From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F30C72DEA89; Thu, 9 Apr 2026 16:08:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1775750881; cv=none; b=S9fkg5QrTZV+DfJk+G7YACOxEj+ANd5ruvhX8HHMItjEUuvcV/T5fttlv/3ypOcTyHrLFwUZwPiye+bRE7ZX7n5mIMb8qX43BqzeMZkSvReFESIM21NDybFC9X4gpfnWKRgHnRd04mIwubETSShhUkGg5X4te/Mb/QCTD8X3j9c= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1775750881; c=relaxed/simple; bh=x0/JEhLtTxz3D2AOHxBhkjdpSaAoxrlbb3O+q/VUPKw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:MIME-Version; b=OtDe5vdaEUySUTs+7ObFYr+T3IpDMO8dqt4EAneHZtbuJ/z792wx5go5zDMqrohJINZLqQ8V3fepYdLIY8Dlm18KPBQvlIb132OkNcZM1w/RVkF06TqME3DO6gvyDMFVlAV/EZxj1OZXbfCeD1Yg4+2HjP3Rd5L2DcFPHcnSTY4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=MeNb+GFX; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="MeNb+GFX" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EE865C4CEF7; Thu, 9 Apr 2026 16:07:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1775750880; bh=x0/JEhLtTxz3D2AOHxBhkjdpSaAoxrlbb3O+q/VUPKw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:From; b=MeNb+GFXXwFRmD/VA0llkRhpb9ceUUy15KcYbD+cV7GKR1iX2Uh2Yf70+qtxSN+tY J9hrx9MspQLJsrR/U7MhgDo95z08ItRe5Jd0vLIPqmIQX6WJSX0A0jzXtZ+iv0/w5D wvCpIfDgIV9yaqmLe+hDG1ob8vz5k2xALp+tgsE+f6JcMkxAdh/I14dM9Hx3UIjKza S4Ky/wg8qOB33Vk/G8lsuM9E8wO8FJiiESJXHie4Pz8xriUe53u7wavmP5x/pwyKk8 xBBkBmVJxm4VsE82La6ILcUsT29me8IMN9VIOLyIYUJtomzEm4RuO82OsCpmxLbMQ0 3coEKtX/2BNGw== From: Jarkko Sakinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Srish Srinivasan , Nayna Jain , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Ahmad Fatoum , Pengutronix Kernel Team , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v3] KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 19:07:51 +0300 Message-Id: <20260409160752.988713-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jarkko Sakkinen TPM_DEBUG, and other similar flags, are a non-standard way to specify a feature in Linux kernel. Introduce CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG for trusted keys, and use it to replace these ad-hoc feature flags. Given that trusted keys debug dumps can contain sensitive data, harden the feature as follows: 1. In the Kconfig description postulate that pr_debug() statements must be used. 2. Use pr_debug() statements in TPM 1.x driver to print the protocol dump. 3. Require trusted.debug=1 on the kernel command line (default: 0) to activate dumps at runtime, even when CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG=y. Traces, when actually needed, can be easily enabled by providing trusted.dyndbg='+p' and trusted.debug=1 in the kernel command-line. Cc: Srish Srinivasan Reported-by: Nayna Jain Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/7f8b8478-5cd8-4d97-bfd0-341fd5cf10f9@linux.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v3: - Add kernel-command line option for enabling the traces. - Add safety information to the Kconfig entry. v2: - Implement for all trusted keys backends. - Add HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG as it is a good practice despite full coverage. --- include/keys/trusted-type.h | 21 ++++++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 23 ++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c | 7 ++-- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 6 ++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 44 +++++++++++++---------- 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index 03527162613f..9f9940482da4 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -83,18 +83,21 @@ struct trusted_key_source { extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; -#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG +extern bool trusted_debug; -#if TRUSTED_DEBUG static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) { - pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); - pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); - pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + pr_debug("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_debug("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_debug("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); } #else static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig index 9e00482d886a..c1ae7db1f612 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig @@ -1,10 +1,29 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS bool +config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + bool + +config TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + bool "Debug trusted keys" + depends on HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG + default n + help + Trusted keys backends and core code that support debug traces can + opt-in that feature here. Traces must only use debug level output, as + sensitive data may pass by. In the kernel-command line traces can be + enabled via trusted.dyndbg='+p'. + + SAFETY: Debug dumps are inactive at runtime until trusted.debug=1 is + set on the kernel command-line. Use at your utmost consideration when + enabling this feature on a production build. The general advice is not + to do this. + config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS @@ -23,6 +42,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_TEE bool "TEE-based trusted keys" depends on TEE >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as trusted @@ -33,6 +53,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_CAAM depends on CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR >= TRUSTED_KEYS select CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_BLOB_GEN default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module @@ -42,6 +63,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_DCP bool "DCP-based trusted keys" depends on CRYPTO_DEV_MXS_DCP >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of NXP's DCP (Data Co-Processor) as trusted key backend. @@ -50,6 +72,7 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS_PKWM bool "PKWM-based trusted keys" depends on PSERIES_PLPKS >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y + select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help Enable use of IBM PowerVM Key Wrapping Module (PKWM) as a trusted key backend. diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c index 601943ce0d60..6a33dbf2a7f5 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_caam.c @@ -28,10 +28,13 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {opt_err, NULL} }; -#ifdef CAAM_DEBUG +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) { - pr_info("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + pr_debug("key encryption algo %d\n", pkey_info->key_enc_algo); } #else static inline void dump_options(const struct caam_pkey_info *pkey_info) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 9046123d94de..9ce2459d14b4 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ static char *trusted_rng = "default"; module_param_named(rng, trusted_rng, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(rng, "Select trusted key RNG"); +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG +bool trusted_debug; +module_param_named(debug, trusted_debug, bool, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Enable trusted keys debug traces (default: 0)"); +#endif + static char *trusted_key_source; module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm, tee, caam, dcp or pkwm)"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index c865c97aa1b4..b9fa2b4205cf 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -46,38 +46,44 @@ enum { SRK_keytype = 4 }; -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 - -#if TPM_DEBUG +#ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { - pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); - pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); - pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); - pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); } static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); - pr_info("secret:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); - pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + + print_hex_dump_debug("trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); + pr_debug("secret:\n"); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); + pr_debug("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, &s->enonce, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); } static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) { int len; - pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n"); + if (!trusted_debug) + return; + pr_debug("\ntpm buffer\n"); len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); + print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); } #else static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) -- 2.39.5