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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
	"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 20/38] crypto: drbg - Move fixed values into constants
Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2026 23:34:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260420063422.324906-21-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260420063422.324906-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

Since only one drbg_core remains, the state length, block length, and
security strength are now fixed values.  Moreover, the maximum request
length, maximum additional data length, and maximum number of requests
were all already fixed values.

Simplify the code by just using #defines for all these fixed values.

In drbg_seed_from_random(), take advantage of the constant to define the
array size.  Remove assertions that are no longer useful.

In the case of drbg_blocklen() and drbg_statelen(), replace these with a
single value DRBG_STATE_LEN, as for HMAC_DRBG they are the same thing.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/drbg.c | 183 +++++++++++++++++---------------------------------
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)

diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 04c798d7a8b6..34a7cbdda1f1 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -89,25 +89,22 @@
  */
 
 #include <crypto/internal/drbg.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
 #include <linux/fips.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/string_choices.h>
 #include <linux/unaligned.h>
 
 struct drbg_state;
-typedef uint32_t drbg_flag_t;
 
 struct drbg_core {
-	drbg_flag_t flags;	/* flags for the cipher */
-	__u8 statelen;		/* maximum state length */
-	__u8 blocklen_bytes;	/* block size of output in bytes */
 	char cra_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; /* mapping to kernel crypto API */
 	 /* kernel crypto API backend cipher name */
 	char backend_cra_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
 };
 
@@ -115,10 +112,36 @@ enum drbg_seed_state {
 	DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED,
 	DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL, /* Seeded with !rng_is_initialized() */
 	DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL,
 };
 
+/* State length in bytes */
+#define DRBG_STATE_LEN		SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/* Security strength in bytes */
+#define DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH	(SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE / 2)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of requests before reseeding is forced.
+ * SP800-90A allows this to be up to 2**48.  We use a lower value.
+ */
+#define DRBG_MAX_REQUESTS	(1 << 20)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of random bytes that can be requested at once.
+ * SP800-90A allows up to 2**19 bits, which is 2**16 bytes.
+ */
+#define DRBG_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES	(1 << 16)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of additional info and personalization strings, in bytes.
+ * SP800-90A allows up to 2**35 bits, i.e. 2**32 bytes.  We use 2**32 - 2 bytes
+ * so that the value never quite completely fills the range of a size_t,
+ * allowing the health check to verify that larger values are rejected.
+ */
+#define DRBG_MAX_ADDTL		(U32_MAX - 1)
+
 struct drbg_state {
 	struct mutex drbg_mutex;	/* lock around DRBG */
 	unsigned char *V;	/* internal state -- 10.1.2.1 1a */
 	unsigned char *Vbuf;
 	unsigned char *C;	/* current key -- 10.1.2.1 1b */
@@ -134,57 +157,10 @@ struct drbg_state {
 	struct crypto_rng *jent;
 	const struct drbg_core *core;
 	struct drbg_string test_data;
 };
 
-static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
-{
-	if (drbg && drbg->core)
-		return drbg->core->statelen;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline __u8 drbg_blocklen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
-{
-	if (drbg && drbg->core)
-		return drbg->core->blocklen_bytes;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static inline size_t drbg_max_request_bytes(struct drbg_state *drbg)
-{
-	/* SP800-90A requires the limit 2**19 bits, but we return bytes */
-	return (1 << 16);
-}
-
-/*
- * SP800-90A allows implementations to support additional info / personalization
- * strings of up to 2**35 bits.  Implementations can have a smaller maximum.  We
- * use 2**35 - 16 bits == U32_MAX - 1 bytes so that the max + 1 always fits in a
- * size_t, allowing drbg_healthcheck_sanity() to verify its enforcement.
- */
-static inline size_t drbg_max_addtl(struct drbg_state *drbg)
-{
-	return U32_MAX - 1;
-}
-
-static inline size_t drbg_max_requests(struct drbg_state *drbg)
-{
-	/* SP800-90A requires 2**48 maximum requests before reseeding */
-	return (1<<20);
-}
-
-/* DRBG type flags */
-#define DRBG_HMAC	((drbg_flag_t)1<<1)
-#define DRBG_TYPE_MASK	DRBG_HMAC
-/* DRBG strength flags */
-#define DRBG_STRENGTH128	((drbg_flag_t)1<<3)
-#define DRBG_STRENGTH192	((drbg_flag_t)1<<4)
-#define DRBG_STRENGTH256	((drbg_flag_t)1<<5)
-#define DRBG_STRENGTH_MASK	(DRBG_STRENGTH128 | DRBG_STRENGTH192 | \
-				 DRBG_STRENGTH256)
-
 enum drbg_prefixes {
 	DRBG_PREFIX0 = 0x00,
 	DRBG_PREFIX1,
 };
 
