From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
To: yanjun.zhu@linux.dev, zyjzyj2000@gmail.com, jgg@ziepe.ca,
leon@kernel.org
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] RDMA/rxe: fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 09:26:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260709072651.9040-1-security@auditcode.ai> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260708224550.1281-1-security@auditcode.ai>
rxe_qp_from_attr()'s IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC branch frees and
reallocates qp->resp.resources[] (the rd_atomic resource array used by
the responder to track in-flight RDMA READ/ATOMIC/FLUSH requests)
completely outside of the IB_QP_STATE handling above it. Unlike every
other place that tears this array down -- rxe_qp_reset(), reached only
under IB_QP_STATE, always calls rxe_disable_task(&qp->recv_task) /
rxe_disable_task(&qp->send_task) to drain the responder and requester
tasks before touching per-QP state, then re-enables them -- this branch
runs with the responder task (rxe_receiver(), scheduled as recv_task on
the rxe_wq workqueue) fully live and unlocked. A userspace modify_qp()
that sets only IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC (no state change, so
__qp_chk_state()/ib_modify_qp_is_ok() never runs and qp->state_lock is
never taken here) can therefore race the responder in two ways:
1. free_rd_atomic_resources() calls kfree(qp->resp.resources) and
alloc_rd_atomic_resources() kzalloc_objs()'s a new array while
rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() in rxe_resp.c are concurrently
walking &qp->resp.resources[i] with no lock held -- a straight
free-vs-read race on the array itself.
2. free_rd_atomic_resources() only NULLs qp->resp.resources; it never
clears qp->resp.res, the raw pointer *into* that array that
rxe_resp.c caches across a multi-packet RDMA READ/ATOMIC/FLUSH
reply (set at rxe_resp.c read/atomic/flush-reply sites, cleared
only on the normal completion paths). If a modify_qp() races a
resource still referenced by qp->resp.res, the array is freed out
from under the cached pointer and the next reply packet dereferences
it -- independent of the kfree/kzalloc_objs() window in (1).
Reproduced with KASAN: a single process driving one RC QP pair in rxe
loopback, one thread pumping large multi-packet IBV_WR_RDMA_READs
against qpB while a second thread hammers
ibv_modify_qp(qpB, IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC), reliably (~11s) produces
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rxe_receiver+0x4f78/0x89e0 [rdma_rxe]
Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work [rdma_rxe]
with the freed kmalloc-1k object being the rd_atomic resource array
freed by the modify_qp() thread while the recv_task kworker reads it.
An identical run modifying only IB_QP_MIN_RNR_TIMER (no resource free)
is clean.
Fix both races the same way rxe_qp_reset() already handles tearing down
this exact array: quiesce the responder task around the free/realloc by
calling rxe_disable_task(&qp->recv_task) before free_rd_atomic_resources()
and rxe_enable_task(&qp->recv_task) only after alloc_rd_atomic_resources()
has succeeded, so rxe_receiver() cannot observe the array mid-free/
mid-realloc. On the alloc-failure path the responder is deliberately
left quiesced: qp->resp.resources is NULL at that point and
rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() would dereference it, so recv_task
must not be re-enabled until a fresh array has been installed. And
close the still-open window for (2) at the source: have
free_rd_atomic_resources() clear qp->resp.res along with
qp->resp.resources, exactly like the existing completion paths in
rxe_resp.c (check_rkey()/duplicate_request()/RESPST_CLEANUP) already do
when a resource's lifetime ends, so a drained-and-resumed responder
restarts at RESPST_CHK_PSN against the fresh array instead of replaying
a stale reference into the old one.
Only qp->recv_task is drained: qp->resp.resources / qp->resp.res are
touched exclusively by the responder (rxe_resp.c); the requester
(send_task / rxe_sender()) never reads them, so there is no need to
widen this beyond what rxe_qp_reset() would drain for the equivalent
state.
Verified on the same v6.19 KASAN stand: with this fix applied, the
identical differential reproducer drives sustained MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC
storms against qpB well past the ~11s pre-fix time-to-first-splat with
zero KASAN reports, versus reliably tripping the slab-use-after-free in
rxe_receiver() described above before the fix.
Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
---
v2: address Zhu Yanjun's review of v1
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rdma/20260708224550.1281-1-security@auditcode.ai/):
only re-enable recv_task after alloc_rd_atomic_resources() succeeds, so
the responder is not resumed against a NULL qp->resp.resources on the
ENOMEM path (rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() would dereference it).
No change to the successful path; fix description updated accordingly.
drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
index f3dff1aea96a..e39fb144cbbb 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_qp.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static void free_rd_atomic_resources(struct rxe_qp *qp)
}
kfree(qp->resp.resources);
qp->resp.resources = NULL;
+ qp->resp.res = NULL;
}
}
@@ -709,11 +710,24 @@ int rxe_qp_from_attr(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct ib_qp_attr *attr, int mask,
qp->attr.max_dest_rd_atomic = max_dest_rd_atomic;
+ /*
+ * This branch is not gated by IB_QP_STATE, so the responder
+ * task is live here. Quiesce it the way rxe_qp_reset() does
+ * before swapping the rd_atomic resource array, so
+ * rxe_receiver() cannot race the free/realloc.
+ */
+ rxe_disable_task(&qp->recv_task);
free_rd_atomic_resources(qp);
-
err = alloc_rd_atomic_resources(qp, max_dest_rd_atomic);
+ /*
+ * On failure the responder stays quiesced: qp->resp.resources
+ * is NULL now, and rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() would
+ * dereference it, so do not re-enable recv_task until a fresh
+ * array has been installed.
+ */
if (err)
return err;
+ rxe_enable_task(&qp->recv_task);
}
if (mask & IB_QP_EN_SQD_ASYNC_NOTIFY)
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-09 7:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 22:45 [PATCH] RDMA/rxe: fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp Ibrahim Hashimov
2026-07-09 1:22 ` yanjun.zhu
2026-07-09 7:22 ` Ibrahim Hashimov
2026-07-09 7:26 ` Ibrahim Hashimov [this message]
2026-07-09 18:24 ` [PATCH v2] " yanjun.zhu
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