From: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
"Saeed Mahameed" <saeedm@nvidia.com>,
Itay Avraham <itayavr@nvidia.com>,
Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
Chiara Meiohas <cmeiohas@nvidia.com>,
Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com>,
Edward Srouji <edwards@nvidia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] lsm: add hook for firmware command validation
Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2026 15:02:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260309150253.00001ec7@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260309-fw-lsm-hook-v1-1-4a6422e63725@nvidia.com>
On Mon, 9 Mar 2026 13:15:18 +0200
Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> wrote:
> From: Chiara Meiohas <cmeiohas@nvidia.com>
>
> Drivers typically communicate with device firmware either via
> register-based commands (writing parameters into device registers)
> or by passing a command buffer using shared-memory mechanisms.
>
> This hook targets the command buffer mechanism, which is commonly
> used on modern, complex devices.
>
> Add the LSM hook fw_validate_cmd. This hook allows inspecting
> firmware command buffers before they are sent to the device.
> The hook receives the command buffer, device, command class, and a
> class-specific id:
> - class_id (enum fw_cmd_class) allows security modules to
> differentiate between classes of firmware commands.
> In this series, class_id distinguishes between commands from the
> RDMA uverbs interface and from fwctl.
> - id is a class-specific device identifier. For uverbs, id is the
> RDMA driver identifier (enum rdma_driver_id). For fwctl, id is the
> device type (enum fwctl_device_type).
>
> Signed-off-by: Chiara Meiohas <cmeiohas@nvidia.com>
> Reviewed-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla@nvidia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Edward Srouji <edwards@nvidia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Hi Leon,
To me this seems sensible, but LSM isn't an area I know that much about.
With that in mind:
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
A few formatting related comments inline.
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 83a646d72f6f8..64786d013207a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum fs_value_type;
> struct watch;
> struct watch_notification;
> struct lsm_ctx;
> +struct device;
>
> /* Default (no) options for the capable function */
> #define CAP_OPT_NONE 0x0
> @@ -157,6 +158,21 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
> LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
> };
>
> +/*
Could add the MAX entry and making this /**
The file is a bit inconsistent on that.
> + * enum fw_cmd_class - Class of the firmware command passed to
> + * security_fw_validate_cmd.
> + * This allows security modules to distinguish between different command
> + * classes.
> + *
> + * @FW_CMD_CLASS_UVERBS: Command originated from the RDMA uverbs interface
> + * @FW_CMD_CLASS_FWCTL: Command originated from the fwctl interface
> + */
> +enum fw_cmd_class {
> + FW_CMD_CLASS_UVERBS,
> + FW_CMD_CLASS_FWCTL,
> + FW_CMD_CLASS_MAX,
Nitpick. Drop the trailing comma to make it a tiny bit more obvious if
someone accidentally adds anything after this counting entry.
> +};
> +
> /*
> * Data exported by the security modules
> */
> @@ -575,6 +591,9 @@ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
> int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, struct lsm_context *cp);
> int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what);
> +int security_fw_validate_cmd(const void *in, size_t in_len,
> + const struct device *dev,
> + enum fw_cmd_class class_id, u32 id);
> int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, u32 *uctx_len,
> void *val, size_t val_len, u64 id, u64 flags);
> int security_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev);
> @@ -1589,6 +1608,12 @@ static inline int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> +static inline int security_fw_validate_cmd(const void *in, size_t in_len,
> + const struct device *dev,
> + enum fw_cmd_class class_id, u32 id)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> static inline int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx,
> u32 *uctx_len, void *val, size_t val_len,
> u64 id, u64 flags)
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 67af9228c4e94..d05941fe89a48 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -5373,6 +5373,32 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down);
>
> +/**
> + * security_fw_validate_cmd() - Validate a firmware command
> + * @in: pointer to the firmware command input buffer
> + * @in_len: length of the firmware command input buffer
> + * @dev: device associated with the command
> + * @class_id: class of the firmware command
> + * @id: device identifier, specific to the command @class_id
> + *
> + * Check permissions before sending a firmware command generated by
> + * userspace to the device.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_fw_validate_cmd(const void *in, size_t in_len,
> + const struct device *dev,
> + enum fw_cmd_class class_id,
> + u32 id)
I'd follow the wrapping you have in the header and have id on the line
above.
> +{
> + if (class_id >= FW_CMD_CLASS_MAX)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + return call_int_hook(fw_validate_cmd, in, in_len,
> + dev, class_id, id);
Fits on one line < 80 chars.
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_fw_validate_cmd);
> +
> /**
> * security_bdev_alloc() - Allocate a block device LSM blob
> * @bdev: block device
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-09 15:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-09 11:15 [PATCH 0/3] Firmware LSM hook Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-09 11:15 ` [PATCH 1/3] lsm: add hook for firmware command validation Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-09 15:02 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2026-03-09 15:25 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-09 17:00 ` Dave Jiang
2026-03-09 11:15 ` [PATCH 2/3] RDMA/mlx5: Invoke fw_validate_cmd LSM hook for DEVX commands Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-09 15:10 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 16:59 ` Dave Jiang
2026-03-09 11:15 ` [PATCH 3/3] fwctl/mlx5: Invoke fw_validate_cmd LSM hook for fwctl commands Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-09 15:12 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-09 16:57 ` Dave Jiang
2026-03-09 18:32 ` [PATCH 0/3] Firmware LSM hook Paul Moore
2026-03-09 19:37 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-09 23:10 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-10 9:07 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-10 16:29 ` Stephen Smalley
2026-03-10 17:57 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-10 18:24 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-10 19:30 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-10 21:40 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-11 8:19 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-03-11 16:06 ` Paul Moore
2026-03-11 19:16 ` Leon Romanovsky
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