* [PATCH 0/3] Add support for ML-DSA signature for EVM and IMA
@ 2026-04-05 23:12 Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-05 23:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, ebiggers, Stefan Berger
Based on IMA sigv3 type of signatures, add support for ML-DSA signature
for EVM and IMA. Use the existing ML-DSA hashless signing mode (pure mode).
Stefan
Stefan Berger (3):
crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys
integrity: Refactor asymmetric_verify for reusability
integrity: Add support for sigv3 verification using ML-DSA keys
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 -
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
base-commit: 82bbd447199ff1441031d2eaf9afe041550cf525
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys
2026-04-05 23:12 [PATCH 0/3] Add support for ML-DSA signature for EVM and IMA Stefan Berger
@ 2026-04-05 23:12 ` Stefan Berger
2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 2/3] integrity: Refactor asymmetric_verify for reusability Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 3/3] integrity: Add support for sigv3 verification using ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
2 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-05 23:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, ebiggers, Stefan Berger,
David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, keyrings,
linux-crypto
Remove the check for the hash_algo since ML-DSA is only used in pure mode
and there is no relevance of a hash_algo for the input data.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 09a0b83d5d77..df6918a77ab8 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -147,11 +147,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) {
if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (!hash_algo)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (strcmp(hash_algo, "none") != 0 &&
- strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0)
- return -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Unknown public key algorithm */
return -ENOPKG;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/3] integrity: Refactor asymmetric_verify for reusability
2026-04-05 23:12 [PATCH 0/3] Add support for ML-DSA signature for EVM and IMA Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
@ 2026-04-05 23:12 ` Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 3/3] integrity: Add support for sigv3 verification using ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-05 23:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, ebiggers, Stefan Berger
Refactor asymmetric_verify for reusability. Have it call
asymmetric_verify_common with the signature verification key and the
public_key structure as parameters. sigv3 support for ML-DSA will need to
check the public key type first to decide how to do the signature
verification and therefore will have these parameters available for
calling asymmetric_verify_common.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 6e68ec3becbd..e29ed73f15cd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -79,18 +79,15 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
return key;
}
-int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
- int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
+static int asymmetric_verify_common(const struct key *key,
+ const struct public_key *pk,
+ const char *sig, int siglen,
+ const char *data, int datalen)
{
- struct public_key_signature pks;
struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
- const struct public_key *pk;
- struct key *key;
+ struct public_key_signature pks;
int ret;
- if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
siglen -= sizeof(*hdr);
if (siglen != be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
@@ -99,15 +96,10 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
if (hdr->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
return -ENOPKG;
- key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- return PTR_ERR(key);
-
memset(&pks, 0, sizeof(pks));
pks.hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo];
- pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key);
pks.pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo;
if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "rsa")) {
pks.encoding = "pkcs1";
@@ -127,11 +119,33 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
pks.s_size = siglen;
ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
out:
- key_put(key);
pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
+int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
+ int siglen, const char *data, int datalen)
+{
+ struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+ const struct public_key *pk;
+ struct key *key;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
+ pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key);
+
+ ret = asymmetric_verify_common(key, pk, sig, siglen, data, datalen);
+
+ key_put(key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* calc_file_id_hash - calculate the hash of the ima_file_id struct data
* @type: xattr type [enum evm_ima_xattr_type]
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/3] integrity: Add support for sigv3 verification using ML-DSA keys
2026-04-05 23:12 [PATCH 0/3] Add support for ML-DSA signature for EVM and IMA Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 2/3] integrity: Refactor asymmetric_verify for reusability Stefan Berger
@ 2026-04-05 23:12 ` Stefan Berger
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-05 23:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-integrity, linux-security-module
Cc: linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, ebiggers, Stefan Berger
Add support for sigv3 signature verification using ML-DSA in pure mode.
When a sigv3 signature is verified, first check whether the key to use
for verification is an ML-DSA key and therefore uses a hashless signature
verification scheme. The hashless signature verification method uses the
ima_file_id structure directly for signature verification rather than
its digest.
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index e29ed73f15cd..e25534117c16 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -190,17 +190,91 @@ static int calc_file_id_hash(enum evm_ima_xattr_type type,
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * asymmetric_verify_v3_hashless - Use hashless signature verification on sigv3
+ * @key: The key to use for signature verification
+ * @pk: The associated public key
+ * @encoding: The encoding the key type uses
+ * @sig: The signature
+ * @siglen: The length of the xattr signature
+ * @algo: The hash algorithm
+ * @digest: The file digest
+ *
+ * Create an ima_file_id structure and use it for signature verification
+ * directly. This can be used for ML-DSA in pure mode for example.
+ */
+static int asymmetric_verify_v3_hashless(struct key *key,
+ const struct public_key *pk,
+ const char *encoding,
+ const char *sig, int siglen,
+ u8 algo,
+ const u8 *digest)
+{
+ struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
+ struct ima_file_id file_id = {
+ .hash_type = hdr->type,
+ .hash_algorithm = algo,
+ };
+ size_t digest_size = hash_digest_size[algo];
+ struct public_key_signature pks = {
+ .m = (u8 *)&file_id,
+ .m_size = sizeof(file_id) - (HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE - digest_size),
+ .s = hdr->sig,
+ .s_size = siglen - sizeof(*hdr),
+ .pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo,
+ .hash_algo = hash_algo_name[hdr->hash_algo],
+ .encoding = encoding,
+ };
+ int ret;
+
+ if (hdr->type != IMA_VERITY_DIGSIG &&
+ hdr->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
+ hdr->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (pks.s_size != be16_to_cpu(hdr->sig_size))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ memcpy(file_id.hash, digest, digest_size);
+
+ ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
+ pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int asymmetric_verify_v3(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen,
const char *data, int datalen, u8 algo)
{
struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig;
struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ const struct public_key *pk;
+ struct key *key;
int rc;
- rc = calc_file_id_hash(hdr->type, algo, data, &hash);
- if (rc)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (siglen <= sizeof(*hdr))
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid));
+ if (IS_ERR(key))
+ return PTR_ERR(key);
- return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, hash.digest,
- hash.hdr.length);
+ pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key);
+ if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "mldsa", 5)) {
+ rc = asymmetric_verify_v3_hashless(key, pk, "raw",
+ sig, siglen, algo, data);
+ } else {
+ rc = calc_file_id_hash(hdr->type, algo, data, &hash);
+ if (rc) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_exit;
+ }
+
+ rc = asymmetric_verify_common(key, pk, sig, siglen, hash.digest,
+ hash.hdr.length);
+ }
+
+err_exit:
+ key_put(key);
+
+ return rc;
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
@ 2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2026-04-06 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, zohar,
roberto.sassu, David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin,
keyrings, linux-crypto
On Sun, Apr 05, 2026 at 07:12:22PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> Remove the check for the hash_algo since ML-DSA is only used in pure mode
> and there is no relevance of a hash_algo for the input data.
>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win>
> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 -----
> 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 09a0b83d5d77..df6918a77ab8 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -147,11 +147,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
> strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) {
> if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> - if (!hash_algo)
> - return -EINVAL;
> - if (strcmp(hash_algo, "none") != 0 &&
> - strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0)
> - return -EINVAL;
Does this broaden which hash algorithms are accepted for CMS signatures
that use ML-DSA and contain signed attributes?
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-06 16:55 UTC | newest]
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2026-04-05 23:12 [PATCH 0/3] Add support for ML-DSA signature for EVM and IMA Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 2/3] integrity: Refactor asymmetric_verify for reusability Stefan Berger
2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 3/3] integrity: Add support for sigv3 verification using ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
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