@@ -199,46 +175,17 @@ enum drbg_prefixes {
  *
  * Thus, the favored DRBGs are the latest entries in this array.
  */
 static const struct drbg_core drbg_cores[] = {
 	{
-		.flags = DRBG_HMAC | DRBG_STRENGTH256,
-		.statelen = 64, /* block length of cipher */
-		.blocklen_bytes = 64,
 		.cra_name = "hmac_sha512",
 		.backend_cra_name = "hmac(sha512)",
 	},
 };
 
 static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg);
 
-/******************************************************************
- * Generic helper functions
- ******************************************************************/
-
-/*
- * Return strength of DRBG according to SP800-90A section 8.4
- *
- * @flags DRBG flags reference
- *
- * Return: normalized strength in *bytes* value or 32 as default
- *	   to counter programming errors
- */
-static inline unsigned short drbg_sec_strength(drbg_flag_t flags)
-{
-	switch (flags & DRBG_STRENGTH_MASK) {
-	case DRBG_STRENGTH128:
-		return 16;
-	case DRBG_STRENGTH192:
-		return 24;
-	case DRBG_STRENGTH256:
-		return 32;
-	default:
-		return 32;
-	}
-}
-
 /******************************************************************
  * HMAC DRBG functions
  ******************************************************************/
 
 static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval,
@@ -261,24 +208,24 @@ static int drbg_hmac_update(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
 	LIST_HEAD(vdatalist);
 
 	if (!reseed) {
 		/* 10.1.2.3 step 2 -- memset(0) of C is implicit with kzalloc */
-		memset(drbg->V, 1, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+		memset(drbg->V, 1, DRBG_STATE_LEN);
 		drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(drbg, drbg->C);
 	}
 
-	drbg_string_fill(&seed1, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+	drbg_string_fill(&seed1, drbg->V, DRBG_STATE_LEN);
 	list_add_tail(&seed1.list, &seedlist);
 	/* buffer of seed2 will be filled in for loop below with one byte */
 	drbg_string_fill(&seed2, NULL, 1);
 	list_add_tail(&seed2.list, &seedlist);
 	/* input data of seed is allowed to be NULL at this point */
 	if (seed)
 		list_splice_tail(seed, &seedlist);
 
-	drbg_string_fill(&vdata, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+	drbg_string_fill(&vdata, drbg->V, DRBG_STATE_LEN);
 	list_add_tail(&vdata.list, &vdatalist);
 	for (i = 2; 0 < i; i--) {
 		/* first round uses 0x0, second 0x1 */
 		unsigned char prefix = DRBG_PREFIX0;
 		if (1 == i)
@@ -319,20 +266,20 @@ static int drbg_hmac_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 		ret = drbg_hmac_update(drbg, addtl, 1);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	}
 
-	drbg_string_fill(&data, drbg->V, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+	drbg_string_fill(&data, drbg->V, DRBG_STATE_LEN);
 	list_add_tail(&data.list, &datalist);
 	while (len < buflen) {
 		unsigned int outlen = 0;
 		/* 10.1.2.5 step 4.1 */
 		ret = drbg_kcapi_hash(drbg, drbg->V, &datalist);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
-		outlen = (drbg_blocklen(drbg) < (buflen - len)) ?
-			  drbg_blocklen(drbg) : (buflen - len);
+		outlen = (DRBG_STATE_LEN < (buflen - len)) ?
+			  DRBG_STATE_LEN : (buflen - len);
 
