From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
To: dust.li@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: alibuda@linux.alibaba.com, wenjia@linux.ibm.com,
hexlabsecurity@proton.me, tonylu@linux.alibaba.com,
guwen@linux.alibaba.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net/smc: validate peer CDC cursor against RMBE size before accepting it
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 12:29:29 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260722102929.38218-1-security@auditcode.ai> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <amA9XGOWH3z4Z1fu@linux.alibaba.com>
> I believe Bryam already sent a similar patch to the mailist and I have
> already reviewed it.
> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260705-b4-disp-28a1bbca-v4-1-be089b98acc6@proton.me/
Thanks Dust -- yes, that fixes the same bug, so please drop mine. (I sent
a v2 earlier today, before I saw your note, in reply to a sashiko review;
please disregard it as a competing patch.)
One thing worth checking on Bryam's series, though: bounding only the cursor
count (clamping temp.count to rmb_desc->len) still leaves the advance
unbounded. smc_curs_diff() on a wrap increment returns
(size - old.count) + new.count, so a peer that sends prod (wrap=W, count=0)
then prod (wrap=W+1, count=size) makes diff_prod ~= 2*size even though both
counts are in range. smc_cdc_msg_recv_action() then atomic_add()s that into
bytes_to_rcv without clamping (despite the "0 <= bytes_to_rcv <=
rmb_desc->len" comment) -- which is exactly what smc_rx_recvmsg()'s second
copy chunk trusts.
A sashiko review of my patch flagged the same gap; I bounded the advance
too, with:
if (smc_curs_diff(size, &old, &temp) > size)
return;
Might be worth folding into Bryam's version. Happy to send it as a
follow-up if that helps.
Thanks,
Ibrahim
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-22 10:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-20 17:07 [PATCH net] net/smc: validate peer CDC cursor against RMBE size before accepting it Ibrahim Hashimov
2026-07-22 3:47 ` Dust Li
2026-07-22 10:29 ` Ibrahim Hashimov [this message]
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