From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795196475; b=ReV8wH/qP8mtWYO1MKQiV24ajnjH52dhmzCAdDmL4eQ+te8V2Ot/lOGIQxqIRAVFra+r T5wtNN1yKgNHcx7kreruyBe0V/jj7AC9I3/CEZF5LjgXggEh/HGzAhM2a6pXcXKa9q/Vc e9ZJofR6lJUJv/1MOpEpbGfjk5A78LewUdAdlIBSFt2QqvXp4yxK0XsmJYCKwqyH5ycT2 yKQR0TCg4Vmxz9eSwARDw2oKQoD/S1lpolFyRxb8csdlNRFBTA47raGPvv7P5BIkrYQN9 /hlo6p45PSw1w55/7PWQj7siwY08BhFbMkPXqOTK9+yXD/J3uvKHKIKKZeOgBQgT+BA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795196475; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Received:Message-ID:User-Agent:Date:From:To: Cc:Subject:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type; bh=IHp1ZPkYUZ83/9+/+lvmjSITnZBCSqciGUD+Oh9oFmk=; b=eLDnHrY/mMYkEVbWLnkO8IFqA0lu++4DCqxkiiUUi4VuqoPLljVdD0K3TdPQBfSbi9Rm hhAjfv8sqve0rHxhbdowge7GTpI9RBVfvim2SdkOXdeITiYaa6pMoIiS2Y1rKtPPRIOD1 Z5duac/DpKKYmhn/BST7jUSrGVydHTVF4PGJl7XqoKLkRY8si5JL1ffg+CWCR5wom3T7w v3HIlNVejf+omlJ47OnE9nFJOVpuqDe7xLPTOIqAG9aS/CeoK59fd1/Hw7A0K3JjIMmZr IybiRfb554GJ467gU+51VDDDq1Y3u4+Pjc0qdjwqNYfKDpl6XVeqS6mCtNwNVES8wcw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=lk0khO1n; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9E57A60A260A for ; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 17:41:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=lk0khO1n Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6DC631F000EF; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 17:41:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795196475; bh=IHp1ZPkYUZ83/9+/+lvmjSITnZBCSqciGUD+Oh9oFmk=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References; b=lk0khO1nivBVhNMBm/MVwOSJZEvJYz7sWw7WZQ08K0K5uCRfsYtqCwVzDmUYfCqnj m+BkaQtgNOcbjyfC6g/IX7yMEGOU2rzo8JgAAfk0E0Ui8X2J/dQvEjQ7ih0XkiRPJq wrEUSXW0R0fixBapzElgeeJruAn1of3P6JYV21geqiCSJ4qlB6w52Sgc1v3WZfIBx0 qUPqzIQLSdrcnRddhdYKTIV2bs/o97eTgKXJc5Xt2qveHoQY/GTWBWWQ191kuqQ834 s9U7G8U2iJX1gpwA5zOlumr1fh46vsZATUYzMBYFkqLfD5bf3Xr8Qok67a9hUVsZr0 1ZXvvDVQaBwgA== Received: from rostedt by gandalf with local (Exim 4.100.1) (envelope-from ) id 1xUSbq-00000004aFs-37rD; Fri, 20 Nov 2026 12:41:14 -0500 Message-ID: <20261120174114.544875377@kernel.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 12:38:55 -0500 From: Steven Rostedt To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu , Mark Rutland , Mathieu Desnoyers , Andrew Morton , Kyle Zeng Subject: [for-linus][PATCH 03/32] tracing: Restrict perf filters that read kernel strings References: <20261120173852.687189370@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 From: Kyle Zeng A task-bound, counting-only syscall tracepoint can be opened without permission to read raw kernel tracepoint data. Setting exclude_kernel does not prevent its filter from running: perf_syscall_enter() submits the saved user-mode registers. Pointer-string filters use FILTER_PRED_FN_PCHAR by default, which reads through strncpy_from_kernel_nofault(). For sys_enter_openat, for example, the filename field comes directly from a syscall argument. An unprivileged caller can pass a kernel address, install a filter such as 'filename ~ "Linux version*"', and use the event count to test the contents of kernel memory, even with perf_event_paranoid=2. Check the compiled filter before installing it and require the same kernel and raw-tracepoint permissions as access to raw kernel tracepoint data for FILTER_PRED_FN_PCHAR. Inspect every predicate so that other events, operators, and boolean expressions cannot bypass the check. Return the permission error through the existing cleanup path before publishing the filter. Keep user-pointer (.ustring) and record-local predicates available under the existing policy. This leaves tracefs filtering and authorized kernel string filtering unchanged. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261006224005.49636-1-kylebot@openai.com Fixes: 5967bd5c4239 ("tracing: Let filter_assign_type() detect FILTER_PTR_STRING") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6-astra Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt --- kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c index c10951bcfc5f..cd0da148414d 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_filter.c @@ -2749,6 +2749,28 @@ static int ftrace_function_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, } #endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER */ +static int ftrace_profile_filter_perm(struct event_filter *filter) +{ + struct prog_entry *prog = rcu_dereference_protected(filter->prog, + lockdep_is_held(&event_mutex)); + int i, err; + + for (i = 0; prog[i].pred; i++) { + if (prog[i].pred->fn_num != FILTER_PRED_FN_PCHAR) + continue; + + /* + * Even a counting filter can reveal kernel string data. + * Require the same access as raw kernel tracepoints. + */ + err = perf_allow_kernel(); + if (err) + return err; + return perf_allow_tracepoint(); + } + return 0; +} + int ftrace_profile_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, int event_id, char *filter_str) { @@ -2770,6 +2792,10 @@ int ftrace_profile_set_filter(struct perf_event *event, int event_id, if (err) goto free_filter; + err = ftrace_profile_filter_perm(filter); + if (err) + goto free_filter; + if (ftrace_event_is_function(call)) err = ftrace_function_set_filter(event, filter); else -- 2.53.0