[PATCH 4/4] x86/cpu: Add comment clarifying CRn pinning

[Borislav Petkov <bp@kernel.org>]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

To avoid future confusion on the purpose and design of the CRn pinning code.

Also note that if the attacker controls page-tables, the CRn bits lose much of
the attraction anyway.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260320092521.GG3739106@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index c57e8972d30f..ec0670114efa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -434,6 +434,19 @@ static __always_inline void setup_lass(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 /* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */
 static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask = X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP |
 					     X86_CR4_FSGSBASE | X86_CR4_CET;
+
+/*
+ * The CR pinning protects against ROP on the 'mov %reg, %CRn' instruction(s).
+ * Since you can ROP directly to these instructions (barring shadow stack),
+ * any protection must follow immediately and unconditionally after that.
+ *
+ * Specifically, the CR[04] write functions below will have the value
+ * validation controlled by the @cr_pinning static_branch which is
+ * __ro_after_init, just like the cr4_pinned_bits value.
+ *
+ * Once set, an attacker will have to defeat page-tables to get around these
+ * restrictions. Which is a much bigger ask than 'simple' ROP.
+ */
 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
 static unsigned long cr4_pinned_bits __ro_after_init;
 
-- 
2.51.0