From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp-190a.mail.infomaniak.ch (smtp-190a.mail.infomaniak.ch [185.125.25.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 03D93281525 for ; Thu, 9 Apr 2026 16:40:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=185.125.25.10 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1775752820; cv=none; b=EnO0/2PpNPkTxbU45dCc7n2j03Jik7waP3sQI79wAUyg20yCQHZXi4Yv9Qvdz9mv5xRr22TZZJSUgT0nvcAdiPV14MvAPTRMIMPSyvu0ia+rS1LTi2c/G4/j7+Vw4pOCAxA8U/Vamts/bcdbIomS5z3FDstoSDOCoPIqeLsAdtg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1775752820; c=relaxed/simple; bh=w8RWqMIPM9dHKurNWL/EV36P5jVrHJ45BQDjK03ucxs=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=g1RBc2XG83j4pykQbf10a2DUJGRBeVPgaI7SCRc5gGFirYGuj//j2kx4vynDAYqeoiLs6zlp94HrIp0cswyuxqNPhx0uxCBtnJ6Ccff/gqKNYdDRHSQhf0MzxUWbAOOH/6Ufp1nVjCEz9GRnPsuuTHN3lzf3yJFFMdiHPPlSPgw= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=digikod.net; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.b=l6klxyko; arc=none smtp.client-ip=185.125.25.10 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=digikod.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=digikod.net header.i=@digikod.net header.b="l6klxyko" Received: from smtp-3-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (unknown [IPv6:2001:1600:4:17::246b]) by smtp-3-3000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4fs5JS3Ld4z7ct; Thu, 9 Apr 2026 18:40:08 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=digikod.net; s=20191114; t=1775752808; bh=Oeswz4s2QGqXLtf96J6c7pMhOlBQo2ulYnDM2Ex2I7o=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=l6klxykodXS7PAmGnOrmN20zixZJOyFizvKpZuwZK5bZjYEXd6xZ+WImR6ieZjM0A kR32E1jh7Nv9BYeOKKuzSwkeSKz9WQlmuByl9G4+vowVkdbIfu2YSxP39EZdb/e4Vy ETStdXlrIQl2XL6A15pgM0xCse2bnk4tHVomTH0Y= Received: from unknown by smtp-3-0000.mail.infomaniak.ch (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 4fs5JR0T5szdll; Thu, 9 Apr 2026 18:40:07 +0200 (CEST) Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 18:40:03 +0200 From: =?utf-8?Q?Micka=C3=ABl_Sala=C3=BCn?= To: Christian Brauner Cc: =?utf-8?Q?G=C3=BCnther?= Noack , Paul Moore , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Justin Suess , Lennart Poettering , Mikhail Ivanov , Nicolas Bouchinet , Shervin Oloumi , Tingmao Wang , kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Durning Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] security: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces Message-ID: <20260409.Mei6Yei0beeZ@digikod.net> References: <20260312100444.2609563-1-mic@digikod.net> <20260312100444.2609563-2-mic@digikod.net> <20260325-filmverleih-auffressen-e897fcf8d3f2@brauner> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20260325-filmverleih-auffressen-e897fcf8d3f2@brauner> X-Infomaniak-Routing: alpha On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 01:31:30PM +0100, Christian Brauner wrote: > On Thu, Mar 12, 2026 at 11:04:34AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > From: Christian Brauner > > > > All namespace types now share the same ns_common infrastructure. Extend > > this to include a security blob so LSMs can start managing namespaces > > uniformly without having to add one-off hooks or security fields to > > every individual namespace type. > > > > Add a ns_security pointer to ns_common and the corresponding lbs_ns > > blob size to lsm_blob_sizes. Allocation and freeing hooks are called > > from the common __ns_common_init() and __ns_common_free() paths so > > every namespace type gets covered in one go. All information about the > > namespace type and the appropriate casting helpers to get at the > > containing namespace are available via ns_common making it > > straightforward for LSMs to differentiate when they need to. > > > > A namespace_install hook is called from validate_ns() during setns(2) > > giving LSMs a chance to enforce policy on namespace transitions. > > > > Individual namespace types can still have their own specialized security > > hooks when needed. This is just the common baseline that makes it easy > > to track and manage namespaces from the security side without requiring > > every namespace type to reinvent the wheel. > > > > Cc: Günther Noack > > Cc: Paul Moore > > Cc: Serge E. Hallyn > > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260216-work-security-namespace-v1-1-075c28758e1f@kernel.org > > --- > > include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 ++ > > include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + > > include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h | 3 ++ > > include/linux/security.h | 20 ++++++++ > > kernel/nscommon.c | 12 +++++ > > kernel/nsproxy.c | 8 +++- > > security/lsm_init.c | 2 + > > security/security.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > 8 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > > index 8c42b4bde09c..fefd3aa6d8f4 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h > > @@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -ENOSYS, task_prctl, int option, unsigned long arg2, > > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_to_inode, struct task_struct *p, > > struct inode *inode) > > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, userns_create, const struct cred *cred) > > +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_alloc, struct ns_common *ns) > > +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, namespace_free, struct ns_common *ns) > > +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_install, const struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns) > > LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ipc_permission, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) > > LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, ipc_getlsmprop, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, > > struct lsm_prop *prop) > > diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > > index d48bf0ad26f4..3e7afe76e86c 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > > +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h > > @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes { > > unsigned int lbs_ipc; > > unsigned int lbs_key; > > unsigned int