RE: [RFC PATCH 07/56] x86/bugs: Reset spectre_v2_user mitigations

Kaplan, David
2025-10-16T14:06:29Z

[AMD Official Use Only - AMD Internal Distribution Only]

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
> Sent: Thursday, October 16, 2025 7:54 AM
> To: Kaplan, David <David.Kaplan@amd.com>; Thomas Gleixner
> <tglx@linutronix.de>; Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>; Peter Zijlstra
> <peterz@infradead.org>; Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>; Pawan Gupta
> <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>; Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>; Dave
> Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>; x86@kernel.org; H . Peter Anvin
> <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>; Boris Ostrovsky
> <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 07/56] x86/bugs: Reset spectre_v2_user mitigations
>
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>
> On Mon Oct 13, 2025 at 2:33 PM UTC, David Kaplan wrote:
> > Add function to reset spectre_v2_user mitigations back to their boot-time
> > defaults.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > index 1f56ccb5f641..4ca46f58e384 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> > @@ -2056,6 +2056,18 @@ static void __init
> spectre_v2_user_apply_mitigation(void)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_MITIGATIONS
> > +static void spectre_v2_user_reset_mitigation(void)
> > +{
> > + static_branch_disable(&switch_vcpu_ibpb);
> > + static_branch_disable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
> > + static_branch_disable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
> > + spectre_v2_user_stibp = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
> > + spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
> > + spectre_v2_user_cmd = SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +
> > static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
> > [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
> > [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
> > @@ -3844,5 +3856,6 @@ void arch_cpu_reset_mitigations(void)
> > spectre_v1_reset_mitigation();
> > spectre_v2_reset_mitigation();
> > retbleed_reset_mitigation();
> > + spectre_v2_user_reset_mitigation();
> > }
> > #endif
>
> I think this might be failing to account for task state? E.g. if a
> user boots with spectre_v2=off then we ignore the PR_SPEC_DISABLE calls
> that would enable IBPB-on-context-switch for that task. Then if they
> enable it via this dynamic interface they probably expect their
> PR_SPEC_DISABLE to take effect retroactively. I don't think it will with
> the current code, do I have that right?

If I'm reading the logic correct, if a process tries to do PR_SPEC_DISABLE say for indirects but spectre_v2_user=off then they'll get -EPERM, so we don't ignore it.

But there could be a case where spectre_v2=on (aka force), when PR_SPEC_DISABLE does get ignored. And then if spectre_v2 is changed to something else like prctl then the relevant task flags weren't set.

Not sure the best way to handle this...even if we were to always set the task flags in this case, there could be other cases where the process might think it could set this flag and then get surprised with an -EPERM. Open to ideas here.

--David Kaplan