From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: joasantonio108@gmail.com
Cc: david@ixit.cz, krzk@kernel.org, oe-linux-nfc@lists.linux.dev,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v3 2/2] nfc: st21nfca: prevent double completion of SE APDU request
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:05:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261118100523.GC860048@horms.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261112-st21nfca-v2-v3-2-c81702269e01@gmail.com>
On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 01:39:30PM +0000, Joas Antonio dos Santos via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Joas Antonio dos Santos <joasantonio108@gmail.com>
>
> Use the spinlock added in the previous commit to prevent completing an
> SE APDU request more than once. Without this, the timeout work handler
> (st21nfca_se_wt_work) and the EVT_TRANSMIT_DATA event handler can both
> invoke the callback for the same request. The callback frees its
> context, so the second call is a use-after-free followed by a double
> free.
>
> Check bwi_active under the lock in both completion paths and only
> complete a request that is still pending. A response that arrives
> after the timeout still gets its EVT_SE_END_OF_APDU_TRANSFER, as
> before, but no callback.
>
> Also reject a new SE APDU request in st21nfca_hci_se_io() with -EBUSY
> while one is in progress, instead of overwriting the callback and
> context of the pending request. The callback is not called in that
> case, so free the context like the -ENODEV path does; nfc_se_io() does
> not free it once the driver has been called.
>
> Found by LLM-assisted manual code review.
>
> Fixes: 2130fb97fecf ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding support for secure element")
> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Joas Antonio dos Santos <joasantonio108@gmail.com>
Hi Joas,
Sashiko.dev has provided an AI-generated review of this patch at
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261112-st21nfca-v2-v3-0-c81702269e01%40gmail.com?part=2
It raises two issues.
Issue 1:
> diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c
> index 03a30f797ff8f..63a88a61d310f 100644
> --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c
> +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c
> @@ -228,6 +228,12 @@ int st21nfca_hci_se_io(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, u32 se_idx,
> switch (se_idx) {
> case ST21NFCA_ESE_HOST_ID:
> spin_lock(&info->se_info.se_lock);
> + if (info->se_info.bwi_active) {
> + spin_unlock(&info->se_info.se_lock);
> + /* The callback is not called, see the comment below */
> + kfree(cb_context);
> + return -EBUSY;
> + }
> info->se_info.cb = cb;
> info->se_info.cb_context = cb_context;
> info->se_info.bwi_active = true;
What happens if nfc_hci_send_event() fails at the end of this case?
drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c:st21nfca_hci_se_io() {
...
info->se_info.bwi_active = true;
spin_unlock(&info->se_info.se_lock);
mod_timer(&info->se_info.bwi_timer, jiffies +
msecs_to_jiffies(info->se_info.wt_timeout));
return nfc_hci_send_event(hdev, ST21NFCA_APDU_READER_GATE,
ST21NFCA_EVT_TRANSMIT_DATA,
apdu, apdu_length);
...
}
When nfc_hci_send_event() returns a synchronous error such as
-EADDRNOTAVAIL, info->se_info.bwi_active stays true and
info->se_info.bwi_timer remains armed. With the new -EBUSY check, every
later st21nfca_hci_se_io() call is rejected until the timer expires, at
which point st21nfca_se_wt_work() sends a spurious reset to the secure
element and invokes cb(cb_context, NULL, 0, -ETIME) for a request that
already failed synchronously.
It seems to me that while this is worth checking into, it may well
be theoretical or unreachable. In which case I think any solution
need not be included in this patch-set.
Issue 2:
> @@ -269,6 +275,10 @@ static void st21nfca_se_wt_work(struct work_struct *work)
> se_info.timeout_work);
>
> spin_lock(&info->se_info.se_lock);
> + if (!info->se_info.bwi_active) {
> + spin_unlock(&info->se_info.se_lock);
> + return;
> + }
> info->se_info.bwi_active = false;
> cb = info->se_info.cb;
> cb_context = info->se_info.cb_context;
> @@ -383,6 +393,7 @@ int st21nfca_apdu_reader_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev,
> u8 event, struct sk_buff *skb)
> {
> int r = 0;
> + bool active;
> se_io_cb_t cb;
> void *cb_context;
> struct st21nfca_hci_info *info = nfc_hci_get_clientdata(hdev);
> @@ -395,6 +406,7 @@ int st21nfca_apdu_reader_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev,
> cancel_work_sync(&info->se_info.timeout_work);
>
> spin_lock(&info->se_info.se_lock);
> + active = info->se_info.bwi_active;
> info->se_info.bwi_active = false;
> cb = info->se_info.cb;
> cb_context = info->se_info.cb_context;
> @@ -405,7 +417,9 @@ int st21nfca_apdu_reader_event_received(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev,
> if (r < 0)
> goto exit;
>
> - cb(cb_context, skb->data, skb->len, 0);
> + /* The request may have been completed by the timeout already */
> + if (active)
> + cb(cb_context, skb->data, skb->len, 0);
> break;
Can a late ST21NFCA_EVT_TRANSMIT_DATA from a timed-out request complete a
newly submitted request instead?
CPU0 (timeout_work) CPU1 (msg_rx_work) CPU2 (syscall)
st21nfca_se_wt_work() st21nfca_apdu_reader_event_received()
spin_lock(&se_lock) timer_delete_sync()
bwi_active = false cancel_work_sync()
spin_unlock(&se_lock)
st21nfca_hci_se_io()
spin_lock(&se_lock)
cb = req2_cb
cb_context = req2_ctx
bwi_active = true
spin_unlock(&se_lock)
mod_timer(&bwi_timer)
nfc_hci_send_event(reset)
req1_cb(req1_ctx, -ETIME)
spin_lock(&se_lock)
active = bwi_active (true)
bwi_active = false
cb = req2_cb
cb_context = req2_ctx
spin_unlock(&se_lock)
...
req2_cb(req2_ctx, req1_skb) <-- wrong request
Once st21nfca_se_wt_work() clears info->se_info.bwi_active and drops
info->se_info.se_lock, a new st21nfca_hci_se_io() call can install a second
request before st21nfca_apdu_reader_event_received() acquires se_lock (or
before a late response from the first request arrives). The first
request's response then completes and frees the second request's
cb_context with stale data, while st21nfca_se_wt_work() can also queue its
reset after the new request.
In addition, because both st21nfca_apdu_reader_event_received() above and
st21nfca_hci_se_io() call timer_delete_sync() / mod_timer() outside
se_lock, info->se_info.bwi_timer can remain armed after bwi_active is set
to false; st21nfca_se_deinit() only deletes bwi_timer when bwi_active is
true, so removing the device before the timer expires can then trigger a
use-after-free.
This seems to be a problem, but it also seems to be related to the
tear-down race flagged in patch 1/2. And as per my opinion there,
I think this is likely out-of scope for this patch-set.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 10:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-12 13:39 [PATCH net v3 0/2] nfc: st21nfca: fix SE APDU request race condition Joas Antonio dos Santos via B4 Relay
2026-11-12 13:39 ` [PATCH net v3 1/2] nfc: st21nfca: add spinlock to serialize SE APDU request state Joas Antonio dos Santos via B4 Relay
2026-11-18 10:05 ` Simon Horman
2026-11-12 13:39 ` [PATCH net v3 2/2] nfc: st21nfca: prevent double completion of SE APDU request Joas Antonio dos Santos via B4 Relay
2026-11-18 10:05 ` Simon Horman [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261118100523.GC860048@horms.kernel.org \
--to=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=david@ixit.cz \
--cc=joasantonio108@gmail.com \
--cc=krzk@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=oe-linux-nfc@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox