[PATCH] x86: predict __access_ok() returning true

[Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>]

This works around what seems to be an optimization bug in gcc (at least
13.3.0), where it predicts access_ok() to fail despite the hint to the
contrary.

_copy_to_user contains:
	if (access_ok(to, n)) {
		instrument_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
		n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
	}

Where access_ok is likely(__access_ok(addr, size)), yet the compiler
emits conditional jumps forward for the case where it succeeds:

<+0>:     endbr64
<+4>:     mov    %rdx,%rcx
<+7>:     mov    %rdx,%rax
<+10>:    xor    %edx,%edx
<+12>:    add    %rdi,%rcx
<+15>:    setb   %dl
<+18>:    movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%r8
<+28>:    test   %rdx,%rdx
<+31>:    jne    0xffffffff81b3b7c6 <_copy_to_user+38>
<+33>:    cmp    %rcx,%r8
<+36>:    jae    0xffffffff81b3b7cb <_copy_to_user+43>
<+38>:    jmp    0xffffffff822673e0 <__x86_return_thunk>
<+43>:    nop
<+44>:    nop
<+45>:    nop
<+46>:    mov    %rax,%rcx
<+49>:    rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
<+51>:    nop
<+52>:    nop
<+53>:    nop
<+54>:    mov    %rcx,%rax
<+57>:    nop
<+58>:    nop
<+59>:    nop
<+60>:    jmp    0xffffffff822673e0 <__x86_return_thunk>

Patching _copy_to_user() to likely() around the access_ok() use does
not change the asm.

However, spelling out the prediction *within* __access_ok() does the
trick:
<+0>:     endbr64
<+4>:     xor    %eax,%eax
<+6>:     mov    %rdx,%rcx
<+9>:     add    %rdi,%rdx
<+12>:    setb   %al
<+15>:    movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%r8
<+25>:    test   %rax,%rax
<+28>:    jne    0xffffffff81b315e6 <_copy_to_user+54>
<+30>:    cmp    %rdx,%r8
<+33>:    jb     0xffffffff81b315e6 <_copy_to_user+54>
<+35>:    nop
<+36>:    nop
<+37>:    nop
<+38>:    rep movsb %ds:(%rsi),%es:(%rdi)
<+40>:    nop
<+41>:    nop
<+42>:    nop
<+43>:    nop
<+44>:    nop
<+45>:    nop
<+46>:    mov    %rcx,%rax
<+49>:    jmp    0xffffffff82255ba0 <__x86_return_thunk>
<+54>:    mov    %rcx,%rax
<+57>:    jmp    0xffffffff82255ba0 <__x86_return_thunk>

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
---

I did not investigate what's going on here. It may be other spots are
also suffering.

If someone commits to figuring out what went wrong I'll be happy to drop
this patch. Otherwise this can be worked around at least for access_ok()
consumers.

 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
index c52f0133425b..30c912375260 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ static inline void __user *mask_user_address(const void __user *ptr)
 static inline bool __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
 {
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(size <= PAGE_SIZE) && size <= PAGE_SIZE) {
-		return valid_user_address(ptr);
+		return likely(valid_user_address(ptr));
 	} else {
 		unsigned long sum = size + (__force unsigned long)ptr;
 
-		return valid_user_address(sum) && sum >= (__force unsigned long)ptr;
+		return likely(valid_user_address(sum) && sum >= (__force unsigned long)ptr);
 	}
 }
 #define __access_ok __access_ok
-- 
2.43.0