From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Eric Chan <ericchancf@google.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>,
Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@gmail.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
"Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Subject: [PATCHv3 2/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 15:14:59 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250113131459.2008123-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250113131459.2008123-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:
memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
arch_memremap_wb()
ioremap_cache()
__ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.
Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
risky:
- It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
guest.
- Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
VMM implementation).
Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.
The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified.
Fix the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11+
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
index ed580c7f9d0a..1a0dc2b2bf5b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/io.h
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ extern void __iomem *ioremap_prot(resource_size_t offset, unsigned long size, un
extern void __iomem *ioremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size);
#define ioremap_encrypted ioremap_encrypted
+void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags);
+#define arch_memremap_wb arch_memremap_wb
+
/**
* ioremap - map bus memory into CPU space
* @offset: bus address of the memory
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 8d29163568a7..3c36f3f5e688 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -503,6 +503,14 @@ void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(iounmap);
+void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
+ return (void __force *)ioremap_cache(phys_addr, size);
+
+ return (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(phys_addr, size);
+}
+
/*
* Convert a physical pointer to a virtual kernel pointer for /dev/mem
* access
--
2.45.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-13 13:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-01-13 13:14 [PATCHv3 0/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-13 13:14 ` [PATCHv3 1/2] memremap: Pass down MEMREMAP_* flags to arch_memremap_wb() Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-13 18:42 ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-13 13:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2025-01-13 18:41 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as encrypted by default tip-bot2 for Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-13 20:47 ` [PATCHv3 2/2] " Tom Lendacky
2025-01-13 20:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-14 7:27 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-14 14:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-14 14:44 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-14 15:06 ` Tom Lendacky
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-01-14 16:54 Tom Lendacky
2025-01-15 10:23 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-01-15 10:34 ` Borislav Petkov
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