From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2F83126B080 for ; Thu, 6 Mar 2025 18:05:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.9.28.11 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1741284308; cv=none; b=QO0y9rf+e5pxao9P+lrW88J8RfInPx+GEquZT1iUDLhVnN4uLHJmq0pKCK6ehCt2p2yAyPxTXQQKRL9w0sgJDTBtn/wnuHb5+27PwA/fMItM7UmHGjKn5ivf1riGeA41MY3kF7X6jnscptbHjtRiPX/m1PSdJ0N/NVgbkdip9ww= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1741284308; c=relaxed/simple; bh=HnOiXdIEGgi0ajA46Ao4q0OHXUgw4cbdKL3Zt6BVsoQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=t6g53x+SgYATTTHYm+g8AFJhoX6rCE60xWyaIcmMHgEAWz0YB/UZI+F9l2PwrplY0GEBshwPIhL/2sQ+g/JWPUqiHX7XxX9kSRsXDuUuOdUASQbB9VApBo0X2v0QSnCFTKK6ID0Fv7ZLIKnlTuFcW13EL6Ku61gQBMQQCAoz/4E= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu; arc=none smtp.client-ip=18.9.28.11 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=mit.edu Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=mit.edu Received: from trampoline.thunk.org (pool-173-48-112-92.bstnma.fios.verizon.net [173.48.112.92]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as tytso@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 526I4Rql015568 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 6 Mar 2025 13:04:27 -0500 Received: by trampoline.thunk.org (Postfix, from userid 15806) id 419262E010B; Thu, 06 Mar 2025 13:04:27 -0500 (EST) Date: Thu, 6 Mar 2025 13:04:27 -0500 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: Aditya Garg Cc: Ethan Carter Edwards , Sven Peter , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-staging@lists.linux.dev" , "asahi@lists.linux.dev" , "ernesto@corellium.com" Subject: Re: [RFC] apfs: thoughts on upstreaming an out-of-tree module Message-ID: <20250306180427.GB279274@mit.edu> References: <795A00D4-503C-4DCB-A84F-FACFB28FA159@live.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <795A00D4-503C-4DCB-A84F-FACFB28FA159@live.com> On Wed, Mar 05, 2025 at 07:23:55AM +0000, Aditya Garg wrote: > > This driver tbh will not ‘really’ be helpful as far as T2 Macs are > concerned. > > On these Macs, the T2 Security Chip encrypts all the APFS partitions > on the internal SSD, and the key is in the T2 Chip. Even proprietary > APFS drivers cannot read these partitions. I dunno how it works in > Apple Silicon Macs. How this workings on Apple Silicon Macs is described in this article: https://eclecticlight.co/2022/04/23/explainer-filevault/ It appears such a driver will also be useful if there are external SSD's using APFS. (Although I suspect many external SSD's would end up using some other file system that might be more portable like VFS.) In terms of making it work with the internal SSD, it sounds like Linux would need to talk to the secure enclave on the T2 Security Chip and convince it to upload the encryption key into the hardware in-line encryption engine. I don't know if presenting the user's password is sufficient, or if there is a requirement that the OS prove that it is "approved" software that was loaded via a certified boot chain, which various secure enclaves (such as TPM) are wont to do. - Ted