_printk: Harden early_serial Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 11/14] llvm: kCFI pointer stuff Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-29 17:53   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-09-30  8:27     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 16:59       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-10-01 10:21         ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-02 16:48           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-10-30  6:29   ` Constable, Scott D
2024-10-30 20:07     ` Constable, Scott D
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 12/14] x86: Hacks for hacked up llvm Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 13/14] x86: BHI stubs Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28  1:37   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:23     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-30 21:30   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-30 21:46     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-30 22:23     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-09-30 22:38       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-30 22:52         ` Andrew Cooper
2024-10-01 11:03         ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-01 11:20           ` Andrew Cooper
2024-10-03 12:17             ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-03 13:59               ` Andrew Cooper
2024-10-14 17:50                 ` Constable, Scott D
2024-10-14 21:54                   ` Andrew Cooper
2024-10-21 15:06                     ` Constable, Scott D
2024-10-29  5:59                       ` Joao Moreira
2024-09-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 14/14] x86/fineibt: Add FineIBT+BHI mitigation Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-28  1:50   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-09-28 13:16     ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-10-28  5:45       ` Constable, Scott D

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