From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
To: richard@nod.at
Cc: chengzhihao1@huawei.com, s.hauer@pengutronix.de,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check
Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2026 09:43:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260724074327.73582-1-security@auditcode.ai> (raw)
ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
check has the wrong sign:
if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))
The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most
snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)
bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.
snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
(c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
embedded in.
Fixes: 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
---
fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index a4a0158f712d..1f770795ee70 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c,
signode = snod->node;
- if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
+ if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
ubifs_err(c, "invalid signature len %d", le32_to_cpu(signode->len));
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_destroy;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
next reply other threads:[~2026-07-24 7:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-24 7:43 Ibrahim Hashimov [this message]
2026-07-24 9:14 ` [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check Richard Weinberger
2026-07-24 10:55 ` Zhihao Cheng
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