From: Minseo Park <jacob.park.9436@gmail.com>
To: marcel@holtmann.org, luiz.dentz@gmail.com
Cc: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
syzbot+b7f3e7d9a596bf6a63e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
Minseo Park <jacob.park.9436@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_ecred_conn_req
Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 22:14:37 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260315131437.10890-1-jacob.park.9436@gmail.com> (raw)
Syzbot reported a KASAN stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_build_cmd()
that is triggered by a malformed Enhanced Credit Based Connection Request.
The vulnerability stems from l2cap_ecred_conn_req(). The function allocates
a local stack buffer (`pdu`) designed to hold a maximum of 5 Source Channel
IDs (SCIDs), totaling 18 bytes. When an attacker sends a request with more
than 5 SCIDs, the function calculates `rsp_len` based on this unvalidated
`cmd_len` before checking if the number of SCIDs exceeds
L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID.
If the SCID count is too high, the function correctly jumps to the
`response` label to reject the packet, but `rsp_len` retains the
attacker's oversized value. Consequently, l2cap_send_cmd() is instructed
to read past the end of the 18-byte `pdu` buffer, triggering a
KASAN panic.
Fix this by moving the assignment of `rsp_len` to after the `num_scid`
boundary check. If the packet is rejected, `rsp_len` will safely
remain 0, and the error response will only read the 8-byte base header
from the stack.
Fixes: c28d2bff7044 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix result of L2CAP_ECRED_CONN_RSP when MTU is too short")
Reported-by: syzbot+b7f3e7d9a596bf6a63e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b7f3e7d9a596bf6a63e3
Tested-by: syzbot+b7f3e7d9a596bf6a63e3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Minseo Park <jacob.park.9436@gmail.com>
---
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index ad98db9632fd..abd091155d04 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -5075,14 +5075,14 @@ static inline int l2cap_ecred_conn_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
cmd_len -= sizeof(*req);
num_scid = cmd_len / sizeof(u16);
- /* Always respond with the same number of scids as in the request */
- rsp_len = cmd_len;
-
if (num_scid > L2CAP_ECRED_MAX_CID) {
result = L2CAP_CR_LE_INVALID_PARAMS;
goto response;
}
+ /* Always respond with the same number of scids as in the request */
+ rsp_len = cmd_len;
+
mtu = __le16_to_cpu(req->mtu);
mps = __le16_to_cpu(req->mps);
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-03-15 13:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-15 13:14 Minseo Park [this message]
2026-03-16 20:00 ` [PATCH] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix stack-out-of-bounds read in l2cap_ecred_conn_req patchwork-bot+bluetooth
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