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From: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
To: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	imbrenda@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@linux.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] s390/mm: add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory
Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2026 08:00:53 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260311070053.9469A4e-hca@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260310150408.160722-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>

On Tue, Mar 10, 2026 at 03:02:42PM +0000, Janosch Frank wrote:
> There are special cases where secure storage access exceptions happen
> in a kernel context for pages that don't have the PG_arch_1 bit
> set. That bit is set for non-exported guest secure storage (memory)
> but is absent on storage donated to the Ultravisor since the kernel
> isn't allowed to export donated pages.
> 
> Prior to this patch we would try to export the page by calling
> arch_make_folio_accessible() which would instantly return since the
> arch bit is absent signifying that the page was already exported and
> no further action is necessary. This leads to secure storage access
> exception loops which can never be resolved.
> 
> With this patch we unconditionally try to export and if that fails we
> fixup.
> 
> Fixes: 084ea4d611a3 ("s390/mm: add (non)secure page access exceptions handlers")
> Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
> Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> 
> Changed fault error handling to nolock. (Heiko)
> Added PG_arch_1 cleanup requested off-list. (Claudio)
> 
> ---
>  arch/s390/mm/fault.c | 11 +++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
> index a52aa7a99b6b..191cc53caead 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/s390/mm/fault.c
> @@ -441,10 +441,17 @@ void do_secure_storage_access(struct pt_regs *regs)
>  		folio = phys_to_folio(addr);
>  		if (unlikely(!folio_try_get(folio)))
>  			return;
> -		rc = arch_make_folio_accessible(folio);
> +		rc = uv_convert_from_secure(folio_to_phys(folio));
> +		if (!rc)
> +			clear_bit(PG_arch_1, &folio->flags.f);
>  		folio_put(folio);

Isn't the clear_bit() racy? That is: another CPU could make the page secure
again, set (the still set) PG_arch_1, and then clear_bit() removes the bit,
and we end up with a secure page where PG_arch_1 is not set?
Which in turn would arch_make_folio_accessible() al

Or is that not possible?

Just wondering, since __make_folio_secure() requires the folio to be locked
when setting PG_arch_1, while clearing happens unlocked. But chances are high
that I don't understand the code.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-11  7:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-10 15:02 [PATCH v2] s390/mm: add missing secure storage access fixups for donated memory Janosch Frank
2026-03-10 16:36 ` Christian Borntraeger
2026-03-10 18:50 ` Claudio Imbrenda
2026-03-11  7:00 ` Heiko Carstens [this message]
2026-03-11 14:17   ` Janosch Frank
2026-03-11 14:36     ` Heiko Carstens

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