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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] KVM: x86: Syzkaller nested_run_pending defense
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2026 15:45:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260310224546.2582118-1-seanjc@google.com> (raw)

Defeat syzkaller once and for all when it comes to nested_run_pending (yeah,
those words won't come back to haunt me), by treating nested_run_pending as
"untrusted" for the purposes of WARNs if userspace gains control of the vCPU.
I.e. don't WARN if userspace _may_ have stuffed vCPU state to force an
impossible VM-Exit.

We've reached the point where the signal:noise ratio for nested_run_pending
WARNs when syzkaller is fuzzing nVMX/nSVM is awful, and playing whack-a-mole
with syzkaller is doing more harm that good at this point.  While it's
possible syzkaller could find an actual KVM bug by stuffing vCPU state, if the
_only_ symptom is the nested_run_pending WARN, then in theory the bug should
also be hittable by stuffing L2 state prior to nested VM-Enter.

Sean Christopherson (1):
  KVM: x86: Suppress WARNs on nested_run_pending after userspace exit

Yosry Ahmed (1):
  KVM: x86: Move nested_run_pending to kvm_vcpu_arch

 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 15 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c       | 23 ++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          | 16 +++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h          |  4 ---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c       | 50 +++++++++++++++++----------------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 16 +++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h          |  3 --
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |  7 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              | 10 +++++++
 9 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)


base-commit: 5128b972fb2801ad9aca54d990a75611ab5283a9
-- 
2.53.0.473.g4a7958ca14-goog


             reply	other threads:[~2026-03-10 22:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-10 22:45 Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-03-10 22:45 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: x86: Move nested_run_pending to kvm_vcpu_arch Sean Christopherson
2026-03-10 22:45 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: x86: Suppress WARNs on nested_run_pending after userspace exit Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11  1:53   ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-11 13:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-11 18:23       ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-12 14:22         ` Sean Christopherson

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