From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 15/24] x86/sev: Move __sev_[get|put]_ghcb() into separate noinstr object
Date: Wed, 9 Jul 2025 10:08:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250709080840.2233208-41-ardb+git@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250709080840.2233208-26-ardb+git@google.com>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Rename sev-nmi.c to noinstr.c, and move the get/put GHCB routines
into it too, which are also annotated as 'noinstr' and suffer from the
same problem as the NMI code, i.e., that GCC may ignore the
__no_sanitize_address__ function attribute implied by 'noinstr' and
insert KASAN instrumentation anyway.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c | 74 --------------------
arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile | 6 +-
arch/x86/coco/sev/{sev-nmi.c => noinstr.c} | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
index 0eb31bf81899..0fd80e63b639 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
@@ -41,83 +41,9 @@
#include <asm/cpuid/api.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
-/*
- * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
- * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
- *
- * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
- */
-noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
- /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
-
- if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
- /*
- * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
- * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
- * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
- * can be printed out.
- */
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-
- instrumentation_begin();
- panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
- instrumentation_end();
- }
-
- /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
- data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
-
- state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
-
- /* Backup GHCB content */
- *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
- } else {
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- data->ghcb_active = true;
- }
-
- return ghcb;
-}
-
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-shared.c"
-noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (state->ghcb) {
- /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
- *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- } else {
- /*
- * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
- * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
- */
- vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- }
-}
-
void __head
early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
unsigned long npages, enum psc_op op,
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
index db3255b979bd..53e964a22759 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-obj-y += core.o sev-nmi.o vc-handle.o
+obj-y += core.o noinstr.o vc-handle.o
# Clang 14 and older may fail to respect __no_sanitize_undefined when inlining
-UBSAN_SANITIZE_sev-nmi.o := n
+UBSAN_SANITIZE_noinstr.o := n
# GCC may fail to respect __no_sanitize_address when inlining
-KASAN_SANITIZE_sev-nmi.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_noinstr.o := n
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
similarity index 61%
rename from arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c
rename to arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
index d8dfaddfb367..b527eafb6312 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/noinstr.c
@@ -106,3 +106,77 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
}
+
+/*
+ * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
+ * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
+ *
+ * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
+ */
+noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
+ /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
+
+ if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
+ /*
+ * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
+ * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
+ * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
+ * can be printed out.
+ */
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
+ instrumentation_end();
+ }
+
+ /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
+
+ state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
+
+ /* Backup GHCB content */
+ *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
+ } else {
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ data->ghcb_active = true;
+ }
+
+ return ghcb;
+}
+
+noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (state->ghcb) {
+ /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
+ *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
+ * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
+ */
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ }
+}
--
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-09 8:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-09 8:08 [PATCH v4 00/24] x86: strict separation of startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 01/24] x86/sev: Separate MSR and GHCB based snp_cpuid() via a callback Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-09 23:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-11 20:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-12 14:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-12 15:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 02/24] x86/sev: Use MSR protocol for remapping SVSM calling area Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 03/24] x86/sev: Use MSR protocol only for early SVSM PVALIDATE call Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 15:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 04/24] x86/sev: Run RMPADJUST on SVSM calling area page to test VMPL Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 16:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 05/24] x86/sev: Move GHCB page based HV communication out of startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 06/24] x86/sev: Avoid global variable to store virtual address of SVSM area Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 17:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 07/24] x86/sev: Move MSR save/restore out of early page state change helper Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 18:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 08/24] x86/sev: Share implementation of MSR-based page state change Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 18:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-07-15 5:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 09/24] x86/sev: Pass SVSM calling area down to early page state change API Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 10/24] x86/sev: Use boot SVSM CA for all startup and init code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 11/24] x86/boot: Drop redundant RMPADJUST in SEV SVSM presence check Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 12/24] x86/sev: Unify SEV-SNP hypervisor feature check Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-10 4:21 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-07-10 4:24 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <85o6tsv8m2.fsf@amd.com>
2025-07-10 7:36 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-10 8:02 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 13/24] x86/boot: Provide PIC aliases for 5-level paging related constants Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 14/24] x86/sev: Provide PIC aliases for SEV related data objects Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 16/24] x86/sev: Export startup routines for later use Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 17/24] objtool: Add action to check for absence of absolute relocations Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:08 ` [PATCH v4 18/24] x86/boot: Check startup code " Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:09 ` [PATCH v4 19/24] x86/boot: Revert "Reject absolute references in .head.text" Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:09 ` [PATCH v4 20/24] x86/kbuild: Incorporate boot/startup/ via Kbuild makefile Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:09 ` [PATCH v4 21/24] x86/boot: Create a confined code area for startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:09 ` [PATCH v4 22/24] efistub/x86: Remap inittext read-execute when needed Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:09 ` [PATCH v4 23/24] x86/boot: Move startup code out of __head section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 8:09 ` [PATCH v4 24/24] x86/boot: Get rid of the .head.text section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 10:23 ` [PATCH v4 00/24] x86: strict separation of startup code Kirill A. Shutemov
2025-07-09 10:32 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-07-09 14:01 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250709080840.2233208-41-ardb+git@google.com \
--to=ardb+git@google.com \
--cc=ardb@kernel.org \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=dionnaglaze@google.com \
--cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
--cc=kevinloughlin@google.com \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).