[PATCH v3 02/35] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines

David Kaplan
2025-01-08T20:25:43Z

Move the mds, taa, mmio, and rfds mitigation enums earlier in the file
to prepare for restructuring of these mitigations as they are all
inter-related.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5a505aa65489..bbe4c772e557 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -243,6 +243,37 @@ static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
};

+enum taa_mitigations {
+ TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+enum rfds_mitigations {
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
+ RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
+static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -286,16 +317,6 @@ early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt

-enum taa_mitigations {
- TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
- TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
- TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
- TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
-static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;

static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -386,15 +407,6 @@ early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt

-enum mmio_mitigations {
- MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
- MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
- MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;

static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
@@ -483,16 +495,6 @@ early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Register File Data Sampling: " fmt

-enum rfds_mitigations {
- RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
- RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
- RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
-static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
-
static const char * const rfds_strings[] = {
[RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
[RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear Register File",
--
2.34.1