Re: [PATCHv3 net 1/3] bonding: move IPsec deletion to bond_ipsec_free_sa

Nikolay Aleksandrov
2025-02-28T11:10:08Z

On 2/28/25 13:07, Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
> On 2/28/25 12:31, Cosmin Ratiu wrote:
>> On Fri, 2025-02-28 at 02:20 +0000, Hangbin Liu wrote:
>>> On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 03:31:01PM +0200, Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
>>>>>> One more thing - note I'm not an xfrm expert by far but it
>>>>>> seems to me here you have
>>>>>> to also call  xdo_dev_state_free() with the old active slave
>>>>>> dev otherwise that will
>>>>>> never get called with the original real_dev after the switch to
>>>>>> a new
>>>>>> active slave (or more accurately it might if the GC runs
>>>>>> between the switching
>>>>>> but it is a race), care must be taken wrt sequence of events
>>>>>> because the XFRM
>>>>>
>>>>> Can we just call xs->xso.real_dev->xfrmdev_ops-
>>>>>> xdo_dev_state_free(xs)
>>>>> no matter xs->xso.real_dev == real_dev or not? I'm afraid calling
>>>>> xdo_dev_state_free() every where may make us lot more easily.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You'd have to check all drivers that implement the callback to
>>>> answer that and even then
>>>> I'd stick to the canonical way of how it's done in xfrm and make
>>>> the bond just passthrough.
>>>> Any other games become dangerous and new code will have to be
>>>> carefully reviewed every
>>>> time, calling another device's free_sa when it wasn't added before
>>>> doesn't sound good.
>>>>
>>>>>> GC may be running in parallel which probably means that in
>>>>>> bond_ipsec_free_sa()
>>>>>> you'll have to take the mutex before calling
>>>>>> xdo_dev_state_free() and check
>>>>>> if the entry is still linked in the bond's ipsec list before
>>>>>> calling the free_sa
>>>>>> callback, if it isn't then del_sa_all got to it before the GC
>>>>>> and there's nothing
>>>>>> to do if it also called the dev's free_sa callback. The check
>>>>>> for real_dev doesn't
>>>>>> seem enough to protect against this race.
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree that we need to take the mutex before calling
>>>>> xdo_dev_state_free()
>>>>> in bond_ipsec_free_sa(). Do you think if this is enough? I'm a
>>>>> bit lot here.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks
>>>>> Hangbin
>>>>
>>>> Well, the race is between the xfrm GC and del_sa_all, in bond's
>>>> free_sa if you
>>>> walk the list under the mutex before calling real_dev's free
>>>> callback and
>>>> don't find the current element that's being freed in free_sa then
>>>> it was
>>>> cleaned up by del_sa_all, otherwise del_sa_all is waiting to walk
>>>> that
>>>> list and clean the entries. I think it should be fine as long as
>>>> free_sa
>>>> was called once with the proper device.
>>>
>>> OK, so the free will be called either in del_sa_all() or free_sa().
>>> Something like this?
>>>
>> [...]
>>
>> Unfortunately, after applying these changes and reasoning about them
>> for a bit, I don't think this will work. There are still races left.
>> For example:
>> 1. An xs is marked DEAD (in __xfrm_state_delete, with x->lock held) and
>> before .xdo_dev_state_delete() is called on it, bond_ipsec_del_sa_all
>> is called in parallel, doesn't call delete on xs (because it's dead),
>> then calls free (incorrect without delete first), then removes the list
>> entry. Later, xdo_dev_state_delete( == bond_ipsec_del_sa) is called,
>> and calls delete (incorrect, out of order with free). Finally,
>> bond_ipsec_free_sa is called, which fortunately doesn't do anything
>> silly in the new proposed form because xs is no longer in the list.
>>
>> 2. A more sinister form of the above race can happen when
>> bond_ipsec_del_sa_all() calls delete on real_dev, then in parallel and
>> immediately after __xfrm_state_delete marks xs as DEAD and calls
>> bond_ipsec_del_sa() which happily calls delete on real_dev again.
>>
>> In order to fix these races (and others like it), I think
>> bond_ipsec_del_sa_all and bond_ipsec_add_sa_all *need* to acquire x-
>>> lock for each xs being processed. This would prevent xfrm from
>> concurrently initiating add/delete operations on the managed states.
>>
>> Cosmin.
>
> Duh, right you are. The state is protected by x->lock and cannot be trusted
> outside of it. If you take x->lock inside the list walk with the mutex held
> you can deadlock.
>
> Cheers,
> Nik
>

Correction - actually took a closer look at the xfrm code and it should be fine.
The x->lock is taken only in the delete path and if the mutex is not acquired by
bond's del_sa callback it should be ok. Though this must be very well documented.