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* [PATCH v3 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation
@ 2026-03-08 20:20 Josh Law
  2026-03-08 20:20 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] lib/ts_kmp: " Josh Law
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Josh Law @ 2026-03-08 20:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Andrew Morton; +Cc: linux-kernel, Josh Law

From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>

Changes in v3:
- move overflow checks before the arithmetic they guard
- add comments explaining the zero-length and size-overflow cases
- use check_mul_overflow() and check_add_overflow() from overflow.h

The ts_bm algorithm stores its good_shift[] table and pattern in a
single allocation sized from the pattern length. If the good_shift[]
size calculation wraps, the resulting allocation can be too small and
subsequent pattern copies can overflow it.

Fix this by rejecting zero-length patterns and by using overflow
helpers before calculating the combined allocation size.

Signed-off-by: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
---
 lib/ts_bm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lib/ts_bm.c b/lib/ts_bm.c
index eed5967238c5..676105e84005 100644
--- a/lib/ts_bm.c
+++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
@@ -163,8 +163,22 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
 	struct ts_config *conf;
 	struct ts_bm *bm;
 	int i;
-	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
-	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;
+	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
+	size_t priv_size;
+
+	/* Zero-length patterns would underflow bm_find()'s initial shift. */
+	if (unlikely(!len))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	/*
+	 * bm->pattern is stored immediately after the good_shift[] table.
+	 * Reject lengths that would wrap while sizing either region.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(len, sizeof(*bm->good_shift),
+					&prefix_tbl_len) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(sizeof(*bm), (size_t)len, &priv_size) ||
+		     check_add_overflow(priv_size, prefix_tbl_len, &priv_size)))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
 	conf = alloc_ts_config(priv_size, gfp_mask);
 	if (IS_ERR(conf))
-- 
2.43.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] lib/ts_bm: fix integer overflow in pattern length calculation
@ 2026-03-08 19:55 Andrew Morton
  2026-03-08 20:17 ` [PATCH v3 " Josh Law
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Andrew Morton @ 2026-03-08 19:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Josh Law; +Cc: linux-kernel, Josh Law

On Sun,  8 Mar 2026 18:10:53 +0000 Josh Law <hlcj1234567@gmail.com> wrote:

> From: Josh Law <objecting@objecting.org>
> 
> The ts_bm algorithm computes the required allocation size by
> multiplying the pattern length by the size of an integer. If the
> pattern length is sufficiently large, this can overflow the 32-bit
> unsigned int before it is widened to size_t. This could result in an
> undersized allocation and a subsequent heap buffer overflow when
> copying the pattern.
> 
> Fix this by explicitly checking that the length does not exceed
> the maximum safe threshold before calculating the buffer sizes.
> 
> ...
>
> --- a/lib/ts_bm.c
> +++ b/lib/ts_bm.c
> @@ -166,6 +166,9 @@ static struct ts_config *bm_init(const void *pattern, unsigned int len,
>  	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
>  	size_t priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;

The above description is referring to this expression?

I think the uints will be promoted to size_t before the addition occurs?

If you're referring to the prefix_tbl_len initialization then yes,
overflow could happen.

> +	if (unlikely(len == 0 || len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1)))
> +		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

Seems odd to perform these (uncommented!) checks after having performed
the problematic operations.  Something like:

  	unsigned int prefix_tbl_len;
  	size_t priv_size;

	/* Explanatory comment goes here */
	/* Can this actually happen? */
	if (unlikely(len == 0))
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

	/* Explanatory comment goes here */
	if (unlikely(len > (UINT_MAX - sizeof(*bm)) / (sizeof(unsigned int) + 1))
		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

  	prefix_tbl_len = len * sizeof(unsigned int);
  	priv_size = sizeof(*bm) + len + prefix_tbl_len;


Also, please check the various helpers in overflow.h.


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

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