Re: [PATCH v3 4/9] lsm: framework for BPF integrity verification

Paul Moore
2026-03-31T22:05:11Z

On Fri, Mar 27, 2026 at 2:25 PM Song Liu <song@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 27, 2026 at 10:54 AM Blaise Boscaccy
> <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> >
> > Song Liu <song@kernel.org> writes:
> >
> > > On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 11:07 PM Blaise Boscaccy
> > > <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
> > > [...]
> > >> The first new callback, bpf_prog_load_integrity(), located within the
> > >> security_bpf_prog_load() hook, is necessary to ensure that the integrity
> > >> verification callbacks are executed before any of the existing LSMs
> > >> are executed via the bpf_prog_load() callback. Reusing the existing
> > >> bpf_prog_load() callback for integrity verification could result in LSMs
> > >> not having access to the integrity verification results when asked to
> > >> authorize the BPF program load in the bpf_prog_load() callback.
> > >>
> > >> The new LSM hook, security_bpf_prog_load_post_integrity(), is intended
> > >> to be called from within LSMs performing BPF program integrity
> > >> verification. It is used to report the verdict of the integrity
> > >> verification to other LSMs enforcing access control policy on BPF
> > >> program loads. LSMs enforcing such access controls should register a
> > >> bpf_prog_load_post_integrity() callback to receive integrity verdicts.
> > >
> > > bpf_prog_load_post_integrity() is weird. Some questions about it:
> > >
> > > 1. Is it possible to call it from other LSMs (not hornet)? Specifically, is it
> > > possible to call it from BPF LSM?
> >
> > There is nothing hornet exclusive about that security hook. If the BPF
> > LSM folks wanted to use it they would probably need to implement a
> > kfunc to invoke it.
>
> Please also include the kfunc in v4.

Blaise is welcome to provide a kfunc for
bpf_prog_load_post_integrity(), but I don't see that as a requirement
for Hornet's acceptance. If a developer wanted to write a service
LSM, like Hornet, in BPF to verify a BPF program's integrity, that
developer would be responsible for implementing the kfunc. If you are
interested in doing that, I suggest you talk with KP as he is the BPF
LSM maintainer and I suspect he may have some concerns around
supporting that (see prior discussions around BPF signature
verification and his own implementation of BPF signature
verification).

As a reminder, if you want to apply security policy to a BPF program
load operation without considering the program's integrity or
provenance, you can do that today with the
security_bpf_prog_load()/bpf_prog_load hook/callback combination.

However, as you pointed out, we ultimately need to see at least one
LSM providing a callback for the bpf_prog_load_post_integrity
callback. I wrote a toy SELinux implementation when I was playing
with Hornet a couple of revisions ago, which could serve as the basis
for a proper patch if needed, but my understanding is that Blaise has
been working with Fan on an IPE implementation.

--
paul-moore.com