 		/* 10.1.2.5 step 4.2 */
 		memcpy(buf + len, drbg->V, outlen);
 		len += outlen;
 	}
@@ -375,11 +322,11 @@ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
 	case DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL:
 		/*
 		 * Seed source has become fully initialized, frequent
 		 * reseeds no longer required.
 		 */
-		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = DRBG_MAX_REQUESTS;
 		break;
 	}
 
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -387,25 +334,21 @@ static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
 static int drbg_seed_from_random(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	__must_hold(&drbg->drbg_mutex)
 {
 	struct drbg_string data;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
-	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
-	unsigned char entropy[32];
+	unsigned char entropy[DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH];
 	int ret;
 
-	BUG_ON(!entropylen);
-	BUG_ON(entropylen > sizeof(entropy));
-
-	drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, entropylen);
+	drbg_string_fill(&data, entropy, DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH);
 	list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
 
-	get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
+	get_random_bytes(entropy, DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH);
 
 	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true, DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL);
 
-	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen);
+	memzero_explicit(entropy, DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH);
 	return ret;
 }
 
 static bool drbg_nopr_reseed_interval_elapsed(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 {
@@ -442,17 +385,17 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 		     bool reseed)
 	__must_hold(&drbg->drbg_mutex)
 {
 	int ret;
 	unsigned char entropy[((32 + 16) * 2)];
-	unsigned int entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+	unsigned int entropylen;
 	struct drbg_string data1;
 	LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
 	enum drbg_seed_state new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL;
 
 	/* 9.1 / 9.2 / 9.3.1 step 3 */
-	if (pers && pers->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
+	if (pers && pers->len > DRBG_MAX_ADDTL) {
 		pr_devel("DRBG: personalization string too long %zu\n",
 			 pers->len);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -467,13 +410,14 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 		 * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
 		 * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy + nonce is 3/2
 		 * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only
 		 * applicable during initial seeding.
 		 */
-		BUG_ON(!entropylen);
 		if (!reseed)
-			entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3;
+			entropylen = ((DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH + 1) / 2) * 3;
+		else
+			entropylen = DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH;
 		BUG_ON((entropylen * 2) > sizeof(entropy));
 
 		/* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
 		if (!rng_is_initialized())
 			new_seed_state = DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL;
@@ -529,18 +473,18 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 		list_add_tail(&pers->list, &seedlist);
 		pr_devel("DRBG: using personalization string\n");
 	}
 
 	if (!reseed) {
-		memset(drbg->V, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
-		memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+		memset(drbg->V, 0, DRBG_STATE_LEN);
+		memset(drbg->C, 0, DRBG_STATE_LEN);
 	}
 
 	ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed, new_seed_state);
 
 out:
-	memzero_explicit(entropy, entropylen * 2);
+	memzero_explicit(entropy, sizeof(entropy));
 
 	return ret;
 }
 
 /* Free all substructures in a DRBG state without the DRBG state structure */
@@ -568,17 +512,17 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 
 	ret = drbg_init_hash_kernel(drbg);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err;
 
-	drbg->Vbuf = kmalloc(drbg_statelen(drbg) + ret, GFP_KERNEL);
+	drbg->Vbuf = kmalloc(DRBG_STATE_LEN + ret, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!drbg->Vbuf) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fini;
 	}
 	drbg->V = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->Vbuf, ret + 1);
-	drbg->Cbuf = kmalloc(drbg_statelen(drbg) + ret, GFP_KERNEL);
+	drbg->Cbuf = kmalloc(DRBG_STATE_LEN + ret, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!drbg->Cbuf) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fini;
 	}
 	drbg->C = PTR_ALIGN(drbg->Cbuf, ret + 1);
@@ -628,24 +572,23 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 		pr_devel("DRBG: wrong format of additional information\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	/* 9.3.1 step 2 */
-	len = -EINVAL;
-	if (buflen > (drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg))) {
+	if (buflen > DRBG_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES) {
 		pr_devel("DRBG: requested random numbers too large %u\n",
 			 buflen);
-		goto err;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	/* 9.3.1 step 3 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */
 
