From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Reject non-positive effective lengths during LAUNCH_UPDATE
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 16:37:34 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250826233734.4011090-1-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
Check for an invalid length during LAUNCH_UPDATE at the start of
snp_launch_update() instead of subtly relying on kvm_gmem_populate() to
detect the bad state. Code that directly handles userspace input
absolutely should sanitize those inputs; failure to do so is asking for
bugs where KVM consumes an invalid "npages".
Keep the check in gmem, but wrap it in a WARN to flag any bad usage by
the caller.
Note, this is technically an ABI change as KVM would previously allow a
length of '0'. But allowing a length of '0' is nonsensical and creates
pointless conundrums in KVM. E.g. an empty range is arguably neither
private nor shared, but LAUNCH_UPDATE will fail if the starting gpa can't
be made private. In practice, no known or well-behaved VMM passes a
length of '0'.
Cc: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
Compile tested only. Came across this when trying to figure out how to
handle the batching of gmem post-populate calls.
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 ++
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index f4381878a9e5..746a57bf1f71 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2360,6 +2360,8 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return -EINVAL;
npages = params.len / PAGE_SIZE;
+ if (npages <= 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
/*
* For each GFN that's being prepared as part of the initial guest
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 7d85cc33c0bb..79552467add5 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -639,7 +639,8 @@ long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long
long i;
lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
- if (npages < 0)
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages <= 0))
return -EINVAL;
slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, start_gfn);
base-commit: ecbcc2461839e848970468b44db32282e5059925
--
2.51.0.268.g9569e192d0-goog
next reply other threads:[~2025-08-26 23:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-26 23:37 Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-09-08 21:35 ` [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Reject non-positive effective lengths during LAUNCH_UPDATE Tom Lendacky
2025-09-08 23:54 ` Sean Christopherson
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