lbs_msg_msg; > > + unsigned int lbs_ns; > > unsigned int lbs_perf_event; > > unsigned int lbs_task; > > unsigned int lbs_xattr_count; /* num xattr slots in new_xattrs array */ > > diff --git a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h > > index 0014fbc1c626..170288e2e895 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h > > +++ b/include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h > > @@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ struct ns_common { > > struct dentry *stashed; > > const struct proc_ns_operations *ops; > > unsigned int inum; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > > + void *ns_security; > > +#endif > > union { > > struct ns_tree; > > struct rcu_head ns_rcu; > > diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h > > index 83a646d72f6f..611b9098367d 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/security.h > > +++ b/include/linux/security.h > > @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum fs_value_type; > > struct watch; > > struct watch_notification; > > struct lsm_ctx; > > +struct nsset; > > > > /* Default (no) options for the capable function */ > > #define CAP_OPT_NONE 0x0 > > @@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ struct lsm_ctx; > > > > struct ctl_table; > > struct audit_krule; > > +struct ns_common; > > struct user_namespace; > > struct timezone; > > > > @@ -533,6 +535,9 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, > > unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); > > void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); > > int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred); > > +int security_namespace_alloc(struct ns_common *ns); > > +void security_namespace_free(struct ns_common *ns); > > +int security_namespace_install(const struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns); > > int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); > > void security_ipc_getlsmprop(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, struct lsm_prop *prop); > > int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); > > @@ -1407,6 +1412,21 @@ static inline int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) > > return 0; > > } > > > > +static inline int security_namespace_alloc(struct ns_common *ns) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > +static inline void security_namespace_free(struct ns_common *ns) > > +{ > > +} > > + > > +static inline int security_namespace_install(const struct nsset *nsset, > > + struct ns_common *ns) > > +{ > > + return 0; > > +} > > + > > static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, > > short flag) > > { > > diff --git a/kernel/nscommon.c b/kernel/nscommon.c > > index bdc3c86231d3..de774e374f9d 100644 > > --- a/kernel/nscommon.c > > +++ b/kernel/nscommon.c > > @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ > > #include > > #include > > #include > > +#include > > #include > > #include > > > > @@ -59,6 +60,9 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope > > > > refcount_set(&ns->__ns_ref, 1); > > ns->stashed = NULL; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY > > + ns->ns_security = NULL; > > +#endif > > ns->ops = ops; > > ns->ns_id = 0; > > ns->ns_type = ns_type; > > @@ -77,6 +81,13 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope > > ret = proc_alloc_inum(&ns->inum); > > if (ret) > > return ret; > > + > > + ret = security_namespace_alloc(ns); > > + if (ret) { > > + proc_free_inum(ns->inum); > > ret = security_namespace_alloc(ns); > if (ret && !inum) > proc_free_inum(ns->inum); > return ret; > > > > + return ret; > > + } > > + > > /* > > * Tree ref starts at 0. It's incremented when namespace enters > > * active use (installed in nsproxy) and decremented when all > > @@ -91,6 +102,7 @@ int __ns_common_init(struct ns_common *ns, u32 ns_type, const struct proc_ns_ope > > > > void __ns_common_free(struct ns_common *ns) > > { > > + security_namespace_free(ns); > > proc_free_inum(ns->inum); > > } > > > > diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c > > index 259c4b4f1eeb..f0b30d1907e7 100644 > > --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c > > +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c > > @@ -379,7 +379,13 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset) > > > > static inline int validate_ns(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns) > > { > > - return ns->ops->install(nsset, ns); > > + int ret; > > + > > + ret = ns->ops->install(nsset, ns); > > + if (ret) > > + return ret; > > + > > + return security_namespace_install(nsset, ns); > > In my local tree I had that moved before the ->install() and I think > that's the correct thing to do. So please switch to that. Looks good, I'll include your fixes in the next version. > > The rest looks good to me, thanks. Another issue raised by Daniel Durning [1] is freeing of anonymous namespaces. I'll extend this patch with this new hunk if that's ok: diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 854f4fc66469..f6977e59be7d 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -4186,6 +4186,8 @@ static void free_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns) { if (!is_anon_ns(ns)) ns_common_free(ns); + else + security_namespace_free(&ns->ns); dec_mnt_namespaces(ns->ucounts); mnt_ns_tree_remove(ns); } Daniel, could you please confirm that this fixes the memory leak? [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260330193100.3603-1-danieldurning.work@gmail.com/ > > +/** > > + * security_namespace_free() - Release LSM security data from a namespace > > + * @ns: the namespace being freed > > + * > > + * Release security data attached to the namespace. Called before the > > + * namespace structure is freed. > > + * > > + * Note: The namespace may be freed via kfree_rcu(). LSMs must use > > + * RCU-safe freeing for any data that might be accessed by concurrent > > + * RCU readers. > > + */ > > +void security_namespace_free(struct ns_common *ns) > > +{ > > + if (!ns->ns_security) > > + return; > > + > > + call_void_hook(namespace_free, ns); > > + > > + kfree(ns->ns_security); > > + ns->ns_security = NULL; I think it would be safer to replace these two lines with: kfree_rcu_mightsleep(ns->ns_security) > > +}