Re: [PATCH v11 4/9] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel code

H. Peter Anvin
2025-11-10T19:14:09Z

On November 10, 2025 10:15:23 AM PST, Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com> wrote:
>Hi Boris,
>
>On 10/29/2025 2:03 PM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
>> +/*
>> + * LASS enforcement is based on bit 63 of the virtual address. The
>> + * kernel is not allowed to touch memory in the lower half of the
>> + * virtual address space.
>> + *
>> + * Use lass_disable()/lass_enable() to toggle the AC bit for kernel data
>> + * accesses (!_PAGE_USER) that are blocked by LASS, but not by SMAP.
>> + *
>> + * Even with the AC bit set, LASS will continue to block instruction
>> + * fetches from the user half of the address space. To allow those,
>> + * clear CR4.LASS to disable the LASS mechanism entirely.
>> + *
>
>Based on the EFI discussion, it looks like we would now need to toggle
>CR4.LASS every time we switch to efi_mm. The lass_enable()/_disable()
>naming would be more suitable for those wrappers.
>
>I am thinking of reverting this back to lass_clac()/lass_stac().
>
>lass_clac()/_stac():
> Disable enforcement for kernel data accesses similar to SMAP.
>
>lass_enable()/_disable():
> Disable the entire LASS mechanism (Data and instruction fetch)
> by toggling CR4.LASS
>
>Would that work? Any other suggestions?
>
>
>> +
>> +static __always_inline void lass_enable(void)
>> +{
>> + alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static __always_inline void lass_disable(void)
>> +{
>> + alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_LASS);
>> +}
>> +

That would be my suggestion for making, too.