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From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Kery Qi <qikeyu2017@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] USB: gadget: max3420: validate endpoint index for max3420 udc
Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2026 16:27:18 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026011619-creatable-suspend-d030@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260105080241.1261-3-qikeyu2017@gmail.com>

On Mon, Jan 05, 2026 at 04:02:43PM +0800, Kery Qi wrote:
> Assure that the host may not manipulate the index to point past the
> endpoint array.
> 
> In max3420_getstatus(), the driver uses the wIndex value from the
> setup packet to obtain the endpoint index. However, there is no
> check to ensure this index is within the valid bounds of the
> udc->ep[] array.
> 
> A malicious host could send a USB_REQ_GET_STATUS request with a
> large endpoint index, leading to an out-of-bounds memory access.
> 
> This patch adds a validation check against MAX3420_MAX_EPS. If the
> endpoint index is invalid, the request is stalled.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kery Qi <qikeyu2017@gmail.com>
> ---
>  drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c | 6 +++++-
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c
> index 7349ea774adf..ac11ddf3fcbc 100644
> --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c
> +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/max3420_udc.c
> @@ -548,7 +548,11 @@ static void max3420_getstatus(struct max3420_udc *udc)
>  			goto stall;
>  		break;
>  	case USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT:
> -		ep = &udc->ep[udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK];
> +		u8 epnum = udc->setup.wIndex & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
> +
> +		if (epnum >= MAX3420_MAX_EPS)
> +			goto stall;
> +		ep = &udc->ep[epnum];
>  		if (udc->setup.wIndex & USB_DIR_IN) {
>  			if (!ep->ep_usb.caps.dir_in)
>  				goto stall;
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 

You didn't use scripts/get_maintainer.pl to determine what list to send
this to :(

Anyway, if you have a malicious USB host, then don't bind to it, we
implicitly trust hosts in the kernel.  Also, I don't think that this
will protect anything here, see the thread on the linux-usb list in the
past when this has come up:
	https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250629201324.30726-4-eeodqql09@gmail.com

thanks,

greg k-h

      reply	other threads:[~2026-01-16 15:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-05  8:02 [PATCH] USB: gadget: max3420: validate endpoint index for max3420 udc Kery Qi
2026-01-16 15:27 ` Greg KH [this message]

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