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AFNElJ+cwe0b2x+MJdzckcbnlIGF1nF97hjgOCpZ7LKsAICGng4lMMVQRiwaemxeJ2LspOOzQ22G+qLXi80jBQc=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YzbrZ0uC9xREUy9uioA1918MHuPXwBX5CukGA8VI4BkTEcolhN0 WwRQunqqM54iie62xcINIpB8ak5BOtCTcbxB7oYovz2a5bohFOzkZ5CghEneCob+NqAFYBwpStf 4C/x/1A== X-Received: from pfjt21.prod.google.com ([2002:a05:6a00:21d5:b0:82f:a2bb:a7cf]) (user=seanjc job=prod-delivery.src-stubby-dispatcher) by 2002:a05:6a00:8009:b0:835:cc47:6ff7 with SMTP id d2e1a72fcca58-83a5eb3a49bmr14404275b3a.50.1778282037655; Fri, 08 May 2026 16:13:57 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: Sean Christopherson Date: Fri, 8 May 2026 16:13:46 -0700 In-Reply-To: <20260508231353.406465-1-seanjc@google.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20260508231353.406465-1-seanjc@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0.563.g4f69b47b94-goog Message-ID: <20260508231353.406465-3-seanjc@google.com> Subject: [PATCH v3 2/9] perf/x86/intel: Don't write PEBS_ENABLED on host<=>guest xfers if CPU has isolation From: Sean Christopherson To: Peter Zijlstra , Ingo Molnar , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Namhyung Kim , Sean Christopherson , Paolo Bonzini Cc: Mark Rutland , Alexander Shishkin , Jiri Olsa , Ian Rogers , Adrian Hunter , James Clark , linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jim Mattson , Mingwei Zhang , Stephane Eranian , Dapeng Mi Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" When filling the list of MSRs to be loaded by KVM on VM-Enter and VM-Exit, *never* insert an entry for PEBS_ENABLED if the CPU properly isolates PEBS events, in which case disabling counters via PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is sufficient to prevent unwanted PEBS events in the guest (or host). Because perf loads PEBS_ENABLE with the unfiltered cpu_hw_events.pebs_enabled, i.e. with both host and guest masks, there is no need to load different values for the guest versus host, perf+KVM can and should simply control which counters are enabled/disabled via PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. Avoiding touching PEBS_ENABLED "fixes" a bug where PEBS_ENABLED can end up with "stuck" bits if a PEBS event is throttled between generating the list and actually entering the guest (Intel CPUs can't arbtitrarily block NMIs). Fixes in quotes because leaving PEBS_ENABLED as-is doesn't fix the underlying problem of perf (via PMIs) being able to modify state after the perf<=>KVM handoff. But not writing PEBS_ENABLED is desirable no matter what, as stating the obvious, leaving PEBS_ENABLED as-is avoids three MSR writes on every VMX transition: one each on entry/exit, and one more explicit WRMSR to zero PEBS_ENABLED before VM-Entry (KVM assumes the only reason PEBS_ENABLED is in the load list is if the CPU lacks isolation and thus needs a quiescent period). Opportunistically add comments to (better) explain the rules for generating the set of PEBS counters that will be active while the guest is running, along with a FIXME for the suspected hack-a-fix where perf disables guest PEBS if _any_ PEBS event is configured to count in the host (commit 854250329c02 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Disable guest PEBS temporarily in two rare situations") doesn't explain the motivation, at all). Fixes: c59a1f106f5c ("KVM: x86/pmu: Add IA32_PEBS_ENABLE MSR emulation for extended PEBS") Cc: Jim Mattson Cc: Mingwei Zhang Cc: Stephane Eranian Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson --- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index b70dc35fcceb..13cd12d3eeee 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -4999,12 +4999,15 @@ static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr, void *data) struct kvm_pmu *kvm_pmu = (struct kvm_pmu *)data; u64 intel_ctrl = hybrid(cpuc->pmu, intel_ctrl); u64 pebs_mask = cpuc->pebs_enabled & x86_pmu.pebs_capable; - int global_ctrl, pebs_enable; + u64 guest_pebs_mask; + int global_ctrl; /* * In addition to obeying exclude_guest/exclude_host, remove bits being * used for PEBS when running a guest, because PEBS writes to virtual - * addresses (not physical addresses). + * addresses (not physical addresses). If the guest wants to utilize + * PEBS, and PEBS can safely enabled in the guest, bits for the guest's + * PEBS-enabled counters will be OR'd back in as appropriate. */ *nr = 0; global_ctrl = (*nr)++; @@ -5051,24 +5054,40 @@ static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr, void *data) }; } - pebs_enable = (*nr)++; - arr[pebs_enable] = (struct perf_guest_switch_msr){ - .msr = MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, - .host = cpuc->pebs_enabled & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask, - .guest = pebs_mask & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask & kvm_pmu->pebs_enable, - }; + /* + * Restrict guest PEBS events to counters that (a) perf supports, (b) + * the guest wants to use for PEBS, (c) are not excluded from counting + * in the guest, and (d) _are_ excluded from counting in the host. + */ + guest_pebs_mask = pebs_mask & intel_ctrl & kvm_pmu->pebs_enable & + ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask & + cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask; - if (arr[pebs_enable].host) { - /* Disable guest PEBS if host PEBS is enabled. */ - arr[pebs_enable].guest = 0; - } else { - /* Disable guest PEBS thoroughly for cross-mapped PEBS counters. */ - arr[pebs_enable].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask; - arr[global_ctrl].guest &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask; - /* Set hw GLOBAL_CTRL bits for PEBS counter when it runs for guest */ - arr[global_ctrl].guest |= intel_ctrl & arr[pebs_enable].guest; - } + /* + * Disable counters where the guest PMC is different than the host PMC + * being used on behalf of the guest, as the PEBS record includes + * PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS, i.e. the guest will see overflow status for the + * wrong counter(s). + */ + guest_pebs_mask &= ~kvm_pmu->host_cross_mapped_mask; + /* + * FIXME: Allow guest and host usage of PEBS events to co-exist instead + * of disabling guest PEBS entirely if the host is using PEBS. + * What exactly goes wrong if guest and host are using PEBS is + * unknown. + */ + if (pebs_mask & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask) + guest_pebs_mask = 0; + + /* + * Do NOT mess with PEBS_ENABLED. As above, disabling counters via + * PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is sufficient, and loading a stale PEBS_ENABLED, + * e.g. on VM-Exit, can put the system in a bad state. Simply enable + * counters in PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, as perf load PEBS_ENABLED with the + * full value, i.e. perf *also* relies on PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL. + */ + arr[global_ctrl].guest |= guest_pebs_mask; return arr; } -- 2.54.0.563.g4f69b47b94-goog