From: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
To: <alistair23@gmail.com>
Cc: <bhelgaas@google.com>, <lukas@wunner.de>,
<rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org>, <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
<linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <alex.gaynor@gmail.com>,
<benno.lossin@proton.me>, <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
<a.hindborg@kernel.org>, <gary@garyguo.net>,
<bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>, <tmgross@umich.edu>,
<ojeda@kernel.org>, <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com>,
<aliceryhl@google.com>, Alistair Francis <alistair@alistair23.me>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 22/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM certificate validation
Date: Tue, 3 Mar 2026 15:00:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260303150040.00007458@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260211032935.2705841-23-alistair.francis@wdc.com>
On Wed, 11 Feb 2026 13:29:29 +1000
alistair23@gmail.com wrote:
> From: Alistair Francis <alistair@alistair23.me>
>
> Support validating the SPDM certificate chain.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair@alistair23.me>
Only minor thing inline + observation on the code that I think we want to remove
for now wrt to checking the root cert.
> diff --git a/lib/rspdm/state.rs b/lib/rspdm/state.rs
> index 1e5656144611..728b920beace 100644
> --- a/lib/rspdm/state.rs
> +++ b/lib/rspdm/state.rs
> @@ -743,4 +746,92 @@ pub(crate) fn get_certificate(&mut self, slot: u8) -> Result<(), Error> {
>
> Ok(())
> }
> +
> + pub(crate) fn validate_cert_chain(&mut self, slot: u8) -> Result<(), Error> {
> + let cert_chain_buf = &self.certs[slot as usize];
> + let cert_chain_len = cert_chain_buf.len();
> + let header_len = 4 + self.hash_len;
> +
> + let mut offset = header_len;
> + let mut prev_cert: Option<*mut bindings::x509_certificate> = None;
> +
> + while offset < cert_chain_len {
> + let cert_len = unsafe {
> + bindings::x509_get_certificate_length(
> + &cert_chain_buf[offset..] as *const _ as *const u8,
> + cert_chain_len - offset,
> + )
> + };
> +
> + if cert_len < 0 {
> + pr_err!("Invalid certificate length\n");
> + to_result(cert_len as i32)?;
> + }
> +
> + let _is_leaf_cert = if offset + cert_len as usize == cert_chain_len {
> + true
> + } else {
> + false
> + };
Same as the following?
let _is_leaf_cert = offset + cert_len as usize == cert_chain_len;
> +
> + let cert_ptr = unsafe {
> + from_err_ptr(bindings::x509_cert_parse(
> + &cert_chain_buf[offset..] as *const _ as *const c_void,
> + cert_len as usize,
> + ))?
> + };
> + let cert = unsafe { *cert_ptr };
> +
> + if cert.unsupported_sig || cert.blacklisted {
> + to_result(-(bindings::EKEYREJECTED as i32))?;
> + }
> +
> + if let Some(prev) = prev_cert {
> + // Check against previous certificate
> + let rc = unsafe { bindings::public_key_verify_signature((*prev).pub_, cert.sig) };
> +
> + if rc < 0 {
> + pr_err!("Signature validation error\n");
> + to_result(rc)?;
> + }
> + } else {
> + // Check aginst root keyring
So this is the check that Dan and Jason are proposing we drop (for now).
Works for me as easy to bring back later and lets us move forward
in the meantime. As long as userspace gets nothing to indicate
that we have in any way checked this root cert we are making no false claims.
> + let key = unsafe {
> + from_err_ptr(bindings::find_asymmetric_key(
> + self.keyring,
> + (*cert.sig).auth_ids[0],
> + (*cert.sig).auth_ids[1],
> + (*cert.sig).auth_ids[2],
> + false,
> + ))?
