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The flag sets the no_new_privs attribute of the calling thread only once the enforcement of the ruleset succeeded: no_new_privs is set if and only if the landlock_restrict_self(2) call succeeds. Following Mickaël's feedback [2] on v2 [1], the "atomic" framing is gone: this is an ordering guarantee, not atomicity, and the wording now reflects that throughout the series. Semantics: A single call replaces the usual prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) + landlock_restrict_self(2) pair. Because no_new_privs is set by the call itself, the no_new_privs/CAP_SYS_ADMIN precondition is fulfilled by construction, so the flag is usable by unprivileged processes. This is safe for the same reason the prctl(2) pair is: the executed programs can either gain privileges or be restricted, never both. The two states cannot diverge. A failed call (invalid ruleset FD, E2BIG, ENOMEM, interrupted TSYNC, ...) leaves no_new_privs unchanged, and a successful call never returns without no_new_privs set: the attribute is set past the last point of failure, right before commit_creds(), which cannot fail. Combined with LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC, no_new_privs is set on all threads with the same guarantee: each sibling thread sets it in the commit phase of the TSYNC protocol, after its all-or-nothing barrier, so either every thread gets both the domain and no_new_privs, or none does. This also makes it possible to set no_new_privs process-wide in one call, which prctl(2) cannot do. The flag requires a ruleset: calls with a ruleset_fd of -1 are rejected. Such a call would be nothing more than a Landlock-flavored prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS), and rejecting it keeps the option of giving it a meaning later. As a consequence of the fulfilled precondition, an unprivileged caller passing unknown flag bits together with this flag receives EINVAL instead of EPERM; the selftests pin this error ordering as well. The Landlock ABI version is bumped to 11. Test coverage: base_test checks that a successful call sets no_new_privs without a prior prctl(2) nor CAP_SYS_ADMIN, that a failed call (invalid ruleset FD or layer maximum) leaves it unchanged, that the flag requires a ruleset FD, and the updated EPERM/EINVAL ordering. tsync_test checks that TSYNC sets no_new_privs on sibling threads along with the domain, and that a TSYNC call failing on the layer maximum leaves it unset on every thread. Changes since v2: - Reworded "atomically" to the ordering guarantee in the commit messages, kdocs and documentation, per Mickaël's feedback. - Explained the valid-ruleset requirement in the first patch's commit message. - Ran clang-format on the selftests and added max-layers failure tests checking E2BIG and that no_new_privs stays unset. - Mentioned the selftest renames in the commit message. - Updated the documentation tutorial (restrict_flags gated on the ABI version, prctl(2) call skipped when the flag is used) and explained that not setting no_new_privs is risky even when it is not required. - New patch: the sandboxer sample now uses the flag by default, gated on the ABI version, with a prctl(2) fallback. Per-patch changelogs are below each patch. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260717220320.1030123-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260731.at2Zilei1ech@digikod.net/ Justin Suess (4): landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to sampler Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 47 +++++++-- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 13 +++ samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 16 ++- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 28 ++++-- security/landlock/tsync.c | 8 +- security/landlock/tsync.h | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c | 72 ++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 263 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) base-commit: 308bc78f1e577439ca61ec77842a5a3ba7e8bbce -- 2.54.0