[PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Josh Law]

From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>

The ts_bm algorithm computes the required allocation size by
multiplying the pattern length by the size of an integer. If the
pattern length is sufficiently large, this can overflow the 32-bit
unsigned int before it is widened to size_t. This could result in an
undersized allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow when
copying the pattern.

Fix this by explicitly checking that the length does not exceed
the maximum safe threshold before calculating the buffer sizes.

Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
---
 lib/ts_bm.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/ts_bm.c b/lib/ts_bm.c
index eed5967238c5..01ea0a93cf6e 100644
--- a/lib/ts_bm.c
+++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
@@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
 	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
 	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
 
+	if (unlikely(len == 0 || len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 	conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
 	if (IS_ERR(conf))
 		return conf;
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v2 2/2] lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Josh Law]

From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>

The ts_kmp algorithm computes the required allocation size by
multiplying the pattern length by the size of an integer. If the
pattern length is sufficiently large, this can overflow the 32-bit
unsigned int before it is widened to size_t. This could result in an
undersized allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow when
copying the pattern.

Fix this by explicitly checking that the length does not exceed
the maximum safe threshold before calculating the buffer sizes.

Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
---
 lib/ts_kmp.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/ts_kmp.c b/lib/ts_kmp.c
index 5520dc28255a..e07f5e80d076 100644
--- a/lib/ts_kmp.c
+++ b/lib/ts_kmp.c
@@ -97,6 +97,9 @@ static struct ts_config *kmp_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
 	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
 	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*kmp) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
 
+	if (unlikely(len == 0 || len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*kmp)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 	conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
 	if (IS_ERR(conf))
 		return conf;
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Andrew Morton]

On Sun,  8 Mar 2026 18:10:53 +0000 Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com> wrote:

> From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
> 
> The ts_bm algorithm computes the required allocation size by
> multiplying the pattern length by the size of an integer. If the
> pattern length is sufficiently large, this can overflow the 32-bit
> unsigned int before it is widened to size_t. This could result in an
> undersized allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow when
> copying the pattern.
> 
> Fix this by explicitly checking that the length does not exceed
> the maximum safe threshold before calculating the buffer sizes.
> 
> ...
>
> --- a/lib/ts_bm.c
> +++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
> @@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
>  	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
>  	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;

The above description is referring to this expression?

I think the uints will be promoted to size_t before the addition occurs?

If you're referring to the prefix_tbl_len initialization then yes,
overflow could happen.

> +	if (unlikely(len == 0 || len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1)))
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

Seems odd to perform these (uncommented!) checks after having performed
the problematic operations.  Something like:

  	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
  	size_t priv_size;

	/* Explanatory comment goes here */
	/* Can this actually happen? */
	if (unlikely(len == 0))
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

	/* Explanatory comment goes here */
	if (unlikely(len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1))
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

  	prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
  	priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;


Also, please check the various helpers in overflow.h.

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Josh Law]

8 Mar 2026 19:55:20 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:

> On Sun,  8 Mar 2026 18:10:53 +0000 Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
>>
>> The ts_bm algorithm computes the required allocation size by
>> multiplying the pattern length by the size of an integer. If the
>> pattern length is sufficiently large, this can overflow the 32-bit
>> unsigned int before it is widened to size_t. This could result in an
>> undersized allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow when
>> copying the pattern.
>>
>> Fix this by explicitly checking that the length does not exceed
>> the maximum safe threshold before calculating the buffer sizes.
>>
>> ...
>>
>> --- a/lib/ts_bm.c
>> +++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
>> @@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
>>     unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
>>     size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
>
> The above description is referring to this expression?
>
> I think the uints will be promoted to size_t before the addition occurs?
>
> If you're referring to the prefix_tbl_len initialization then yes,
> overflow could happen.
>
>> +   if (unlikely(len == 0 || len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1)))
>> +       return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
> Seems odd to perform these (uncommented!) checks after having performed
> the problematic operations.  Something like:
>
>     unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
>     size_t priv_size;
>
>     /* Explanatory comment goes here */
>     /* Can this actually happen? */
>     if (unlikely(len == 0))
>         return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
>     /* Explanatory comment goes here */
>     if (unlikely(len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1))
>         return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>
>     prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
>     priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
>
>
> Also, please check the various helpers in overflow.h.

