Re: [PATCH v2 03/14] nvmet: Implement CCR nvme command

Mohamed Khalfella
2026-02-09T19:27:11Z

On Sun 2026-02-08 15:10:36 -0800, Mohamed Khalfella wrote:
> On Sat 2026-02-07 15:58:49 +0200, Sagi Grimberg wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 04/02/2026 19:52, Mohamed Khalfella wrote:
> > > On Wed 2026-02-04 01:55:18 +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> > >> On 2/4/26 01:44, Mohamed Khalfella wrote:
> > >>> On Wed 2026-02-04 01:38:44 +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> > >>>> On 2/3/26 19:40, Mohamed Khalfella wrote:
> > >>>>> On Tue 2026-02-03 04:19:50 +0100, Hannes Reinecke wrote:
> > >>>>>> On 1/30/26 23:34, Mohamed Khalfella wrote:
> > >>>>>>> @@ -1501,6 +1516,38 @@ struct nvmet_ctrl *nvmet_ctrl_find_get(const char *subsysnqn,
> > >>>>>>> return ctrl;
> > >>>>>>> }
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> +struct nvmet_ctrl *nvmet_ctrl_find_get_ccr(struct nvmet_subsys *subsys,
> > >>>>>>> + const char *hostnqn, u8 ciu,
> > >>>>>>> + u16 cntlid, u64 cirn)
> > >>>>>>> +{
> > >>>>>>> + struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl;
> > >>>>>>> + bool found = false;
> > >>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>>> + mutex_lock(&subsys->lock);
> > >>>>>>> + list_for_each_entry(ctrl, &subsys->ctrls, subsys_entry) {
> > >>>>>>> + if (ctrl->cntlid != cntlid)
> > >>>>>>> + continue;
> > >>>>>>> + if (strncmp(ctrl->hostnqn, hostnqn, NVMF_NQN_SIZE))
> > >>>>>>> + continue;
> > >>>>>>> +
> > >>>>>> Why do we compare the hostnqn here, too? To my understanding the host
> > >>>>>> NQN is tied to the controller, so the controller ID should be sufficient
> > >>>>>> here.
> > >>>>> We got cntlid from CCR nvme command and we do not trust the value sent by
> > >>>>> the host. We check hostnqn to confirm that host is actually connected to
> > >>>>> the impacted controller. A host should not be allowed to reset a
> > >>>>> controller connected to another host.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>> Errm. So we're starting to not trust values in NVMe commands?
> > >>>> That is a very slippery road.
> > >>>> Ultimately it would require us to validate the cntlid on each
> > >>>> admin command. Which we don't.
> > >>>> And really there is no difference between CCR and any other
> > >>>> admin command; you get even worse effects if you would assume
> > >>>> a misdirected 'FORMAT' command.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Please don't. Security is _not_ a concern here.
> > >>> I do not think the check hurts. If you say it is wrong I will delete it.
> > >>>
> > >> It's not 'wrong', It's inconsistent. The argument that the contents of
> > >> an admin command may be wrong applies to _every_ admin command.
> > >> Yet we never check on any of those commands.
> > >> So I fail to see why this command requires special treatment.
> > > Okay, I will delete this check.
> >
> > It is a very different command than other commands that nvmet serves. Format
> > is different because it is an attached namespace, hence the host should
> > be able
> > to format it. If it would have been possible to access a namespace that
> > is not mapped
> > to a controller, then this check would have been warranted I think.
> >
> > There have been some issues lately opened on nvme-tcp that expose
> > attacks that can
> > crash the kernel with some hand-crafted commands, I'd say that this is a
> > potential attack vector.
>
> For an attacker to exploit CCR command they will have to guess both CUI
> (8bit) and CIRN(64bit) random values correctly. I do not see how an
> attacker can find these values without being connected to the impacted
> controller.

I changed ciu and cirn sysfs controller attributes on the host from S_IRUGO
to S_IRUSR. This should mitigate an attack by unprivileged process
running on host. On the target side debugfs files already have S_IRUSR
so no change is needed.