From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: sched-ext@lists.linux.dev, David Vernet <void@manifault.com>,
Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>,
Changwoo Min <changwoo@igalia.com>
Cc: Cheng-Yang Chou <yphbchou0911@gmail.com>,
Juntong Deng <juntong.deng@outlook.com>,
Ching-Chun Huang <jserv@ccns.ncku.edu.tw>,
Chia-Ping Tsai <chia7712@gmail.com>,
Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 02/10] sched_ext: Add select_cpu kfuncs to scx_kfunc_ids_unlocked
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2026 20:30:38 -1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260410063046.3556100-3-tj@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260410063046.3556100-1-tj@kernel.org>
select_cpu_from_kfunc() has an extra scx_kf_allowed_if_unlocked() branch
that accepts calls from unlocked contexts and takes task_rq_lock() itself
- a "callable from unlocked" property encoded in the kfunc body rather
than in set membership. That's fine while the runtime check is the
authoritative gate, but the upcoming verifier-time filter uses set
membership as the source of truth and needs it to reflect every context
the kfunc may be called from.
Add the three select_cpu kfuncs to scx_kfunc_ids_unlocked so their full
set of callable contexts is captured by set membership. This follows the
existing dual-set convention used by scx_bpf_dsq_move{,_vtime} and
scx_bpf_dsq_move_set_{slice,vtime}, which are members of both
scx_kfunc_ids_dispatch and scx_kfunc_ids_unlocked.
While at it, add brief comments on each duplicate BTF_ID_FLAGS block
(including the pre-existing dsq_move ones) explaining the dual
membership.
No runtime behavior change: the runtime check in select_cpu_from_kfunc()
remains the authoritative gate until it is removed along with the rest
of the scx_kf_mask enforcement in a follow-up.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
---
kernel/sched/ext.c | 6 ++++++
kernel/sched/ext_idle.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext.c b/kernel/sched/ext.c
index b757b853b42b..cf441fb4b1ad 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/ext.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/ext.c
@@ -8497,6 +8497,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dispatch_nr_slots, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dispatch_cancel, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move_to_local, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move_to_local___v2, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS)
+/* also in scx_kfunc_ids_unlocked: also callable from unlocked contexts */
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move_set_slice, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move_set_vtime, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move, KF_RCU)
@@ -8612,10 +8613,15 @@ __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
BTF_KFUNCS_START(scx_kfunc_ids_unlocked)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_create_dsq, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_SLEEPABLE)
+/* also in scx_kfunc_ids_dispatch: also callable from ops.dispatch() */
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move_set_slice, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move_set_vtime, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move, KF_RCU)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_dsq_move_vtime, KF_RCU)
+/* also in scx_kfunc_ids_select_cpu: also callable from ops.select_cpu()/ops.enqueue() */
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __scx_bpf_select_cpu_and, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_RCU)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_select_cpu_and, KF_RCU)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, scx_bpf_select_cpu_dfl, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_RCU)
BTF_KFUNCS_END(scx_kfunc_ids_unlocked)
static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set scx_kfunc_set_unlocked = {
diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c b/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c
index cd88aee47bd8..8c31fb65477c 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c
@@ -1482,6 +1482,10 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set scx_kfunc_set_idle = {
* contexts where @p's pi_lock state is unknown. Keep them out of
* BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING by registering them in their own set which is exposed
* only to STRUCT_OPS and SYSCALL programs.
+ *
+ * These kfuncs are also members of scx_kfunc_ids_unlocked (see ext.c) because
+ * they're callable from unlocked contexts in addition to ops.select_cpu() and
+ * ops.enqueue().
*/
BTF_KFUNCS_START(scx_kfunc_ids_select_cpu)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __scx_bpf_select_cpu_and, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_RCU)
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-10 6:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-10 6:30 [PATCHSET sched_ext/for-7.1] sched_ext: Add verifier-time kfunc context filter Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 01/10] sched_ext: Drop TRACING access to select_cpu kfuncs Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` Tejun Heo [this message]
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 03/10] sched_ext: Track @p's rq lock across set_cpus_allowed_scx -> ops.set_cpumask Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 04/10] sched_ext: Fix ops.cgroup_move() invocation kf_mask and rq tracking Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 05/10] sched_ext: Decouple kfunc unlocked-context check from kf_mask Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 06/10] sched_ext: Drop redundant rq-locked check from scx_bpf_task_cgroup() Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 07/10] sched_ext: Add verifier-time kfunc context filter Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 08/10] sched_ext: Remove runtime kfunc mask enforcement Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 09/10] sched_ext: Rename scx_kf_allowed_on_arg_tasks() to scx_kf_arg_task_ok() Tejun Heo
2026-04-10 6:30 ` [PATCH 10/10] sched_ext: Warn on task-based SCX op recursion Tejun Heo
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