From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 406613101A0; Wed, 26 Aug 2026 10:21:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787739688; cv=none; b=GSk3TNA9YQNZgbqosXYEXpOrjNemuO1iXRyhcuxOdb69I+4yrCE9pCnosh8tcLhfNL2WOeefjufvVMTpBOMBY0OWC6qyBDXQt0Lyugets8jU95zS16JvO2vjoVCviRuCKHZNVyPPISxiUz3Zswis7571MQxozQAQDbJw+xy+wMc= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787739688; c=relaxed/simple; bh=wdUhjAvWmCwybDXFgNLrUkXqyq0KYCJ84+XxCC0jGUs=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=cyPeBuJIK431X1A36tiqTfETeByRXtQ/EwiMCxE3XWAuxUpFa9synW3LDJDYqV6oF5zc0jrwfou1JzTZkVFvjSnvlPyAgf34dAC7taq4OqwbR+HE2pejSNINLvVkx9snBN6sShcToL5Ni3sE6Rn0aAB8OvyKWlBuL/JQ/iS169Q= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=CVWfR1Jo; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="CVWfR1Jo" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 480381F000E9; Wed, 26 Aug 2026 10:21:26 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1787739687; bh=4kGp7jbiECkKrPVW6Fc3c3dk4ftWUNGo399Yq5FH5JU=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=CVWfR1Jo9mzvMKvQmZO6OD06j08dGJab4zqNrAC+P9NjAuwbOqbie1zzJAjFOKsog xPw14I9ZD6SMfxs+rAorhCoMLrrOf/N2wAk6Md58gUq9JvfmpsrGXuIw+C+81fuuCo wkn/bOmlM4MMb25cno8itp/7ul+hgwI/GyXc/8k0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:19:33 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] driver core: add TAINT_FORCED_BIND for when userspace manually messes with devices and drivers Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: <20260826-bind_taint-v1-2-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260826-bind_taint-v1-0-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20260826-bind_taint-v1-0-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org> To: Luis Chamberlain , Petr Pavlu , Daniel Gomez , Sami Tolvanen , Aaron Tomlin , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Randy Dunlap , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Danilo Krummrich , Steven Rostedt , Masami Hiramatsu , Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: linux-modules@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Greg Kroah-Hartman X-Mailer: b4 0.17-dev-362b8 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=9230; i=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=wdUhjAvWmCwybDXFgNLrUkXqyq0KYCJ84+XxCC0jGUs=; b=owGbwMvMwCRo6H6F97bub03G02pJDFl96zevs9vnUnSIKyPRrdqgVHdBxOfZXN8Y1294Kmrtu 6UxRJ+1I5aFQZCJQVZMkeXLNp6j+ysOKXoZ2p6GmcPKBDKEgYtTACbySYNhrnj89ji91hSdmT7b 1jZJNx75+u+LGcNcwU9Pop4bmXtxCDdbim68VxMrlWACAA== X-Developer-Key: i=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org; a=openpgp; fpr=F4B60CC5BF78C2214A313DCB3147D40DDB2DFB29 The ability to add and remove devices from a driver through the sysfs "bind" and "unbind" files was created all those decades ago as a way that kernel developers can iterate faster, and provide a debugging way for users to attempt to add a new device to a driver without having to rebuild their kernel. This api over the years has been abused and recently come under a major fuzzing "attack" through tools like syzbot which decided that it would attempt to just randomly bind any driver to any type of device, causing loads of unneeded errors and pointless kernel patches to be generated by unsuspecting new developers. Handle all of this by adding a new taint flag, TAINT_FORCED_BIND, which will be set on the driver if the bind/unbind sysfs files are ever successfully written to. This lets kernel developers "know" that a user is attempting to do something that is not normal, and as such, if the kernel breaks they get to keep the shiny pieces laying around on the floor. Note, the taint flag gets set _BEFORE_ the bind/unbind callback happens, as many times crashes/oops/warnings/failures happen within the callback, and the taint flag needs to be there to show what was being attempted. If it were to be set after the callback happens, the oops report would not properly reflect what foolishness was being attempted. Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst | 52 ++++++++++++++------------- drivers/base/bus.c | 3 ++ include/linux/panic.h | 3 +- include/trace/events/module.h | 3 +- kernel/panic.c | 5 +-- tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint | 8 +++++ 6 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst index 9ead927a37c0..d4ca8b9e3819 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst @@ -79,30 +79,31 @@ which bits are set:: Table for decoding tainted state ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -=== === ====== ======================================================== -Bit Log Number Reason that got the kernel tainted -=== === ====== ======================================================== - 0 G/P 1 proprietary module was loaded - 1 _/F 2 module was force loaded - 2 _/S 4 kernel running on an out of specification system - 3 _/R 8 module was force unloaded - 4 _/M 16 processor reported a Machine Check Exception (MCE) - 5 _/B 32 bad page referenced or some unexpected page flags - 6 _/U 64 taint requested by userspace application - 7 _/D 128 kernel died recently, i.e. there was an OOPS or BUG - 8 _/A 256 ACPI table overridden by user - 9 _/W 512 kernel issued warning - 10 _/C 1024 staging driver was loaded - 11 _/I 2048 workaround for bug in platform firmware applied - 12 _/O 4096 externally-built ("out-of-tree") module was loaded - 13 _/E 8192 unsigned module was loaded - 14 _/L 16384 soft lockup occurred - 15 _/K 32768 kernel has been live patched - 16 _/X 65536 auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros - 17 _/T 131072 kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin - 18 _/N 262144 an in-kernel test