 	/* 9.3.1 step 4 */
-	if (addtl && addtl->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
+	if (addtl && addtl->len > DRBG_MAX_ADDTL) {
 		pr_devel("DRBG: additional information string too long %zu\n",
 			 addtl->len);
-		goto err;
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	/* 9.3.1 step 5 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */
 
 	/*
 	 * 9.3.1 step 6 and 9 supplemented by 9.3.2 step c is implemented
@@ -721,12 +664,12 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 	unsigned int len = 0;
 	unsigned int slice = 0;
 	do {
 		int err = 0;
 		unsigned int chunk = 0;
-		slice = ((buflen - len) / drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg));
-		chunk = slice ? drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg) : (buflen - len);
+		slice = (buflen - len) / DRBG_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES;
+		chunk = slice ? DRBG_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES : (buflen - len);
 		mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
 		err = drbg_generate(drbg, buf + len, chunk, addtl);
 		mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
 		if (0 > err)
 			return err;
@@ -783,22 +726,21 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
 
 	/* 9.1 step 1 is implicit with the selected DRBG type */
 
 	/*
 	 * 9.1 step 2 is implicit as caller can select prediction resistance
-	 * and the flag is copied into drbg->flags --
 	 * all DRBG types support prediction resistance
 	 */
 
-	/* 9.1 step 4 is implicit in  drbg_sec_strength */
+	/* 9.1 step 4 is implicit in DRBG_SEC_STRENGTH */
 
 	if (!drbg->core) {
 		drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
 		drbg->pr = pr;
 		drbg->seeded = DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED;
 		drbg->last_seed_time = 0;
-		drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+		drbg->reseed_threshold = DRBG_MAX_REQUESTS;
 
 		ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
 		if (ret)
 			goto unlock;
 
@@ -882,11 +824,11 @@ static int drbg_init_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
 		pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate digest TFM handle: %s\n",
 				drbg->core->backend_cra_name);
 		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
 	}
-	BUG_ON(drbg_blocklen(drbg) != crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
+	BUG_ON(DRBG_STATE_LEN != crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm));
 	sdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!sdesc) {
 		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -912,11 +854,11 @@ static int drbg_fini_hash_kernel(struct drbg_state *drbg)
 static void drbg_kcapi_hmacsetkey(struct drbg_state *drbg,
 				  const unsigned char *key)
 {
 	struct sdesc *sdesc = drbg->priv_data;
 
-	crypto_shash_setkey(sdesc->shash.tfm, key, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+	crypto_shash_setkey(sdesc->shash.tfm, key, DRBG_STATE_LEN);
 }
 
 static int drbg_kcapi_hash(struct drbg_state *drbg, unsigned char *outval,
 			   const struct list_head *in)
 {
@@ -1058,11 +1000,10 @@ static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
 	int ret;
 	int rc = -EFAULT;
 	bool pr = false;
 	int coreref = 0;
 	struct drbg_string addtl;
-	size_t max_addtllen, max_request_bytes;
 
 	/* only perform test in FIPS mode */
 	if (!fips_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -1072,28 +1013,26 @@ static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
 	if (!drbg)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	guard(mutex_init)(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
 	drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
-	drbg->reseed_threshold = drbg_max_requests(drbg);
+	drbg->reseed_threshold = DRBG_MAX_REQUESTS;
 
 	/*
 	 * if the following tests fail, it is likely that there is a buffer
 	 * overflow as buf is much smaller than the requested or provided
 	 * string lengths -- in case the error handling does not succeed
 	 * we may get an OOPS. And we want to get an OOPS as this is a
 	 * grave bug.
 	 */
 
