Re: [PATCH v3 12/35] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation

Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-11T00:10:46Z

On Wed, Jan 08, 2025 at 02:24:52PM -0600, David Kaplan wrote:
> @@ -1254,27 +1269,6 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
> (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
> cpu_smt_disable(false);
>
> - /*
> - * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
> - * retbleed= cmdline option except for call depth based stuffing
> - */
> - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
> - switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
> - case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
> - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
> - break;
> - case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
> - case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
> - case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
> - retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
> - break;
> - default:
> - if (retbleed_mitigation != RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF)
> - pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
> - }
> - }
> -
> - pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
> }

Extra whitespace at end of function.

--
Josh