From: Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
To: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Cc: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org>,
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>,
Hans de Goede <hansg@kernel.org>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] media: uvcvideo: Introduce allow_privacy_override
Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 17:01:04 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251118170104.01dba6bf.michal.pecio@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <x2xheosw24fecqjjv4fmj2t3i53k2ypyvmkkkvmv6xtdwsherd@e5klkm3ou4g7>
On Tue, 18 Nov 2025 15:09:16 +0100, Mauro Carvalho Chehab wrote:
> On other words, if someone has secure boot enabled, he can be more
> confident that a distro-vendor signed Kernel will honour the privacy
> LED, and not even the root can tamper with - as BIOS access to
> disable secure boot would be needed to change it - plus, booting a
> non-signed kernel.
IMHO users are better off trusting duct tape than any chain of trust,
and those with tinfoil hats already do.
Rational people with any clue will simply assume their computer broke
and put duct tape over the LED, carefully not to cover the lens ;)
Regards,
Michal
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-18 16:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-17 20:14 [PATCH 0/4] media: uvcvideo: Map known XU controls Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-17 20:14 ` [PATCH 1/4] media: uvcvideo: Remove nodrop parameter Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-19 4:20 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-11-17 20:14 ` [PATCH 2/4] media: uvcvideo: Import standard controls from uvcdynctrl Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-19 4:21 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-11-17 20:14 ` [PATCH 3/4] media: uvcvideo: Announce deprecation intentions for UVCIOC_CTRL_MAP Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-19 4:21 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-11-17 20:14 ` [PATCH 4/4] media: uvcvideo: Introduce allow_privacy_override Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-17 21:10 ` Gergo Koteles
2025-11-18 6:21 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-18 8:48 ` Gergo Koteles
2025-11-18 9:25 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-18 11:14 ` Gergo Koteles
2025-11-18 14:26 ` Hans de Goede
2025-11-18 15:36 ` Gergo Koteles
2025-11-18 18:30 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-19 21:34 ` Gergo Koteles
2025-11-19 4:19 ` Laurent Pinchart
2025-11-18 11:14 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2025-11-18 14:09 ` Mauro Carvalho Chehab
2025-11-18 16:01 ` Michal Pecio [this message]
2025-11-18 18:28 ` Ricardo Ribalda
2025-11-19 4:19 ` Laurent Pinchart
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