From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6E419437846; Wed, 19 Aug 2026 13:41:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787146892; cv=none; b=iqXMopUoihD0PR3tEgAxR8DS3uFk8C/SCYPZ+vOp9vClMXMhAlolsjD/mG9BXoBdjoFlYQHTDW4fJ1V/VhnDm0ncFCzMGptD5Mjdh/iVf2mmobhfEWo+95JGqlYxAVcyKZzzqZMgGReVk39E7ZE+bGl78+wA0cD2KHT3VNqcQuE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787146892; c=relaxed/simple; bh=GVNIfzOWjURxXcaf/H66mujwIAWitdrkhZ5E2Iz8sYU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version; b=ts/eoCS87vDsR95uuzofzqU2004SSNshn1Wgd701WAr5GPP1+0Ld3Rmvmh3e6CoFglcv7o7KNsE+Eb3L2WgiLbXBYlI4zew5isAjBbhqyewF4MsTvHlC9sL678DW8yR4EbxBA//+S2l+P6YkYP2VxskgJlqbxcJtehAEg4OwkPQ= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=PC447qCr; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="PC447qCr" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 16F221F00A3A; Wed, 19 Aug 2026 13:41:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1787146889; bh=eO8Z6DIyi7LTcl+hgovHauXM4WisvfWUCh9I38Nciw0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date; b=PC447qCrxnsW+J5yEMe3y17TNx8fuWUF9xZ8+yo81alttRqHtLIb6fij68mJzVHsY B9QzOrjqhgXQE1LRZ2YkVjw6mu1GbAj6oORykMt0dDxHZ4KPo3MbgjFdOj2+hUlCJs WKkfJsHhccS82gyQ9lB85vUA9eQCoa73sJ2N+wbWdobqS8FJzUQdr4Wi7O5ELCa9q/ sLVa+00ICEL40JtIORHTk3u9qqQEyeh1wfTxnOVal/Msp9h8f4D+widSYEcoEbRgz6 9ICGKdczCpfm9gM23FITKEqSQOU+jQuc4brsz0F4ysZnRP+0C+PxXak2XOSOJo5PwA 1kb74v9Mprgwg== Received: from johan by xi.lan with local (Exim 4.99.4) (envelope-from ) id 1wwgXn-00000001Cch-00pN; Wed, 19 Aug 2026 15:41:27 +0200 From: Johan Hovold To: Jonathan Corbet Cc: Shuah Khan , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Willy Tarreau , workflows@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Johan Hovold Subject: [PATCH] docs: threat-model: fix /dev/kmsg reference Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 15:40:39 +0200 Message-ID: <20260819134039.286793-1-johan@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Fix a '/dev/kmsg' reference which got replaced with '/proc/kmsg' (which is not accessible to regular users). Fixes: a03ef333fbd6 ("Documentation: security-bugs: explain what is and is not a security bug") Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold --- Documentation/process/threat-model.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst index a68be888ce8e..04e5df6a6f78 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/threat-model.rst @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document. The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g. -kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to +kernel logs via ``/dev/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these -- 2.54.0