From: Hasan Basbunar <basbunarhasan@gmail.com>
To: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>, Nicolas Schier <nsc@kernel.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Hasan Basbunar <basbunarhasan@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] modpost: prevent stack buffer overflow in do_input_entry()
Date: Mon, 27 Apr 2026 22:42:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260427204255.22117-1-basbunarhasan@gmail.com> (raw)
Several functions in scripts/mod/file2alias.c build the module alias
string by repeatedly appending into a fixed-size on-stack buffer:
char alias[256] = {};
...
sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "%X,*", i);
In do_input_entry() this pattern is unbounded across nine bitmap
classes (evbit/keybit/relbit/absbit/mscbit/ledbit/sndbit/ffbit/swbit).
The keybit case alone scans bits from INPUT_DEVICE_ID_KEY_MIN_INTERESTING
(0x71) to INPUT_DEVICE_ID_KEY_MAX (0x2ff), which is 655 iterations; if
a MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(input, ...) populates keybit[] densely, the
emission reaches ~3132 bytes — overflowing the 256-byte buffer by
about 12x. include/linux/mod_devicetable.h declares storage for the
full bit range ("keybit[INPUT_DEVICE_ID_KEY_MAX / BITS_PER_LONG + 1]"),
so the worst case is reachable per the ABI.
No driver in the current tree triggers this — every in-tree user of
INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_KEYBIT populates keybit[] very sparsely (1-3
bits). The concern is defense-in-depth: the unbounded sprintf is a
silent stack-corruption primitive in a host build tool, and the buffer
size has not been revisited since this code was added in commit
1d8f430c15b3 ("[PATCH] Input: add modalias support", 2005).
Reproduced under AddressSanitizer with a stand-alone harness mirroring
the do_input loop on a fully-populated keybit:
==18319==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow
WRITE of size 2 at offset 288 in frame [32, 288) 'alias'
#6 do_input poc.c:44
Stack-canary build:
Abort trap: 6 (strlen(alias)=3134, cap was 256-1)
Add a small alias_append() helper around vsnprintf with cumulative
bookkeeping. It calls fatal() on overflow, matching the modpost style
for unrecoverable build conditions. do_input() takes the buffer size
as a new parameter; do_input_entry() passes sizeof(alias) at every
call site. This bounds every write into the on-stack buffer and turns
the latent overflow into a clean build error if it is ever reached.
Reported-by: Hasan Basbunar <basbunarhasan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hasan Basbunar <basbunarhasan@gmail.com>
---
scripts/mod/file2alias.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/mod/file2alias.c b/scripts/mod/file2alias.c
index 4e99393a35f1..c377e9a3761c 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/file2alias.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/file2alias.c
@@ -651,7 +651,36 @@ static void do_vio_entry(struct module *mod, void *symval)
module_alias_printf(mod, true, "%s", alias);
}
-static void do_input(char *alias,
+/*
+ * alias_append() — bounded printf into a fixed-size alias buffer.
+ *
+ * Replaces the historical pattern sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), ...) used
+ * across this file. That pattern silently corrupts the stack when the
+ * cumulative formatted output exceeds the destination size; with a
+ * maliciously-crafted MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() input the worst-case emission in
+ * do_input_entry() is about 12x the on-stack 256-byte buffer. Use snprintf
+ * with cumulative bookkeeping and abort the build on overflow.
+ */
+static void __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)))
+alias_append(char *alias, size_t size, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ size_t len = strlen(alias);
+ va_list args;
+ int n;
+
+ if (len >= size)
+ fatal("alias buffer (%zu) overflow before append\n", size);
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ n = vsnprintf(alias + len, size - len, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= size - len)
+ fatal("alias buffer (%zu) overflow on append (need %d, have %zu)\n",
+ size, n, size - len);
+}
+
+static void do_input(char *alias, size_t size,
kernel_ulong_t *arr, unsigned int min, unsigned int max)
{
unsigned int i;
@@ -659,13 +688,14 @@ static void do_input(char *alias,
for (i = min; i <= max; i++)
if (get_unaligned_native(arr + i / BITS_PER_LONG) &
(1ULL << (i % BITS_PER_LONG)))
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "%X,*", i);
+ alias_append(alias, size, "%X,*", i);
}
/* input:b0v0p0e0-eXkXrXaXmXlXsXfXwX where X is comma-separated %02X. */
static void do_input_entry(struct module *mod, void *symval)
{
char alias[256] = {};
+ const size_t sizeof_alias = sizeof(alias);
DEF_FIELD(symval, input_device_id, flags);
DEF_FIELD(symval, input_device_id, bustype);
@@ -687,35 +717,35 @@ static void do_input_entry(struct module *mod, void *symval)
ADD(alias, "p", flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_PRODUCT, product);
ADD(alias, "e", flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_VERSION, version);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "-e*");
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "-e*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_EVBIT)
- do_input(alias, *evbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_EV_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "k*");
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *evbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_EV_MAX);
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "k*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_KEYBIT)
- do_input(alias, *keybit,
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *keybit,
INPUT_DEVICE_ID_KEY_MIN_INTERESTING,
INPUT_DEVICE_ID_KEY_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "r*");
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "r*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_RELBIT)
- do_input(alias, *relbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_REL_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "a*");
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *relbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_REL_MAX);
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "a*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_ABSBIT)
- do_input(alias, *absbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_ABS_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "m*");
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *absbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_ABS_MAX);
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "m*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_MSCIT)
- do_input(alias, *mscbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MSC_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "l*");
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *mscbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MSC_MAX);
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "l*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_LEDBIT)
- do_input(alias, *ledbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_LED_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "s*");
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *ledbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_LED_MAX);
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "s*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_SNDBIT)
- do_input(alias, *sndbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_SND_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "f*");
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *sndbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_SND_MAX);
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "f*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_FFBIT)
- do_input(alias, *ffbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_FF_MAX);
- sprintf(alias + strlen(alias), "w*");
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *ffbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_FF_MAX);
+ alias_append(alias, sizeof_alias, "w*");
if (flags & INPUT_DEVICE_ID_MATCH_SWBIT)
- do_input(alias, *swbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_SW_MAX);
+ do_input(alias, sizeof_alias, *swbit, 0, INPUT_DEVICE_ID_SW_MAX);
module_alias_printf(mod, false, "input:%s", alias);
}
--
2.53.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-04-27 20:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-27 20:42 Hasan Basbunar [this message]
2026-04-28 1:09 ` [PATCH] modpost: prevent stack buffer overflow in do_input_entry() Randy Dunlap
2026-04-28 6:29 ` [PATCH v2] modpost: prevent stack buffer overflow in do_input_entry() and do_dmi_entry() Hasan Basbunar
2026-04-28 6:58 ` Randy Dunlap
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