From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Cc: "Krzysztof Wilczyński" <kw@linux.com>,
linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, "Ariel Almog" <ariela@nvidia.com>,
"Aditya Prabhune" <aprabhune@nvidia.com>,
"Hannes Reinecke" <hare@suse.de>,
"Heiner Kallweit" <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
"Arun Easi" <aeasi@marvell.com>,
"Jonathan Chocron" <jonnyc@amazon.com>,
"Bert Kenward" <bkenward@solarflare.com>,
"Matt Carlson" <mcarlson@broadcom.com>,
"Kai-Heng Feng" <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>,
"Jean Delvare" <jdelvare@suse.de>,
"Alex Williamson" <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"netdev@vger.kernel.org Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] PCI/sysfs: Change read permissions for VPD attributes
Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 08:36:08 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241112063608.GF71181@unreal> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241111214804.GA1820183@bhelgaas>
On Mon, Nov 11, 2024 at 03:48:04PM -0600, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> [+cc Thomas]
>
> On Mon, Nov 11, 2024 at 11:17:38PM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 11, 2024 at 02:41:04PM -0600, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> > > On Thu, Nov 07, 2024 at 08:56:56PM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > > > From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
> > > >
> > > > The Vital Product Data (VPD) attribute is not readable by regular
> > > > user without root permissions. Such restriction is not really needed
> > > > for many devices in the world, as data presented in that VPD is not
> > > > sensitive and access to the HW is safe and tested.
> > > >
> > > > This change aligns the permissions of the VPD attribute to be accessible
> > > > for read by all users, while write being restricted to root only.
> > > >
> > > > For the driver, there is a need to opt-in in order to allow this
> > > > functionality.
> > >
> > > I don't think the use case is very strong (and not included at all
> > > here).
> >
> > I will add the use case, which is running monitoring application without
> > need to be root. IMHO reducing number of applications that require
> > privileged access is a very strong case. I personally try to avoid
> > applications with root/setuid privileges.
>
> Avoiding root/setuid is a very good thing. I just don't think using
> VPD directly from userspace is a great idea because VPD is so slow and
> sometimes unreliable to read.
This is one time operation during application initialization, which is
fast in our devices. It is used by the NVML https://developer.nvidia.com/management-library-nvml.
> And apparently this is a pretty unusual situation since I haven't heard
> similar requests for other devices.
Maybe they didn't bother to ask.
>
> Sort of ironic that some vendors, especially Intel and AMD, add new
> Device IDs for devices that work exactly the same as their
> predecessors, so we are continually adding to the pci_device_id
> tables, while here we apparently the same Device ID is used for
> devices that differ in ways we actually want to know about.
I'm not Intel or AMD employee and never worked there, but from what I
heard it is not technical decision but outcome of how their development
process is structured.
>
> > > If we do need to do this, I think it's a property of the device, not
> > > the driver.
> >
> > But how will device inform PCI core about safe VPD read?
> > Should I add new field to struct pci_device_id? Add a quirk?
> > Otherwise, I will need to add a line "pci_dev->downgrade_vpd_read=true"
> > to mlx5 probe function and it won't change a lot from current
> > implementation.
>
> To me it looks like a pci_dev bit, not a pci_driver bit.
>
> I would set it .probe() so all the code is in one place. And it's not
> related to a device defect, as most quirks are.
The advantage of quirks is that we will be able to set proper file
permissions from the beginning without need to load/bind driver.
As Thomas suggested, the vpd_attr_is_visible() will be something
like this, which is neat:
if (pdev->downgrade_vpd_read)
return 644;
else
return 600;
Thanks
>
> Bjorn
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-12 6:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-07 18:56 [PATCH v1 0/2] Fix read permissions for VPD attributes Leon Romanovsky
2024-11-07 18:56 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] PCI/sysfs: Change " Leon Romanovsky
2024-11-11 20:41 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-11-11 21:17 ` Leon Romanovsky
2024-11-11 21:48 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-11-12 6:36 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2024-11-12 0:34 ` Stephen Hemminger
2024-11-12 6:12 ` Leon Romanovsky
2024-11-12 6:44 ` Heiner Kallweit
2024-11-12 7:26 ` Leon Romanovsky
2024-11-12 21:48 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-11-11 21:08 ` Thomas Weißschuh
2024-11-07 18:56 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] net/mlx5: Enable unprivileged read of PCI VPD file Leon Romanovsky
2024-11-07 19:09 ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-11-11 20:31 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] Fix read permissions for VPD attributes Leon Romanovsky
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