> + };
> +
> + let rc = unsafe { bindings::verify_signature(key, cert.sig) };
> + unsafe { bindings::key_put(key) };
> +
> + if rc < 0 {
> + pr_err!("Root signature validation error\n");
> + to_result(rc)?;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if let Some(prev) = prev_cert {
> + unsafe { bindings::x509_free_certificate(prev) };
> + }
> +
> + prev_cert = Some(cert_ptr);
> + offset += cert_len as usize;
> + }
> +
> + if let Some(prev) = prev_cert {
> + if let Some(validate) = self.validate {
> + let rc = unsafe { validate(self.dev, slot, prev) };
> + to_result(rc)?;
> + }
> +
> + self.leaf_key = unsafe { Some((*prev).pub_) };
> + }
> +
> + Ok(())
> + }
> }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-03 15:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-11 3:29 [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 01/27] rust: add untrusted data abstraction alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 02/27] X.509: Make certificate parser public alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 03/27] X.509: Parse Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 04/27] X.509: Move certificate length retrieval into new helper alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 05/27] certs: Create blacklist keyring earlier alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 06/27] rust: add bindings for hash.h alistair23
2026-02-19 14:48 ` Gary Guo
2026-03-02 16:18 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 07/27] rust: error: impl From<FromBytesWithNulError> for Kernel Error alistair23
2026-02-19 14:49 ` Gary Guo
2026-03-13 2:20 ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-13 10:35 ` Alice Ryhl
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 08/27] lib: rspdm: Initial commit of Rust SPDM alistair23
2026-03-02 17:09 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-13 3:44 ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 09/27] PCI/CMA: Authenticate devices on enumeration alistair23
2026-02-16 4:25 ` Aksh Garg
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 10/27] PCI/CMA: Validate Subject Alternative Name in certificates alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 11/27] PCI/CMA: Reauthenticate devices on reset and resume alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 12/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_version alistair23
2026-02-11 4:00 ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-03 11:36 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-13 5:35 ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-13 5:53 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-13 5:55 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-16 17:16 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 13/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_capabilities alistair23
2026-02-11 4:08 ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-03 12:09 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-03 18:07 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-03-20 4:32 ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 14/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM negotiate_algorithms alistair23
2026-03-03 13:46 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 15/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_digests alistair23
2026-03-03 14:29 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 16/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM get_certificate alistair23
2026-03-03 14:51 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 17/27] crypto: asymmetric_keys - Load certificate parsing early in boot alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 18/27] KEYS: Load keyring and certificates " alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 19/27] PCI/CMA: Support built in X.509 certificates alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 20/27] crypto: sha: Load early in boot alistair23
2026-03-03 14:52 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 21/27] crypto: ecdsa: " alistair23
2026-03-03 14:54 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 22/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM certificate validation alistair23
2026-03-03 15:00 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 23/27] rust: allow extracting the buffer from a CString alistair23
2026-02-19 14:50 ` Gary Guo
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 24/27] lib: rspdm: Support SPDM challenge alistair23
2026-03-03 16:54 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 25/27] PCI/CMA: Expose in sysfs whether devices are authenticated alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 26/27] rust: add bindings for hash_info alistair23
2026-02-11 3:29 ` [RFC v3 27/27] rspdm: Multicast received signatures via netlink alistair23
2026-02-19 10:19 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-12 5:56 ` [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM dan.j.williams
2026-02-18 2:12 ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-17 23:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-18 2:17 ` Alistair Francis
2026-02-18 23:40 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 0:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 5:05 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 14:15 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 14:31 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 15:07 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 17:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 20:07 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-20 8:30 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20 14:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-21 18:46 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-21 23:29 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-23 17:15 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-02-23 19:11 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-24 14:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-05 4:17 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-05 12:48 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-05 19:49 ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-09 11:39 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 12:31 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 15:33 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 15:59 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 18:00 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 20:40 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-09 23:11 ` DanX Williams
2026-02-24 14:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-24 15:54 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-25 14:50 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 14:40 ` Greg KH
2026-02-20 7:46 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20 9:14 ` Greg KH
2026-02-20 11:45 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-20 11:57 ` Greg KH
2026-02-19 9:34 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 12:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-02-19 18:48 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 9:13 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-02-19 18:42 ` dan.j.williams
2026-02-19 11:24 ` Jonathan Cameron
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