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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Simon Richter <Simon.Richter@hogyros.de>
Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/9] crypto: Provide a wrapper for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 19:37:14 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804023714.GA1940@sol> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d7764cb3-152e-4b52-bed3-d23b45fce540@hogyros.de>

On Tue, Aug 04, 2026 at 11:21:30AM +0900, Simon Richter wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On 8/4/26 4:05 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> 
> > I guess we should start using __cleanup with type-specific zeroization
> > functions like this more often.
> Frame challenge: should key material be copied that often that we need a
> mechanism to keep track of it?

This seems to be yet another case where you are responding to some
thread and trying to start a mostly unrelated discussion.

There are many cases where data on the stack can be sensitive, and this
has always been the case.  If __cleanup helps to manage such data, it's
probably worth using more often.

> My feeling is that this wasn't a conscious decision, but is the result of
> two other decisions (that individually make sense): contexts need to be
> self-contained (so need to include key material), and context creation
> should be cheap (so stack contexts are allowed).

The entire point of "crypto_aes_ctx" is that it is an expanded AES key.
The callers of it are using it to compute the round keys.

If you're actually referring to the contexts for per-message incremental
calculation (e.g. sha256_ctx) offered by the library API, those are a
bit different.  Sometimes they contain key material, sometimes they
don't.  Even if the algorithm is unkeyed, it may still contain key
material, since the user could be hashing a key.  Either way, the
finalization function for each algorithm zeroizes it.  The caller needs
to zeroize only if it abandons a context without zeroizing it.

> 2. allow contexts to refer to key material stored elsewhere to avoid the
> copy. That opens the lifetime tracking can of worms, but the on-stack crypto
> context is rather short-lived.

That is already what is being done in most cases.  The exception is the
HMAC library code since the 'ostate' is not very large.  But again the
per-message contexts are supposed to be zeroized anyway.  Also, if the
one-shot functions are used, then no context is exposed to the caller...

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-04  2:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-03  9:44 [PATCH v2 0/9] crypto: Provide a function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 1/9] crypto: Provide a wrapper " Thomas Huth
2026-08-03 19:05   ` Eric Biggers
2026-08-04  2:21     ` Simon Richter
2026-08-04  2:37       ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-08-04  7:42     ` Thomas Huth
2026-08-04 18:54       ` Eric Biggers
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 2/9] crypto: aspeed - clear the crypto_aes_ctx when done Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 3/9] crypto: inside-secure/eip93 " Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 4/9] crypto: padlock-aes " Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 5/9] crypto: sa2ul " Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 6/9] crypto: arm/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 7/9] crypto: arm64/aes-neonbs " Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 8/9] crypto: safexcel - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_clear_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-03  9:44 ` [PATCH v2 9/9] crypto: qat " Thomas Huth

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