From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 02:56:31 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202411070218.ge5HHTv1-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241105215455.359471-14-david.kaplan@amd.com>
Hi David,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on tip/master]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.12-rc6 next-20241106]
[cannot apply to tip/smp/core tip/x86/core tip/auto-latest]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/David-Kaplan/x86-bugs-Add-X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER/20241106-060512
base: tip/master
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241105215455.359471-14-david.kaplan%40amd.com
patch subject: [PATCH v2 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation
config: x86_64-randconfig-121-20241106 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241107/202411070218.ge5HHTv1-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241107/202411070218.ge5HHTv1-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202411070218.ge5HHTv1-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1337:32: sparse: sparse: symbol 'spectre_v2_cmd' was not declared. Should it be static?
vim +/spectre_v2_cmd +1337 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
1336
> 1337 enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
1338
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-06 18:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-05 21:54 [PATCH v2 00/35] x86/bugs: Attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/35] x86/bugs: Add X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 03/35] x86/bugs: Add AUTO mitigations for mds/taa/mmio/rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-14 2:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 14:59 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 17:14 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:17 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 04/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 3:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:01 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-10 15:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 05/35] x86/bugs: Restructure taa mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 4:43 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:08 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 06/35] x86/bugs: Restructure mmio mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:03 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 07/35] x86/bugs: Restructure rfds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 5:55 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 08/35] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srbds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 10/35] x86/bugs: Restructure gds mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 6:21 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 11/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-14 6:57 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 15:36 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 15:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 16:45 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-14 23:33 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-12 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-14 17:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-11-14 17:48 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 13/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-06 18:56 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 14/35] x86/bugs: Restructure bhi mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 15/35] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 16/35] x86/bugs: Restructure ssb mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 17/35] x86/bugs: Restructure l1tf mitigation David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 18/35] x86/bugs: Restructure srso mitigation David Kaplan
2025-01-02 14:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 19/35] Documentation/x86: Document the new attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-06 10:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-06 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 3:58 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:05 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 15:31 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 16:00 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 16:19 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-14 9:32 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 16:15 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-22 16:36 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-22 17:23 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-20 0:14 ` Manwaring, Derek
2024-11-13 14:49 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-13 14:15 ` Brendan Jackman
2024-11-13 15:42 ` Kaplan, David
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 20/35] x86/bugs: Define attack vectors David Kaplan
2025-01-03 15:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 15:29 ` Kaplan, David
2025-01-03 15:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 21/35] x86/bugs: Determine relevant vulnerabilities based on attack vector controls David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 22/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 23/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for taa David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 24/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for mmio David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 25/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for rfds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 26/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srbds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 27/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for gds David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 28/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 29/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 30/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 31/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for bhi David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 32/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 33/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for l1tf David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 34/35] x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for srso David Kaplan
2024-11-05 21:54 ` [PATCH v2 35/35] x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for pti David Kaplan
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