From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
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Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Subject: Re: [PATCH kernel 6/9] x86/dma-direct: Stop changing encrypted page state for TDISP devices
Date: Sun, 1 Mar 2026 20:35:35 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260302003535.GU44359@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2a5b2d8c-7359-42bd-9e8e-2c3efacee747@amd.com>
On Mon, Mar 02, 2026 at 11:01:24AM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>
>
> On 28/2/26 11:06, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> > On Wed, Feb 25, 2026 at 05:08:37PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> >
> > > I guess this comes back to the point I just raised on the previous patch -
> > > the current assumption is that devices cannot access private memory at all,
> > > and thus phys_to_dma() is implicitly only dealing with the mechanics of how
> > > the given device accesses shared memory. Once that no longer holds, I don't
> > > see how we can find the right answer without also consulting the relevant
> > > state of paddr itself, and that really *should* be able to be commonly
> > > abstracted across CoCo environments.
> >
> > Definately, I think building on this is a good place to start
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260223095136.225277-2-jiri@resnulli.us/
>
> cool, thanks for the pointer.
>
> > Probably this series needs to take DMA_ATTR_CC_DECRYPTED and push it
> > down into the phys_to_dma() and make the swiotlb shared allocation
> > code force set it.
> >
> > But what value is stored in the phys_addr_t for shared pages on the
> > three arches? Does ARM and Intel set the high GPA/IPA bit in the
> > phys_addr or do they set it through the pgprot? What does AMD do?
> > ie can we test a bit in the phys_addr_t to reliably determine if it is
> > shared or private?
>
> Without secure vIOMMU, no Cbit in the S2 table (==host) for any
> VM. SDTE (==IOMMU) decides on shared/private for the device,
> i.e. (device_cc_accepted()?private:shared).
Is this "Cbit" part of the CPU S2 page table address space or is it
actually some PTE bit that says it is "encrypted" ?
It is confusing when you say it would start working with a vIOMMU.
If 1<<51 is a valid IOPTE, and it is an actually address, then it
should be mapped into the IOMMU S2, shouldn't it? If it is in the
IOMMU S2 then shouldn't it work as a dma_addr_t?
If the HW is treating 1<<51 special in some way and not reflecting it
into a S2 lookup then it isn't an address bit but an IOPTE flag.
IMHO is really dangerous to intermix PTE flags into phys_addr_t, I
hope that is not what is happening.
> > Does AMD have the shared/private GPA split like ARM and Intel do? Ie
> > shared is always at a high GPA? What is the SME mask?
>
> sorry but I do not follow this entirely.
>
> In general, GPA != DMA handle. Cbit (bit51) is not an address bit in a GPA but it is a DMA handle so I mask it there.
>
> With one exception - 1) host 2) mem_encrypt=on 3) iommu=pt, but we default to IOMMU in the case of host+mem_encrypt=on and don't have Cbit in host's DMA handles.
>
> For CoCoVM, I could map everything again at the 1<<51 offset in the same S2 table to leak Cbit to the bus (useless though).
Double map is what ARM does at least. I don't know it is a good
choice, but it means that phys_addr_t can have a shared/private bit
(eg your Cbit at 51) and both the CPU and IOMMU S2 have legitimate
mappings. ie it is a *true* address bit.
Given AMD has only a single IOMMO for T=0 and 1 it would make sense to
me if AMD always remove the C bit and there is always a uniform IOVA
mapping from 0 -> vTOM.
But in this case I would expect the vIOMMU to also use the same GPA
space starting from 0 and also remove the C bit, as the S2 shouldn't
have mappings starting at 1<<51.
> There is vTOM in SDTE which is "every phys_addr_t above vTOM is no
> Cbit, below - with Cbit" (and there is the same thing for the CPU
> side in SEV) but this not it, right?
That seems like the IOMMU HW is specially handling the address bits in
some way? At least ARM doesn't have anything like that, address bits
are address bits, they don't get overloaded with secondary mechanisms.
> AMD's SME mask for shared is 0, for private - 1<<51.
ARM is the inverse of this (private is at 0), but the same idea.
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-02 0:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-25 5:37 [PATCH kernel 0/9] PCI/TSM: coco/sev-guest: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe TDISP (phase2) Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 1/9] pci/tsm: Add TDISP report blob and helpers to parse it Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 6:16 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 10:10 ` Arnd Bergmann
2026-02-26 0:09 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-26 2:34 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-26 3:49 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-26 21:08 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 2/9] pci/tsm: Add tsm_tdi_status Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 6:33 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 23:42 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-02 6:58 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 3/9] coco/sev-guest: Allow multiple source files in the driver Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 4/9] dma/swiotlb: Stop forcing SWIOTLB for TDISP devices Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 16:30 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 18:00 ` Robin Murphy
2026-02-25 20:57 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-28 0:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-02 23:53 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-03 0:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-03 0:29 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-03 12:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-04 6:45 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-04 12:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-25 10:42 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 16:48 ` Robin Murphy
2026-02-26 0:09 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-02 7:54 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 5/9] x86/mm: Stop forcing decrypted page state " Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 16:51 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 6/9] x86/dma-direct: Stop changing encrypted " Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 17:08 ` Robin Murphy
2026-02-25 21:35 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-26 6:22 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-28 0:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-02 0:01 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-02 0:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-03-02 5:26 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-02 13:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-03 8:19 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-03 12:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 7/9] coco/sev-guest: Implement the guest support for SEV TIO (phase2) Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-25 6:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-02-26 3:39 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-26 19:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 8/9] RFC: PCI: Avoid needless touching of Command register Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-26 0:24 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2026-02-26 5:58 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-02-26 0:34 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-25 5:37 ` [PATCH kernel 9/9] pci: Allow encrypted MMIO mapping via sysfs Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-02 8:20 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-02 8:59 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
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