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Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Jeffrey Altman , stable@kernel.org Subject: [PATCH net 1/4] rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response() Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 15:58:54 +0100 Message-ID: <20260420145900.1223732-2-dhowells@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <20260420145900.1223732-1-dhowells@redhat.com> References: <20260420145900.1223732-1-dhowells@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.0 on 10.30.177.17 Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free ticket by using a __free() construct rather than explicitly freeing it. Also fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the server key by using a __free() construct. Fixes: 57af281e5389 ("rxrpc: Tidy up abort generation infrastructure") Fixes: ec832bd06d6f ("rxrpc: Don't retain the server key in the connection") Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Howells cc: Marc Dionne cc: Jeffrey Altman cc: Eric Dumazet cc: "David S. Miller" cc: Jakub Kicinski cc: Paolo Abeni cc: Simon Horman cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: stable@kernel.org --- include/linux/key.h | 2 + net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 133 +++++++++++++++----------------------------- 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 81b8f05c6898..1cafbc3827c2 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -304,6 +304,8 @@ extern void key_put(struct key *key); extern bool key_put_tag(struct key_tag *tag); extern void key_remove_domain(struct key_tag *domain_tag); +DEFINE_FREE(key_put, struct key *, if (!IS_ERR(_T)) key_put(_T)) + static inline struct key *__key_get(struct key *key) { refcount_inc(&key->usage); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index eb7f2769d2b1..0acdc46f42c2 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -1131,21 +1131,20 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct rxkad_response *response; struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb); struct rxrpc_crypt session_key; - struct key *server_key; time64_t expiry; - void *ticket; u32 version, kvno, ticket_len, level; __be32 csum; int ret, i; _enter("{%d}", conn->debug_id); - server_key = rxrpc_look_up_server_security(conn, skb, 0, 0); + struct key *server_key __free(key_put) = + rxrpc_look_up_server_security(conn, skb, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(server_key)) { ret = PTR_ERR(server_key); + server_key = NULL; switch (ret) { case -ENOKEY: return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, ret, @@ -1160,16 +1159,15 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, } ret = -ENOMEM; - response = kzalloc_obj(struct rxkad_response, GFP_NOFS); + struct rxkad_response *response __free(kfree) = + kzalloc_obj(struct rxkad_response, GFP_NOFS); if (!response) goto temporary_error; if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header), - response, sizeof(*response)) < 0) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_short); - goto protocol_error; - } + response, sizeof(*response)) < 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_short); version = ntohl(response->version); ticket_len = ntohl(response->ticket_len); @@ -1177,103 +1175,79 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, trace_rxrpc_rx_response(conn, sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len); - if (version != RXKAD_VERSION) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_version); - goto protocol_error; - } + if (version != RXKAD_VERSION) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADINCONSISTENCY, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_version); - if (ticket_len < 4 || ticket_len > MAXKRB5TICKETLEN) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len); - goto protocol_error; - } + if (ticket_len < 4 || ticket_len > MAXKRB5TICKETLEN) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADTICKETLEN, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_len); - if (kvno >= RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt); - goto protocol_error; - } + if (kvno >= RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADUNKNOWNKEY, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_unknown_tkt); /* extract the kerberos ticket and decrypt and decode it */ ret = -ENOMEM; - ticket = kmalloc(ticket_len, GFP_NOFS); + void *ticket __free(kfree) = kmalloc(ticket_len, GFP_NOFS); if (!ticket) - goto temporary_error_free_resp; + goto temporary_error; if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header) + sizeof(*response), - ticket, ticket_len) < 0) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt); - goto protocol_error; - } + ticket, ticket_len) < 0) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADPACKETSHORT, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_short_tkt); ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, server_key, skb, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key, &expiry); if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; + goto temporary_error; /* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the * response */ ret = rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key); if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; + goto temporary_error; if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch || ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid || - ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param); - goto protocol_error_free; - } + ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_param); csum = response->encrypted.checksum; response->encrypted.checksum = 0; rxkad_calc_response_checksum(response); - if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum); - goto protocol_error_free; - } + if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_checksum); for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; i++) { u32 call_id = ntohl(response->encrypted.call_id[i]); u32 counter = READ_ONCE(conn->channels[i].call_counter); - if (call_id > INT_MAX) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid); - goto protocol_error_free; - } - - if (call_id < counter) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr); - goto protocol_error_free; - } - + if (call_id > INT_MAX) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_bad_callid); + if (call_id < counter) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_call_ctr); if (call_id > counter) { - if (conn->channels[i].call) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_call_state); - goto protocol_error_free; - } + if (conn->channels[i].call) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADSEALEDINCON, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_call_state); conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id; } } - if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->rxkad.nonce + 1) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq); - goto protocol_error_free; - } + if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->rxkad.nonce + 1) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_ooseq); level = ntohl(response->encrypted.level); - if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT) { - rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO, - rxkad_abort_resp_level); - goto protocol_error_free; - } + if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT) + return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADLEVELFAIL, -EPROTO, + rxkad_abort_resp_level); conn->security_level = level; /* create a key to hold the security data and expiration time - after @@ -1281,30 +1255,15 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, * as for a client connection */ ret = rxrpc_get_server_data_key(conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno); if (ret < 0) - goto temporary_error_free_ticket; - - kfree(ticket); - kfree(response); + goto temporary_error; _leave(" = 0"); return 0; -protocol_error_free: - kfree(ticket); -protocol_error: - kfree(response); - key_put(server_key); - return -EPROTO; - -temporary_error_free_ticket: - kfree(ticket); -temporary_error_free_resp: - kfree(response); temporary_error: /* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as * ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we * also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails. */ - key_put(server_key); return ret; }