From: jeffxu@chromium.org
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org,
jannh@google.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org, oleg@redhat.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, jorgelo@chromium.org, sroettger@google.com,
ojeda@kernel.org, adobriyan@gmail.com, anna-maria@linutronix.de,
mark.rutland@arm.com, linus.walleij@linaro.org, Jason@zx2c4.com,
deller@gmx.de, rdunlap@infradead.org, davem@davemloft.net,
hch@lst.de, peterx@redhat.com, hca@linux.ibm.com,
f.fainelli@gmail.com, gerg@kernel.org,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mingo@kernel.org, ardb@kernel.org,
Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com, mhocko@suse.com, 42.hyeyoo@gmail.com,
peterz@infradead.org, ardb@google.com, enh@google.com,
rientjes@google.com, groeck@chromium.org,
lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/1] seal system mappings
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 19:16:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241113191602.3541870-1-jeffxu@google.com> (raw)
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Seal vdso, vvar, sigpage, uprobes and vsyscall.
Those mappings are readonly or executable only, sealing can protect
them from ever changing or unmapped during the life time of the process.
For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see mseal.rst [1].
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, and sigpage (for arm) are
generated by the kernel during program initialization, and are
sealed after creation.
Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not
established during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same
as the process's lifetime [1]. It is sealed from creation.
The vdso, vvar, sigpage, and uprobe mappings all invoke the
_install_special_mapping() function. As no other mappings utilize this
function, it is logical to incorporate sealing logic within
_install_special_mapping(). This approach avoids the necessity of
modifying code across various architecture-specific implementations.
The vsyscall mapping, which has its own initialization function, is
sealed in the XONLY case, it seems to be the most common and secure
case of using vsyscall.
It is important to note that the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE feature (CRIU) may
alter the mapping of vdso, vvar, and sigpage during restore
operations. Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled
across all systems. To address this, a kernel configuration option has
been introduced to enable or disable this functionality.
[1] Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/
History:
V3:
Revert uprobe to v1 logic (Oleg Nesterov)
use CONFIG_SEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS instead of _ALWAYS/_NEVER (Kees Cook)
Move kernel cmd line from fs/exec.c to mm/mseal.c and misc. refactor (Liam R. Howlett)
V2:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241014215022.68530-1-jeffxu@google.com/
Seal uprobe always (Oleg Nesterov)
Update comments and description (Randy Dunlap, Liam R.Howlett, Oleg Nesterov)
Rebase to linux_main
V1:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241004163155.3493183-1-jeffxu@google.com/
Jeff Xu (1):
exec: seal system mappings
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 +++++
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 9 ++++-
include/linux/mm.h | 12 ++++++
mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++
mm/mseal.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
security/Kconfig | 11 ++++++
6 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.47.0.277.g8800431eea-goog
next reply other threads:[~2024-11-13 19:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-13 19:16 jeffxu [this message]
2024-11-13 19:16 ` [PATCH v3 1/1] exec: seal system mappings jeffxu
2024-11-13 20:47 ` Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-11-19 23:49 ` Jeff Xu
2024-11-14 0:54 ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-11-19 20:57 ` Jeff Xu
2024-11-13 20:36 ` [PATCH v3 0/1] " Lorenzo Stoakes
2024-11-19 23:48 ` Jeff Xu
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