-	max_addtllen = drbg_max_addtl(drbg);
-	max_request_bytes = drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg);
-	drbg_string_fill(&addtl, buf, max_addtllen + 1);
+	drbg_string_fill(&addtl, buf, DRBG_MAX_ADDTL + 1);
 	/* overflow addtllen with additional info string */
 	ret = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, OUTBUFLEN, &addtl);
 	BUG_ON(ret == 0);
 	/* overflow max_bits */
-	ret = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, max_request_bytes + 1, NULL);
+	ret = drbg_generate(drbg, buf, DRBG_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES + 1, NULL);
 	BUG_ON(ret == 0);
 
 	/* overflow max addtllen with personalization string */
 	ret = drbg_seed(drbg, &addtl, false);
 	BUG_ON(0 == ret);
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-20  6:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-20  6:33 [PATCH 00/38] Fix and simplify the NIST DRBG implementation Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 01/38] crypto: drbg - Fix returning success on failure in CTR_DRBG Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 02/38] crypto: drbg - Fix misaligned writes in CTR_DRBG and HASH_DRBG Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 03/38] crypto: drbg - Fix ineffective sanity check Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 04/38] crypto: drbg - Fix drbg_max_addtl() on 64-bit kernels Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 05/38] crypto: drbg - Fix the fips_enabled priority boost Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 06/38] crypto: drbg - Remove always-enabled symbol CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 07/38] crypto: drbg - Remove broken commented-out code Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 08/38] crypto: drbg - Remove unhelpful helper functions Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 09/38] crypto: drbg - Remove obsolete FIPS 140-2 continuous test Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 10/38] crypto: drbg - Fold include/crypto/drbg.h into crypto/drbg.c Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 11/38] crypto: drbg - Remove import of crypto_cipher functions Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 12/38] crypto: drbg - Remove support for CTR_DRBG Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  8:07   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2026-04-20 14:40   ` Stephan Mueller
2026-04-20 17:47     ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-20 19:54       ` Stephan Mueller
2026-04-20 20:56         ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-20 20:58           ` Stephan Mueller
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 13/38] crypto: drbg - Remove support for HASH_DRBG Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 14/38] crypto: drbg - Flatten the DRBG menu Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:33 ` [PATCH 15/38] crypto: testmgr - Add test for drbg_pr_hmac_sha512 Eric Biggers
2026-04-20 16:04   ` Joachim Vandersmissen
2026-04-20 17:06     ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 16/38] crypto: testmgr - Update test for drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512 Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 17/38] crypto: drbg - Remove support for HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 18/38] crypto: drbg - Simplify algorithm registration Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 19/38] crypto: drbg - De-virtualize drbg_state_ops Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-04-20 16:06   ` [PATCH 20/38] crypto: drbg - Move fixed values into constants Joachim Vandersmissen
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 21/38] crypto: drbg - Embed V and C into struct drbg_state Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 22/38] crypto: drbg - Use HMAC-SHA512 library API Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 23/38] crypto: drbg - Remove drbg_core Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 24/38] crypto: drbg - Install separate seed functions for pr and nopr Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 25/38] crypto: drbg - Move module aliases to end of file Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 26/38] crypto: drbg - Consolidate "instantiate" logic and remove drbg_state::C Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 27/38] crypto: drbg - Eliminate use of 'drbg_string' and lists Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 28/38] crypto: drbg - Simplify drbg_generate_long() and fold into caller Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 29/38] crypto: drbg - Put rng_alg methods in logical order Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 30/38] crypto: drbg - Fold drbg_instantiate() into drbg_kcapi_seed() Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 31/38] crypto: drbg - Separate "reseed" case in drbg_kcapi_seed() Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 32/38] crypto: drbg - Fold drbg_prepare_hrng() into drbg_kcapi_seed() Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 33/38] crypto: drbg - Simplify "uninstantiate" logic Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 34/38] crypto: drbg - Include get_random_bytes() output in additional input Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 35/38] crypto: drbg - Change DRBG_MAX_REQUESTS to 4096 Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 36/38] crypto: drbg - Remove redundant reseeding based on random.c state Eric Biggers
2026-04-20 16:48   ` Joachim Vandersmissen
2026-04-20 17:25     ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 37/38] crypto: drbg - Clean up generation code Eric Biggers
2026-04-20  6:34 ` [PATCH 38/38] crypto: drbg - Clean up loop in drbg_hmac_update() Eric Biggers

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