From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: moonafterrain@outlook.com
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
sd@queasysnail.net, andrew+netdev@lunn.ch, davem@davemloft.net,
edumazet@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com,
radu-nicolae.pirea@oss.nxp.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, danisjiang@gmail.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] macsec: check offload ops before inserting TX tag
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2026 14:50:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260810215012.869528-1-kuba@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260805-macsec-fixes-v1-1-634d7679a030@outlook.com>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
---
macsec: check offload ops before inserting TX tag
This commit fixes a NULL pointer dereference in macsec_insert_tx_tag().
When phy_detach() clears the lower device's phydev, macsec_get_ops()
returns NULL. This patch adds a check to safely drop the frame instead
of dereferencing the NULL ops pointer.
> diff --git a/drivers/net/macsec.c b/drivers/net/macsec.c
> index ee0e2eb7dbc61..86c8009dcfa98 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/macsec.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/macsec.c
> @@ -3436,6 +3436,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *macsec_insert_tx_tag(struct sk_buff *skb,
> int err;
>
> ops = macsec_get_ops(macsec, &ctx);
> + if (unlikely(!ops)) {
> + err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + goto cleanup;
> + }
> +
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does macsec_insert_tx_tag()
still risk a NULL pointer dereference or Use-After-Free?
Further down in macsec_insert_tx_tag(), we re-read the phydev directly from
the real_dev without any synchronization:
drivers/net/macsec.c:macsec_insert_tx_tag() {
...
phydev = macsec->real_dev->phydev;
...
err = ops->mdo_insert_tx_tag(phydev, skb);
...
}
If phy_detach() runs concurrently and clears real_dev->phydev, couldn't this
pass a NULL or freed pointer to mdo_insert_tx_tag()?
Additionally, macsec_check_offload() and __macsec_get_ops() appear to perform
multiple unguarded reads of macsec->real_dev->phydev. Since
phy_device_release() frees the device directly rather than via RCU, could these
lockless dereferences lead to memory corruption, as the datapath's
rcu_read_lock_bh() doesn't protect the phy_device?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but doesn't the RX datapath have a similar
NULL pointer dereference?
Looking at handle_not_macsec(), if phy_detach() clears real_dev->phydev
concurrently, macsec_get_ops() can return NULL.
drivers/net/macsec.c:handle_not_macsec() {
...
ops = macsec_get_ops(macsec, NULL);
if (ops->rx_uses_md_dst && !is_macsec_md_dst)
continue;
...
}
Since the returned ops pointer is immediately dereferenced without a check,
will this cause a crash when the PHY is detached?
> skb_final_len = skb->len - ETH_HLEN + ops->needed_headroom +
> ops->needed_tailroom;
> if (unlikely(skb_final_len > macsec->real_dev->mtu)) {
--
pw-bot: cr
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-10 21:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-05 4:52 [PATCH net] macsec: check offload ops before inserting TX tag Junrui Luo via B4 Relay
2026-08-06 12:35 ` Antoine Tenart
2026-08-10 21:50 ` Jakub Kicinski [this message]
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