has been run - 19 _/J 524288 userspace used a mutating debug operation in fwctl -=== === ====== ======================================================== +=== === ====== ======================================================== +Bit Log Number Reason that got the kernel tainted +=== === ====== ======================================================== + 0 G/P 1 proprietary module was loaded + 1 _/F 2 module was force loaded + 2 _/S 4 kernel running on an out of specification system + 3 _/R 8 module was force unloaded + 4 _/M 16 processor reported a Machine Check Exception (MCE) + 5 _/B 32 bad page referenced or some unexpected page flags + 6 _/U 64 taint requested by userspace application + 7 _/D 128 kernel died recently, i.e. there was an OOPS or BUG + 8 _/A 256 ACPI table overridden by user + 9 _/W 512 kernel issued warning + 10 _/C 1024 staging driver was loaded + 11 _/I 2048 workaround for bug in platform firmware applied + 12 _/O 4096 externally-built ("out-of-tree") module was loaded + 13 _/E 8192 unsigned module was loaded + 14 _/L 16384 soft lockup occurred + 15 _/K 32768 kernel has been live patched + 16 _/X 65536 auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros + 17 _/T 131072 kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin + 18 _/N 262144 an in-kernel test has been run + 19 _/J 524288 userspace used a mutating debug operation in fwctl + 20 _/Y 1048576 device was manually bound or unbound from a driver +=== === ======= ======================================================== Note: The character ``_`` is representing a blank in this table to make reading easier. @@ -189,3 +190,6 @@ More detailed explanation for tainting 19) ``J`` if userspace opened /dev/fwctl/* and performed a FWTCL_RPC_DEBUG_WRITE to use the devices debugging features. Device debugging features could cause the device to malfunction in undefined ways. + + 20) ``Y`` If userspace wrote to the `bind` or `unbind` sysfs files and + successfully bound or removed a device from a driver. diff --git a/drivers/base/bus.c b/drivers/base/bus.c index d17bd91490ee..c51ad96d4de4 100644 --- a/drivers/base/bus.c +++ b/drivers/base/bus.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "base.h" #include "power/power.h" @@ -241,6 +242,7 @@ static ssize_t unbind_store(struct device_driver *drv, const char *buf, dev = bus_find_device_by_name(bus, NULL, buf); if (dev && dev->driver == drv) { + add_taint_module(drv->owner, TAINT_FORCED_BIND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); device_driver_detach(dev); err = count; } @@ -264,6 +266,7 @@ static ssize_t bind_store(struct device_driver *drv, const char *buf, dev = bus_find_device_by_name(bus, NULL, buf); if (dev && driver_match_device(drv, dev)) { + add_taint_module(drv->owner, TAINT_FORCED_BIND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); err = device_driver_attach(drv, dev); if (!err) { /* success */ diff --git a/include/linux/panic.h b/include/linux/panic.h index f1dd417e54b2..8e7250b0e913 100644 --- a/include/linux/panic.h +++ b/include/linux/panic.h @@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ static inline void set_arch_panic_timeout(int timeout, int arch_default_timeout) #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT 17 #define TAINT_TEST 18 #define TAINT_FWCTL 19 -#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 20 +#define TAINT_FORCED_BIND 20 +#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 21 #define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX ((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1) struct taint_flag { diff --git a/include/trace/events/module.h b/include/trace/events/module.h index e5a006be9dc6..19df3e39bba4 100644 --- a/include/trace/events/module.h +++ b/include/trace/events/module.h @@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ struct module; { (1UL << TAINT_OOT_MODULE), "O" }, \ { (1UL << TAINT_FORCED_MODULE), "F" }, \ { (1UL << TAINT_CRAP), "C" }, \ - { (1UL << TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE), "E" }) + { (1UL << TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE), "E" }, \ + { (1UL << TAINT_FORCED_BIND), "Y" }) TRACE_EVENT(module_load, diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 213725b612aa..6bf60f9dd120 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -826,6 +826,7 @@ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = { TAINT_FLAG(RANDSTRUCT, 'T', ' '), TAINT_FLAG(TEST, 'N', ' '), TAINT_FLAG(FWCTL, 'J', ' '), + TAINT_FLAG(FORCED_BIND, 'Y', ' '), }; #undef TAINT_FLAG @@ -862,9 +863,9 @@ static void print_tainted_seq(struct seq_buf *s, bool verbose) * exact size is allocated dynamically; the initial buffer remains * as a fallback if allocation fails. * - * The verbose taint string currently requires up to 327 characters. + * The verbose taint string currently requires up to 344 characters. */ -#define INIT_TAINT_BUF_MAX 350 +#define INIT_TAINT_BUF_MAX 370 static char init_taint_buf[INIT_TAINT_BUF_MAX] __initdata; static char *taint_buf __refdata = init_taint_buf; diff --git a/tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint b/tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint index e1571c04afb5..d8628be37214 100755 --- a/tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint +++ b/tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint @@ -211,6 +211,14 @@ else addout "J" echo " * fwctl's mutating debug interface was used (#19)" fi + +T=`expr $T / 2` +if [ `expr $T % 2` -eq 0 ]; then + addout " " +else + addout "Y" + echo " * device was manually bound or unbound from a driver (#20)" +fi echo "Raw taint value as int/string: $taint/'$out'" # report on any tainted loadable modules -- 2.55.0