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From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 11/11] lib/crypto: sha2: Provide wrappers for zeroizing SHA2 hmac_sha*_ctx structures
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 15:49:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260813134953.979481-12-thuth@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260813134953.979481-1-thuth@redhat.com>

From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>

Some crypto code functions need to zeroize their local SHA2 hmac_sha*_ctx
structures after use to avoid leaking sensitive material on the stack.
Provide hmac_sha*_zeroize_ctx() helper functions that can be used with
__cleanup() to automatically zeroize the context when it goes out of
scope.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
---
 Note: These will be useful in some spots in the fs/smb/ code later.

 include/crypto/sha2.h | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/crypto/sha2.h b/include/crypto/sha2.h
index 7bb8fe169daf2..2b2b06ebff993 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sha2.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sha2.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #define _CRYPTO_SHA2_H
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
 
 #define SHA224_DIGEST_SIZE	28
 #define SHA224_BLOCK_SIZE	64
@@ -218,6 +219,20 @@ struct hmac_sha224_ctx {
 	struct __hmac_sha256_ctx ctx;
 };
 
+/**
+ * hmac_sha224_zeroize_ctx() - Zeroize an hmac_sha224_ctx structure
+ * @ctx: The location of the context that should be zeroized
+ *
+ * This function explicitly fills the hmac_sha224_ctx with zeroes. For
+ * example, use it with __cleanup() for local hmac_sha224_ctx structures
+ * on the stack, so that their content is not leaked when the context is
+ * left. Note: This is only required when not using hmac_sha224_final().
+ */
+static inline void hmac_sha224_zeroize_ctx(struct hmac_sha224_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
 /**
  * hmac_sha224_preparekey() - Prepare a key for HMAC-SHA224
  * @key: (output) the key structure to initialize
@@ -422,6 +437,20 @@ struct hmac_sha256_ctx {
 	struct __hmac_sha256_ctx ctx;
 };
 
+/**
+ * hmac_sha256_zeroize_ctx() - Zeroize an hmac_sha256_ctx structure
+ * @ctx: The location of the context that should be zeroized
+ *
+ * This function explicitly fills the hmac_sha256_ctx with zeroes. For
+ * example, use it with __cleanup() for local hmac_sha256_ctx structures
+ * on the stack, so that their content is not leaked when the context is
+ * left. Note: This is only required when not using hmac_sha256_final().
+ */
+static inline void hmac_sha256_zeroize_ctx(struct hmac_sha256_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
 /**
  * hmac_sha256_preparekey() - Prepare a key for HMAC-SHA256
  * @key: (output) the key structure to initialize
@@ -631,6 +660,20 @@ struct hmac_sha384_ctx {
 	struct __hmac_sha512_ctx ctx;
 };
 
+/**
+ * hmac_sha384_zeroize_ctx() - Zeroize an hmac_sha384_ctx structure
+ * @ctx: The location of the context that should be zeroized
+ *
+ * This function explicitly fills the hmac_sha384_ctx with zeroes. For
+ * example, use it with __cleanup() for local hmac_sha384_ctx structures
+ * on the stack, so that their content is not leaked when the context is
+ * left. Note: This is only required when not using hmac_sha384_final().
+ */
+static inline void hmac_sha384_zeroize_ctx(struct hmac_sha384_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
 /**
  * hmac_sha384_preparekey() - Prepare a key for HMAC-SHA384
  * @key: (output) the key structure to initialize
@@ -806,6 +849,20 @@ struct hmac_sha512_ctx {
 	struct __hmac_sha512_ctx ctx;
 };
 
+/**
+ * hmac_sha512_zeroize_ctx() - Zeroize an hmac_sha512_ctx structure
+ * @ctx: The location of the context that should be zeroized
+ *
+ * This function explicitly fills the hmac_sha512_ctx with zeroes. For
+ * example, use it with __cleanup() for local hmac_sha512_ctx structures
+ * on the stack, so that their content is not leaked when the context is
+ * left. Note: This is only required when not using hmac_sha512_final().
+ */
+static inline void hmac_sha512_zeroize_ctx(struct hmac_sha512_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
 /**
  * hmac_sha512_preparekey() - Prepare a key for HMAC-SHA512
  * @key: (output) the key structure to initialize
-- 
2.55.0


      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-13 13:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-13 13:49 [PATCH 00/11] libcrypto: Provide more __cleanup functions for zeroizing data Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 01/11] lib/crypto: aes: Provide a wrapper function for zeroizing crypto_aes_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 02/11] crypto: safexcel - Simplify the check for a valid AES key Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 03/11] crypto: safexcel - zeroize crypto_aes_ctx with __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx) Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 04/11] lib/crypto: aes: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_key and aes_enckey Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 05/11] lib/crypto: aes: Use aes_zeroize_*key() instead of memzero_explicit() Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 06/11] lib/crypto: md5: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_md5_ctx structures Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 07/11] lib/crypto: md5: Use hmac_md5_zeroize_ctx() instead of memzero_explicit() Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 08/11] lib/crypto: sha1: Provide a wrapper for zeroizing hmac_sha1_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 09/11] lib/crypto: sha1: Use hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx() instead of memzero_explicit() Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` [PATCH 10/11] x86/purgatory: Compile purgatory.c with -D__NO_FORTIFY Thomas Huth
2026-08-13 13:49 ` Thomas Huth [this message]

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