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Fri, 20 Feb 2026 18:34:36 +0000 (GMT) From: Srish Srinivasan To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, jarkko@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, stefanb@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, ssrish@linux.ibm.com Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options Date: Sat, 21 Feb 2026 00:04:26 +0530 Message-ID: <20260220183426.80446-3-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260220183426.80446-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> References: <20260220183426.80446-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: 3FBsKpOl1eqszax_Z8G0yEBf2nU2ejSf X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details-Enc: AW1haW4tMjYwMjIwMDE1MyBTYWx0ZWRfXyAKCOU7Az/q/ aC6mD++zO8jpy7TrO9xykSM9O9+vjnCHOavfEXEsOTe+4aHy3mTGoSCdBw0WaWCPi0vlgqQop85 oqCtehbmkopI36gI8RoD2cDOEMXCOhBhMzwE6tJh5vLijQfnCK7FbdPjpxS5GCyQoRKfRy3ycG0 +S79Kz41bDiPzSH8L3aBI+4Ba47iODM7iD2aQnLpWlYxKkLUFYMCz927mTBPbRdhmIps8Clca5i sCP53gJ6aSje/nofQ/PMzm56CyVziM8BEKtdPEBf389X7wwmQeBqucHw4+1+kzNXJa7yAzzROgW aaTQNdsFOOXfvTBIgPsiyJr6q4abeqwmrGguihKRVhOmeCWA1A20Z7DW/ZBFLTZdO6lo0WPXWBI +J6uSAvXKcQe9LP3KYDoK9Pbz2rBp1is2RPzqAt/rK1roSd/WYtEPnlD0LoI0bGLRHIvi7xl7rt D63zbitiacDl7hFzbRw== X-Proofpoint-GUID: 3FBsKpOl1eqszax_Z8G0yEBf2nU2ejSf X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=U+mfzOru c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=6998a943 cx=c_pps a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:117 a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:17 a=HzLeVaNsDn8A:10 a=VkNPw1HP01LnGYTKEx00:22 a=Mpw57Om8IfrbqaoTuvik:22 a=GgsMoib0sEa3-_RKJdDe:22 a=VnNF1IyMAAAA:8 a=Jts-3Rt90Sf2m4vj4rUA:9 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1121,Hydra:6.1.51,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2026-02-20_02,2026-02-20_03,2025-10-01_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 clxscore=1015 bulkscore=0 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 spamscore=0 adultscore=0 phishscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 priorityscore=1501 suspectscore=0 classifier=typeunknown authscore=0 authtc= authcc= route=outbound adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.22.0-2601150000 definitions=main-2602200153 The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash, policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure. Define trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in trusted_key_options's private. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 95 ++++++++++++++--------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 51 ++++++------ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 03527162613f..b80f250305b8 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { struct trusted_key_options { uint16_t keytype; - uint32_t keyhandle; - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t blobauth_len; - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; - int pcrlock; - uint32_t hash; - uint32_t policydigest_len; - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - uint32_t policyhandle; void *private; }; diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index 0fadc6a4f166..355ebd36cbfd 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -7,6 +7,20 @@ extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; +struct trusted_tpm_options { + uint32_t keyhandle; + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t blobauth_len; + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; + int pcrlock; + uint32_t hash; + uint32_t policydigest_len; + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t policyhandle; +}; + int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 216caef97ffc..741b1d47d9f8 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -48,12 +48,14 @@ enum { static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; + pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); - pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); - pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); - pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle); + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock); + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len); print_hex_dump(KERN_DEBUG, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); + 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0); } static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) @@ -609,6 +611,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; struct tpm_buf tb; int ret; @@ -619,9 +622,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; - ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, + ret = tpm_seal(&tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo, + private->pcrinfo_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); @@ -635,6 +639,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, struct trusted_key_options *o) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; struct tpm_buf tb; int ret; @@ -642,8 +647,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, if (ret) return ret; - ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); + ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob, + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); if (ret < 0) pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); else @@ -680,6 +685,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, struct trusted_key_options *opt) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private; substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; char *p = c; int token; @@ -695,7 +701,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; if (!c) return 0; @@ -709,11 +715,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, switch (token) { case Opt_pcrinfo: - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) + private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; + if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, - opt->pcrinfo_len); + res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from, + private->pcrinfo_len); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; break; @@ -722,12 +728,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; - opt->keyhandle = handle; + private->keyhandle = handle; break; case Opt_keyauth: if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, + res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -738,21 +744,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) */ - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); + private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, + if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { + res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; + private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; break; } - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, - opt->blobauth_len); + if (tpm2 && + private->blobauth_len <= + sizeof(private->blobauth)) { + memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from, + private->blobauth_len); break; } @@ -770,14 +778,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->pcrlock = lock; + private->pcrlock = lock; break; case Opt_hash: if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { - opt->hash = i; + private->hash = i; break; } } @@ -789,14 +797,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, } break; case Opt_policydigest: - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash]; if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) return -EINVAL; - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, + res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from, digest_len); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; + private->policydigest_len = digest_len; break; case Opt_policyhandle: if (!tpm2) @@ -804,7 +812,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; - opt->policyhandle = handle; + private->policyhandle = handle; break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -815,6 +823,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private; struct trusted_key_options *options; int tpm2; @@ -827,14 +836,23 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) /* set any non-zero defaults */ options->keytype = SRK_keytype; - if (!tpm2) - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + private = kzalloc(sizeof(*private), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!private) { + kfree_sensitive(options); + options = NULL; + } else { + if (!tpm2) + private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; + + options->private = private; + } } return options; } static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; int ret = 0; int tpm2; @@ -852,7 +870,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; dump_options(options); - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -866,20 +885,22 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; } - if (options->pcrlock) { - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (private->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } } out: + kfree_sensitive(options->private); kfree_sensitive(options); return ret; } static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; int ret = 0; int tpm2; @@ -897,7 +918,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) goto out; dump_options(options); - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { + private = options->private; + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } @@ -909,14 +931,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) if (ret < 0) pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - if (options->pcrlock) { - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (private->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } } out: + kfree_sensitive(options->private); kfree_sensitive(options); return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 6340823f8b53..94e01249b921 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 *src, u32 len) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); u8 *work = scratch, *work1; @@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { + if (private->blobauth_len == 0) { unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); @@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, goto err; } - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); @@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, u8 **buf) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; int ret; struct tpm2_key_context ctx; u8 *blob; @@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, return -ENOMEM; *buf = blob; - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent; memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); blob += ctx.priv_len; @@ -233,6 +235,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; struct tpm_buf buf, sized; int blob_len = 0; @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 flags; int rc; - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash); if (hash < 0) return hash; - if (!options->keyhandle) + if (!private->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); @@ -268,18 +271,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out_put; } - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); if (rc) goto out; tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); + private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); /* sensitive */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, private->blobauth_len); - if (options->blobauth_len) - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + if (private->blobauth_len) + tpm_buf_append(&sized, private->blobauth, + private->blobauth_len); tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len); tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len); @@ -292,14 +296,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* key properties */ flags = 0; - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; + flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT); tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags); /* policy */ - tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len); - if (options->policydigest_len) - tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, private->policydigest_len); + if (private->policydigest_len) + tpm_buf_append(&sized, private->policydigest, + private->policydigest_len); /* public parameters */ tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL); @@ -373,6 +378,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *blob_handle) { u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; struct tpm_buf buf; unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; @@ -392,7 +398,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ - if (!options->keyhandle) + if (!private->keyhandle) return -EINVAL; /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ @@ -433,11 +439,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, return rc; } - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, &buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); if (rc) goto out; - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, options->keyauth, + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 0, private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); @@ -481,6 +487,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 blob_handle) { + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; struct tpm_header *head; struct tpm_buf buf; u16 data_len; @@ -502,10 +509,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (rc) goto out; - if (!options->policyhandle) { + if (!private->policyhandle) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, - options->blobauth, - options->blobauth_len); + private->blobauth, + private->blobauth_len); } else { /* * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the @@ -518,9 +525,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated * password. */ - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle, + tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, private->policyhandle, NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); } else { -- 2.43.0