Yeah, I'm fixing that now, I also submitted a couple other patches you may want to have a look at


V/R


Josh law

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Josh Law]

8 Mar 2026 20:06:15 Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com>:

> 8 Mar 2026 19:55:20 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>:
>
>> On Sun,  8 Mar 2026 18:10:53 +0000 Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
>>>
>>> The ts_bm algorithm computes the required allocation size by
>>> multiplying the pattern length by the size of an integer. If the
>>> pattern length is sufficiently large, this can overflow the 32-bit
>>> unsigned int before it is widened to size_t. This could result in an
>>> undersized allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow when
>>> copying the pattern.
>>>
>>> Fix this by explicitly checking that the length does not exceed
>>> the maximum safe threshold before calculating the buffer sizes.
>>>
>>> ...
>>>
>>> --- a/lib/ts_bm.c
>>> +++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
>>> @@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
>>>     unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
>>>     size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
>>
>> The above description is referring to this expression?
>>
>> I think the uints will be promoted to size_t before the addition occurs?
>>
>> If you're referring to the prefix_tbl_len initialization then yes,
>> overflow could happen.
>>
>>> +   if (unlikely(len == 0 || len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1)))
>>> +       return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>
>> Seems odd to perform these (uncommented!) checks after having performed
>> the problematic operations.  Something like:
>>
>>     unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
>>     size_t priv_size;
>>
>>     /* Explanatory comment goes here */
>>     /* Can this actually happen? */
>>     if (unlikely(len == 0))
>>         return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>
>>     /* Explanatory comment goes here */
>>     if (unlikely(len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1))
>>         return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>
>>     prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
>>     priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
>>
>>
>> Also, please check the various helpers in overflow.h.
>
> Yeah, I'm fixing that now, I also submitted a couple other patches you may want to have a look at
>
>
> V/R
>
>
> Josh law

Oh and also, sorry for bugging, but I have  a maintainers patch I sent, and another one you need to look at,

V/R


Josh law

[PATCH v3 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Josh Law]

From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>

Changes in v3:
- move overflow checks before the arithmetic they guard
- add comments explaining the zero-length and size-overflow cases
- use check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() from overflow.h

The ts_bm algorithm stores its good_shift[] table and pattern in a
single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the good_shift[]
size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and
subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow
helpers before calculating the combined allocation size.

Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
---
 lib/ts_bm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/ts_bm.c b/lib/ts_bm.c
index eed5967238c5..676105e84005 100644
--- a/lib/ts_bm.c
+++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
@@ -163,8 +163,22 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
 	struct ts_config *conf;
 	struct ts_bm *bm;
 	int i;
-	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
-	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
+	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
+	size_t priv_size;
+
+	/* Zero-length patterns would underflow bm_find()'s initial shift. */
+	if (unlikely(!len))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/*
+	 * bm->pattern is stored immediately after the good_shift[] table.
+	 * Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(len, sizeof(*bm->good_shift),
+					&prefix_tbl_len) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(sizeof(*bm), (size_t)len, &priv_size) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
 	if (IS_ERR(conf))
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v3 2/2] lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Josh Law]

From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>

Changes in v3:
- mirror the ts_bm review fixes for consistency across the series
- move overflow checks before the arithmetic they guard
- add comments and use overflow.h helpers for the allocation math

The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a
single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the prefix_tbl[]
size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and
subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow
helpers before calculating the combined allocation size.

Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
---
 lib/ts_kmp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/ts_kmp.c b/lib/ts_kmp.c
index 5520dc28255a..29466c1803c9 100644
--- a/lib/ts_kmp.c
+++ b/lib/ts_kmp.c
@@ -94,8 +94,22 @@ static struct ts_config *kmp_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
 	struct ts_config *conf;
 	struct ts_kmp *kmp;
 	int i;
-	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
-	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*kmp) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
+	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
+	size_t priv_size;
+
+	/* Zero-length patterns would make kmp_find() read beyond kmp->pattern. */
+	if (unlikely(!len))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/*
+	 * kmp->pattern is stored immediately after the prefix_tbl[] table.
+	 * Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(len, sizeof(*kmp->prefix_tbl),
+					&prefix_tbl_len) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(sizeof(*kmp), (size_t)len, &priv_size) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
 	if (IS_ERR(conf))
-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH v3 2/2] lib/ts_kmp: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation

[Josh Law]

From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>

Changes in v3:
- mirror the ts_bm review fixes for consistency across the series
- move overflow checks before the arithmetic they guard
- add comments and use overflow.h helpers for the allocation math

The ts_kmp algorithm stores its prefix_tbl[] table and pattern in a
single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the prefix_tbl[]
size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and
subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow
helpers before calculating the combined allocation size.

Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
---
 lib/ts_kmp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/ts_kmp.c b/lib/ts_kmp.c
index 5520dc28255a..29466c1803c9 100644
--- a/lib/ts_kmp.c
+++ b/lib/ts_kmp.c
@@ -94,8 +94,22 @@ static struct ts_config *kmp_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
 	struct ts_config *conf;
 	struct ts_kmp *kmp;
 	int i;
-	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
-	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*kmp) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
+	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
+	size_t priv_size;
+
+	/* Zero-length patterns would make kmp_find() read beyond kmp->pattern. */
+	if (unlikely(!len))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/*
+	 * kmp->pattern is stored immediately after the prefix_tbl[] table.
+	 * Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(len, sizeof(*kmp->prefix_tbl),
+					&prefix_tbl_len) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(sizeof(*kmp), (size_t)len, &priv_size) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
 	if (IS_ERR(conf))
-- 
2.43.0