From: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
martin.lau@linux.dev, eddyz87@gmail.com, song@kernel.org,
yonghong.song@linux.dev, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
kpsingh@kernel.org, sdf@fomichev.me, haoluo@google.com,
jolsa@kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org,
hawk@kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org, aleksander.lobakin@intel.com,
toke@redhat.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>, Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>,
Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>,
Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf, test_run: Fix user-memory-access vulnerability for LIVE_FRAMES
Date: Mon, 5 Jan 2026 00:23:49 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260104162350.347403-2-kafai.wan@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260104162350.347403-1-kafai.wan@linux.dev>
When testing XDP programs with LIVE_FRAMES mode, if the metalen is set
to >= (XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM - sizeof(struct xdp_frame)), there won't be
enough space for the xdp_frame conversion in xdp_update_frame_from_buff().
Additionally, the xdp_frame structure may be filled with user-provided data,
which can lead to a memory access vulnerability when converting to skb.
This fix reverts to the original version and ensures data_hard_start
correctly points to the xdp_frame structure, eliminating the security risk.
Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd@hust.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210@hust.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91@hust.edu.cn>
Fixes: 294635a8165a ("bpf, test_run: fix &xdp_frame misplacement for LIVE_FRAMES")
Signed-off-by: KaFai Wan <kafai.wan@linux.dev>
---
net/bpf/test_run.c | 23 +++++++++----------
.../bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c | 6 ++---
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c
index 655efac6f133..00234eba7c76 100644
--- a/net/bpf/test_run.c
+++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c
@@ -90,11 +90,9 @@ static bool bpf_test_timer_continue(struct bpf_test_timer *t, int iterations,
struct xdp_page_head {
struct xdp_buff orig_ctx;
struct xdp_buff ctx;
- union {
- /* ::data_hard_start starts here */
- DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(struct xdp_frame, frame);
- DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(u8, data);
- };
+ /* ::data_hard_start starts here */
+ struct xdp_frame frame;
+ DECLARE_FLEX_ARRAY(u8, data);
};
struct xdp_test_data {
@@ -131,10 +129,11 @@ static void xdp_test_run_init_page(netmem_ref netmem, void *arg)
frm_len = orig_ctx->data_end - orig_ctx->data_meta;
meta_len = orig_ctx->data - orig_ctx->data_meta;
headroom -= meta_len;
+ headroom += sizeof(head->frame);
new_ctx = &head->ctx;
- frm = head->frame;
- data = head->data;
+ frm = &head->frame;
+ data = frm;
memcpy(data + headroom, orig_ctx->data_meta, frm_len);
xdp_init_buff(new_ctx, TEST_XDP_FRAME_SIZE, &xdp->rxq);
@@ -215,8 +214,8 @@ static bool frame_was_changed(const struct xdp_page_head *head)
* i.e. has the highest chances to be overwritten. If those two are
* untouched, it's most likely safe to skip the context reset.
*/
- return head->frame->data != head->orig_ctx.data ||
- head->frame->flags != head->orig_ctx.flags;
+ return head->frame.data != head->orig_ctx.data ||
+ head->frame.flags != head->orig_ctx.flags;
}
static bool ctx_was_changed(struct xdp_page_head *head)
@@ -234,8 +233,8 @@ static void reset_ctx(struct xdp_page_head *head)
head->ctx.data = head->orig_ctx.data;
head->ctx.data_meta = head->orig_ctx.data_meta;
head->ctx.data_end = head->orig_ctx.data_end;
- xdp_update_frame_from_buff(&head->ctx, head->frame);
- head->frame->mem_type = head->orig_ctx.rxq->mem.type;
+ xdp_update_frame_from_buff(&head->ctx, &head->frame);
+ head->frame.mem_type = head->orig_ctx.rxq->mem.type;
}
static int xdp_recv_frames(struct xdp_frame **frames, int nframes,
@@ -301,7 +300,7 @@ static int xdp_test_run_batch(struct xdp_test_data *xdp, struct bpf_prog *prog,
head = phys_to_virt(page_to_phys(page));
reset_ctx(head);
ctx = &head->ctx;
- frm = head->frame;
+ frm = &head->frame;
xdp->frame_cnt++;
act = bpf_prog_run_xdp(prog, ctx);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c
index dd34b0cc4b4e..f7615c265e6e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_do_redirect.c
@@ -59,12 +59,12 @@ static int attach_tc_prog(struct bpf_tc_hook *hook, int fd)
/* The maximum permissible size is: PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct xdp_page_head) -
* SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info)) - XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM =
- * 3408 bytes for 64-byte cacheline and 3216 for 256-byte one.
+ * 3368 bytes for 64-byte cacheline and 3216 for 256-byte one.
*/
#if defined(__s390x__)
-#define MAX_PKT_SIZE 3216
+#define MAX_PKT_SIZE 3176
#else
-#define MAX_PKT_SIZE 3408
+#define MAX_PKT_SIZE 3368
#endif
#define PAGE_SIZE_4K 4096
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-04 16:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <fa2be179-bad7-4ee3-8668-4903d1853461@hust.edu.cn>
2026-01-04 16:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] bpf, test_run: Fix user-memory-access vulnerability for LIVE_FRAMES KaFai Wan
2026-01-04 16:23 ` KaFai Wan [this message]
2026-01-05 10:46 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] " Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2026-01-05 13:22 ` KaFai Wan
2026-01-05 16:43 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2026-01-06 13:53 ` KaFai Wan
2026-01-04 16:23 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Add test for xdp_md context with LIVE_FRAMES in BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN KaFai Wan
2026-01-05 8:07 ` [syzbot ci] Re: bpf, test_run: Fix user-memory-access vulnerability for LIVE_FRAMES syzbot ci
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