[PATCH 08/12] sysctl: Move tainted ctl_table into kernel/panic.c

Joel Granados
2025-05-09T12:55:06Z

Move the ctl_table with the "tainted" proc_name into kernel/panic.c.
With it moves the proc_tainted helper function.

This is part of a greater effort to move ctl tables into their
respective subsystems which will reduce the merge conflicts in
kernel/sysctl.c.

Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
---
kernel/panic.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/sysctl.c | 49 -------------------------------------------------
2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 047ea3215312c439950c6ec4674a91572146234d..213c6c9d6a750ff3d17f3cf530b37c619cd816f4 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -84,6 +84,50 @@ ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+/*
+ * Taint values can only be increased
+ * This means we can safely use a temporary.
+ */
+static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct ctl_table t;
+ unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
+ int err;
+
+ if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ t = *table;
+ t.data = &tmptaint;
+ err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ if (write) {
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
+ * false positives due to userspace input, bail out
+ * before setting the requested taint flags.
+ */
+ if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
+ * to everyone's atomic.h for this
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
+ if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
+ add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
{
@@ -96,6 +140,12 @@ static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
#endif
+ {
+ .procname = "tainted",
+ .maxlen = sizeof(long),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_taint,
+ },
{
.procname = "panic",
.data = &panic_timeout,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index ebcc7d75acd9fecbf3c10f31480c3cb6960cb53e..9d8db9cef11122993d850ab5c753e3da1cbfb5cc 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -731,49 +731,6 @@ int proc_douintvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
do_proc_douintvec_conv, NULL);
}

-/*
- * Taint values can only be increased
- * This means we can safely use a temporary.
- */
-static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- struct ctl_table t;
- unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
- int err;
-
- if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
-
- t = *table;
- t.data = &tmptaint;
- err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
-
- if (write) {
- int i;
-
- /*
- * If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
- * false positives due to userspace input, bail out
- * before setting the requested taint flags.
- */
- if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /*
- * Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
- * to everyone's atomic.h for this
- */
- for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
- if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
- add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
- }
-
- return err;
-}
-
/**
* struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
* @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
@@ -1557,12 +1514,6 @@ int proc_do_static_key(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,

static const struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
- {
- .procname = "tainted",
- .maxlen = sizeof(long),
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_taint,
- },
{
.procname = "sysctl_writes_strict",
.data = &sysctl_writes_strict,

--
2.47.2